Which leaders will leave office in 2026?

Benjamin Netanyahu faces significant electoral challenges potentially ending his tenure by late 2026. A constitutionally mandated national election is scheduled for the end of October 2026, which current widespread polling indicates he is projected to lose ^{[^][^][^][^]}. This upcoming election was triggered by a governing coalition collapse, largely due to the withdrawal of ultra-Orthodox support following the failure of draft exemption legislation ^{[^][^][^]}. Contributing factors to the anticipated electoral defeat include public discontent over his management of the October 7 intelligence failure and subsequent conflict, his judicial reform initiatives, and perceived inequalities in military conscription ^{[^][^][^]}.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to remain in power until at least 2028. His presidential elections are not formally scheduled until 2028, and he possesses the constitutional authority to call for early elections ^{[^][^][^]}. However, the available research does not identify specific catalysts that could compel his removal from office before the conclusion of 2026 ^{[^][^][^]}. Erdoğan's primary strategy involves intensifying authoritarian measures to neutralize political opponents. This includes recent court-ordered interventions in the internal leadership elections of the main opposition party (CHP), designed to foster organizational exhaustion within the opposition ahead of any potential future election cycle ^{[^][^]}.

Javier Milei's political stability through 2026 is robustly supported. The decisive victory of his party in the October 2025 midterm legislative elections significantly bolstered his legislative influence and capacity to uphold vetoes ^{[^][^][^]}. This improved political standing is further corroborated by prediction markets in mid-2026, which assign a very low probability, approximately 9.3%, to Milei leaving office before January 1, 2027, indicating a strong market consensus on his continued tenure ^{[^][^]}. In terms of legislative performance, Milei's administration transitioned from an initial period of gridlock to enhanced cooperation by late 2025 ^{[^][^]}. This shift led to significant legislative achievements in December 2025, including the approval of a national budget—the first in two years—alongside key reforms such as the labor reform and a new Penal Juvenile Regime ^{[^][^]}.

Early 2026 economic indicators reveal both stabilization and ongoing challenges. The period showed signs of stabilization and recovery, particularly evidenced by positive shifts in industrial production and domestic market indicators by March of that year ^{[^][^][^]}. Despite these improvements, the nation continues to grapple with significant economic hardships, notably high unemployment, which stood at 7.5% at the end of 2025, underscoring persistent challenges ^{[^][^][^]}.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy maintains wartime support, shielded from immediate electoral removal. Despite increasing domestic and international pressures, his political position is bolstered by martial law, extended until at least August 2, 2026, which legally precludes presidential and parliamentary elections ^{[^]}. Zelenskyy's personal approval rating stabilized at 62% in March 2026, though public trust in broader national leadership was lower at 46% in 2025 ^{[^][^][^]}. However, allegations of corruption, including a significant scandal in late 2025, have eroded public trust and international standing, leading to increased pressure from international partners for Ukraine to hold elections in 2026 ^{[^][^][^]}.

Netanyahu faces severe instability, likely departing office in 2026. In stark contrast, Benjamin Netanyahu's government in Israel is experiencing profound instability, marked by severe internal coalition fractures and significant public dissatisfaction. His government’s reliance on ultra-Orthodox parties and the contentious issue of military draft exemptions for these groups critically threatens its stability ^{[^][^][^][^][^]}. By May 2026, legislative steps to dissolve the Knesset had advanced, with 110 out of 120 members supporting the move, signaling deep internal divisions that could trigger early elections ^{[^][^][^][^][^]}. Netanyahu's personal approval remained around 40% in 2025 ^{[^]}, but by May 2026, 55% of Israelis desired his retirement from politics, with recent polls suggesting his coalition would lose its majority if elections were held ^{[^]}. The combination of advanced legislative action for Knesset dissolution, deep coalition divides, and consistent polling pointing to a loss of majority makes his departure from office in 2026 highly probable ^{[^][^][^][^][^][^]}. Prediction market pricing in May 2026 also indicated a 52.5% "YES" for "Netanyahu Out by end of 2026?" ^{[^]}. Conversely, Zelenskyy, while facing long-term pressures, is shielded from immediate electoral removal by martial law until at least August 2, 2026, and maintains relatively robust public support in the wartime context ^{[^][^][^][^]}, making his departure in 2026 less likely than Netanyahu's, barring specific circumstances.

Vladimir Putin faces significant non-electoral risks in 2026, primarily economic and elite-driven. These include mounting economic distress, declining public trust, and intensifying competition and tensions among Russian political and business elites ^{[^][^][^][^]}. Analysts suggest a potential crisis of power or an elite revolt could emerge, driven by economic and military failures related to the war in Ukraine. In response, the Kremlin is observed consolidating power through intensified repression of elites via a 'new oprichnina' ^{[^]}.

Despite systemic issues, analysts predict no imminent leadership change in Russia or China. Most analysts do not foresee an imminent collapse or leadership change in Russia by 2026 ^{[^][^][^][^]}. Both China and Russia maintain highly controlled political environments that effectively suppress or criminalize non-electoral, organized opposition, making traditional forms of internal political challenge exceptionally difficult ^{[^][^]}. While prediction markets for 2026 feature active contracts on leadership outcomes for major global figures, including Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin ^{[^]}, the available information does not detail specific non-electoral risks for Xi Jinping beyond general opposition suppression, nor does it contain details on health crises or major protests for either leader in 2026.

President Cyril Ramaphosa firmly rejects resignation, challenging impeachment over the Phala Phala scandal. In May 2026, he explicitly stated he would not resign, even after a Constitutional Court ruling revived his Phala Phala impeachment process ^{[^][^][^]}

In a national address on May 11, 2026, Ramaphosa rejected calls for his resignation, describing them as attempts to destabilise the country. He also announced plans to challenge the Section 89 panel report, which found that he may have violated his oath of office over the handling of foreign currency stolen from his farm in 2020.

Several significant leadership transitions are anticipated or have been announced for 2026. Bulgarian President Rumen Radev announced his resignation, effective January 20, 2026, to pursue active politics ^{[^]}. Similarly, Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah agreed to resign on or around May 28, 2026, following a directive from the Congress party high command ^{[^][^][^]}. In the United States, numerous House members have announced plans not to seek re-election or have resigned in 2026, including figures such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, with others moving to statewide offices ^{[^][^][^]}.

Looking beyond 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron has stated his intention to exit active politics following the completion of his second term in 2027 [^] [^] . These political events, including leadership transitions, election schedules, and policy deadlines, are increasingly being tracked by prediction markets such as Polymarket and Kalshi throughout 2026, despite growing regulatory scrutiny from the CFTC and legislative bodies ^{[^][^][^]}.