Which companies will the US take a stake in this year?
Short Answer
Both the model and the market expect TikTok US to be the company the US takes a stake in this year, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.
1. Executive Verdict
- A potential Trump administration may seek equity stakes in chip makers.
- Government equity could be required in exchange for subsidies.
- DoD's Office of Strategic Capital strengthens the defense industrial base.
- Executive branch may use DPA Title III for acquiring equity stakes.
- Boeing's financial health indicators suggest a high risk of distress.
- Geopolitical events or financial distress can trigger US stakes.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anduril | 20.0% | 20.1% | Model higher by 0.1pp |
| Anthropic | 9.0% | 20.1% | Model higher by 11.1pp |
| Palantir | 12.0% | 20.1% | Model higher by 8.1pp |
| Lockheed Martin | 20.0% | 20.1% | Model higher by 0.1pp |
| Nvidia | 9.0% | 20.1% | Model higher by 11.1pp |
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
Based on the provided chart data, the prediction market for "Which companies will the US take a stake in this year?" has exhibited a stable, sideways trading pattern. The price has been confined to a very narrow 2-percentage-point range, fluctuating between a support level at 12.0% and a resistance level at 14.0%. The market opened at 14.0% and is currently trading at 13.0%, indicating a slight negative drift over the period. There have been no significant price spikes or drops; the movement has been minimal and contained within this established range.
The total volume of 741 contracts is relatively low, and the sample data points show days with zero volume, suggesting infrequent trading activity and low market liquidity. This lack of volume indicates that there is little new information or conviction driving traders to take significant positions. Given the absence of any specific news or context, the minor price fluctuations, such as the drop from 14.0% to 13.0%, cannot be attributed to any external event and likely reflect small, isolated trades rather than a broad shift in market opinion.
Overall, the market sentiment appears to be one of stable, low expectation. The consistent trading within a low-probability band (12-14%) suggests that participants consistently view the US government taking a stake in a company as an unlikely event. The sideways trend and low volume reinforce this interpretation, pointing to a market that is waiting for a significant catalyst to shift its assessment, but none has emerged thus far.
3. Significant Price Movements
Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.
📉 March 24, 2026: 11.0pp drop
Price decreased from 18.0% to 7.0%
Outcome: Palantir
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
4. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
The market resolves to YES if any part of the U.S. federal government acquires a direct equity stake or equivalent ownership interest in Anduril before January 1, 2027, as reported by official or specified news sources; otherwise, it resolves to NO. Taking a stake includes direct equity, voting shares, indirect ownership, and convertible rights, but excludes non-equity instruments like bonds or loans. The market will close early upon such an acquisition announcement, or by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM EST, with projected payout 30 minutes after closing.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anduril | $0.21 | $0.82 | 20% |
| Lockheed Martin | $0.20 | $0.84 | 20% |
| Boeing | $0.19 | $0.85 | 18% |
| OpenAI | $0.15 | $0.86 | 15% |
| Eli Lilly | $0.13 | $0.88 | 13% |
| Micron | $0.15 | $0.87 | 13% |
| TikTok US | $0.13 | $0.89 | 13% |
| Palantir | $0.12 | $0.90 | 12% |
| Freeport-McMoRan | $0.11 | $0.91 | 10% |
| Anthropic | $0.09 | $0.92 | 9% |
| D-Wave Quantum | $0.07 | $0.94 | 9% |
| Nvidia | $0.10 | $0.95 | 9% |
| TSMC | $0.10 | $0.91 | 9% |
| IonQ | $0.09 | $0.96 | 8% |
| Pfizer | $0.08 | $0.97 | 8% |
| Rigetti Computing | $0.07 | $0.96 | 8% |
| GlobalFoundries | $0.08 | $0.93 | 6% |
Market Discussion
Traders are discussing the likelihood of the US government taking stakes in defense and technology firms. Arguments for a 'Yes' on Lockheed Martin focus on ongoing global conflicts as a potential driver for government investment in defense contractors. However, 'No' arguments, like for Anduril, suggest the government wouldn't interfere with successful, private companies, with the low market probabilities for all listed companies reflecting a general consensus against such acquisitions.
