What countries will hold referenda on leaving the EU?

Two parties in Italy and France advocate EU exit with minimal support. In Italy, the Italexit party explicitly includes Italy's withdrawal from the European Union, the Eurozone, and the European Stability Mechanism in its official platform ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}. As of February 23, 2026, Italexit's latest polling data indicates support at 2.1% ^{[^]}, and the party is not projected to secure any seats in the upcoming Italian parliamentary election ^{[^]}. Similarly, in France, Les Patriotes (The Patriots), led by Florian Philippot, has a published charter advocating for France's withdrawal from the European Union, the Eurozone, and NATO ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}. This party consistently polls below the 5% electoral threshold required for parliamentary representation and is not projected to win any seats ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}.

Hungary’s Mi Hazánk Movement advocates Huxit with modest parliamentary standing. In Hungary, the Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) includes a proposal for a referendum on the country's continued EU membership in its platform, presenting 'Huxit' as a potential outcome ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}. The party's latest polling numbers from January 2026 show support at 7% ^{[^]}. Mi Hazánk currently holds 6 seats in the Hungarian National Assembly ^{[^]} and, based on current polling, is expected to retain representation in the next general election ^{[^]}.

UK and France offer established paths for treaty referendums. In the United Kingdom, initiating a national referendum concerning international treaty obligations, including those related to EU membership, typically requires an Act of Parliament. This legislative mechanism needs only a simple parliamentary majority and was notably utilized for the European Union Act 2011, which mandated referendums on specific EU treaty changes or transfers of power ^{[^]}. France, conversely, operates under Article 11 of its Constitution, which allows the President to submit certain bills, including those authorizing the ratification of treaties impacting institutional functioning, to a referendum via presidential decision. This constitutional provision enabled the 2005 referendum on the European Constitution, demonstrating an established path for such referendums without necessitating a constitutional amendment ^{[^]}.

Germany lacks federal provisions for national policy referendums. In stark contrast to the United Kingdom and France, Germany's Basic Law (Grundgesetz) generally does not provide for binding national referendums on international treaty obligations or EU membership. The German Constitutional Court has consistently rejected pleas for national referendums on EU matters, highlighting that such actions are legally problematic under the current constitutional structure ^{[^]}. Therefore, for Germany to hold a binding national referendum on these types of issues, a prior constitutional amendment would most likely be a legal prerequisite, as federal provisions for national referendums on policy matters are absent ^{[^]}.