5. Will a Trump Administration Take Equity in Chip Makers?
| Potential Equity Stakes | Considered for chip makers receiving CHIPS Act funds [^] |
|---|---|
| Company Cited for Equity | Intel is specifically mentioned [^] |
| Exempt from Equity Demands | TSMC and Micron may be exempt if increasing U.S. investment [^] |
A potential Trump administration may seek equity stakes in chip makers. This administration is reportedly considering requiring government equity stakes from semiconductor manufacturers that receive CHIPS Act funds [^]. Howard Lutnick, CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, has publicly discussed these plans, suggesting that grants provided under the CHIPS Act could be converted into government equity to ensure a return for taxpayers, specifically citing Intel as an example [^]. This policy aims to bolster domestic manufacturing and counter foreign influence in critical sectors.
Equity stake demands would likely exclude significant U.S. investors. This strategy appears to differentiate based on a company's investment in the U.S. While Intel is frequently cited as a company whose CHIPS Act grants might be converted into government equity [^], sources indicate that a potential Trump administration might not pursue equity stakes in firms significantly increasing U.S. investment [^]. Examples such as TSMC and Micron are mentioned as companies likely to be excluded from such demands due to their substantial U.S. investments [^].
Information on AI company equity stakes remains undefined. Peter Navarro, identified as a chief trade strategist for a potential Trump administration, has commented on the market performance of "AI stocks" [^]. However, the available research does not detail specific stances from these advisors or a potential Trump administration regarding the use of government equity stakes in AI companies like OpenAI or Anthropic to counter China's influence. The focus of the available information on equity stakes primarily revolves around semiconductor manufacturers receiving CHIPS Act funding [^].
6. How Does the DoD's Office of Strategic Capital Facilitate Investments?
| Establishment | Section 903, FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) [^] |
|---|---|
| Primary Investment Mechanism | Loan guarantees to de-risk private financing [^] |
| Targeted Private Capital Unlocked | Up to $100 billion [^] or hundreds of billions of dollars [^] |
The Department of Defense (DoD) established the Office of Strategic Capital to strengthen the defense industrial base. Created by Section 903 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) operates within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) [^]. This office serves as a primary vehicle to facilitate investment in strategic companies [^], with its mandate focusing on addressing key investment gaps and enabling the scaling of emerging technologies vital for national security [^].
OSC primarily uses loan guarantees to attract private capital, not equity investments. The OSC's main mechanism for achieving its objectives involves providing loan guarantees to de-risk private financing, thereby attracting private capital into strategic companies [^]. Critically, the DoD explicitly states that the OSC program "does not take an equity stake in companies" [1, p. 10]. These guarantees, detailed in the OSC's investment strategies for FY24 and FY25, are designed to unlock substantial private capital, projected to be "up to $100 billion" [^] or "hundreds of billions of dollars" [^]. The program supports critical technology sectors, including artificial intelligence, advanced materials, hypersonics, and quantum computing, by leveraging existing DoD authority through Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III [^].
7. What is the Financial Health of Key Defense Contractors?
| Boeing Altman Z-score | 1.16 (as of May 14, 2025) [^] |
|---|---|
| Lockheed Martin Altman Z-score | 3.71 (for 2026) [^] |
| Government Intervention Discussion | Potential partial ownership or nationalization for key defense companies, e.g., Lockheed Martin [^] |
Boeing's financial health indicators suggest a high risk of distress. As of May 14, 2025, The Boeing Company (BA) registered an Altman Z-score of 1.16, which places it within the "distress zone" typically characterized by scores below 1.81 [^]. While specific company-level critical supply chain dependency risk scores are not publicly available, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted broader vulnerabilities within the Defense Industrial Base, particularly concerning reliance on foreign suppliers [^].
Lockheed Martin maintains strong financial health despite nationalization discussions. In contrast to Boeing, Lockheed Martin (LMT) exhibits robust financial standing with a projected Altman Z-score of 3.71 for 2026, a figure well within the "safe zone" generally defined as above 2.99 [^]. Despite this strong financial position, Lockheed Martin has been specifically cited in discussions regarding potential government intervention, including proposals for partial government ownership or nationalization by a Trump Administration [^].
Government intervention criteria for national champions remain broadly defined. The research provided does not detail the precise thresholds or specific criteria employed by the Department of Commerce for initiating a 'national champion' intervention. However, the wider context underscores recognized anxieties regarding the resilience of the defense industrial base, encompassing supply chain vulnerabilities [^]. Political discourse suggests that even financially stable defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, could be considered for government restrictions or ownership stakes under specific circumstances [^].
8. Can the Executive Branch Acquire Equity Stakes Under DPA Title III?
| DPA Authority for Equity | Title III "Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply" [^] |
|---|---|
| DPC Investment (1940-1945) | Approximately $7 billion [^] |
| DPC Investment (2023 Equivalent) | Over $120 billion [^] |
Executive branch might use DPA Title III for equity stakes. Influential think tanks suggest the executive branch could utilize Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities to acquire equity stakes in strategic companies without requiring new congressional approval [^]. These interpretations consider equity investments as a form of "financial assistance" permissible under the DPA, aimed at expanding domestic industrial capacity for national defense. Specifically, Title III's "Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply" empowers the President to authorize various financial assistance, including purchases and loan guarantees, to establish or restore critical industrial capabilities [^]. Therefore, if an investment serves national defense objectives and aligns with existing DPA appropriations, company-specific congressional authorization may not be necessary [^].
Historical precedents demonstrate government's use of equity for national security. To support the executive branch's ability to take equity stakes, historical precedents frequently cite the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and its offshoot, the Defense Plant Corporation (DPC), during the New Deal and World War II [^]. The DPC, funded by the RFC, directly owned and operated manufacturing plants and invested in private firms through acquiring preferred stock to finance the expansion of critical wartime production facilities [^]. Between 1940 and 1945, the DPC invested approximately $7 billion in war production, equivalent to over $120 billion in 2023 dollars. This effort resulted in the building of over 2,300 facilities and direct ownership of hundreds of factories [^]. These instances illustrate the U.S. government's historical reliance on financial mechanisms, including direct equity, to secure vital industrial capacity for national security under broad executive authority [^].
9. What Events Trigger US Stakes in TSMC, Defense Primes?
| TSMC Geopolitical Trigger | Significant escalation of Chinese military pressure on Taiwan [^] |
|---|---|
| TSMC Operational Trigger | Major disruptions to TSMC's operations from natural disasters or cyberattacks [^] |
| Defense Prime Supplier Trigger | Default by a critical sub-tier defense supplier [^] |
US government planning identifies triggers for taking stakes in critical companies. Recent National Security Council (NSC) and Pentagon contingency planning documents outline specific geopolitical and economic shock events as "trigger events" that could lead the US government to take a direct stake in companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) [^]. For TSMC, these triggers primarily focus on ensuring access to advanced semiconductors. Identified events include a significant escalation of Chinese military pressure on Taiwan, such as a naval blockade or large-scale military exercises [^]. Other potential catalysts for government intervention include a major disruption to TSMC's operations caused by natural disasters or cyberattacks, or a severe economic downturn that threatens the global semiconductor supply chain [^]. US defense and intelligence agencies consistently model various scenarios for supply chain disruptions stemming from geopolitical events, natural disasters, or cyberattacks [^].
Defense primes face intervention triggers from supply chain vulnerabilities and material disruptions. Regarding major defense primes, contingency planning indicates that critical vulnerabilities within the defense industrial base might necessitate government intervention, potentially including equity stakes [^]. Trigger events in this sector include a default by a critical sub-tier supplier of specialized components essential for defense production, or a severe disruption to the supply of essential rare earth materials vital for various defense technologies, which impacts overall defense production [^]. The Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) actively works to strengthen the defense industrial base by deploying capital into critical technologies and suppliers, utilizing various investment vehicles to address market failures or national security imperatives [^]. The OSC's strategy specifically emphasizes mitigating risks in areas like microelectronics and advanced materials to prevent supply chain disruptions and ensure access to essential capabilities [^].
10. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
Catalyst analysis unavailable.
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Expiration: January 08, 2027
- Closes: January 01, 2027
11. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Catalyst analysis unavailable.
13. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
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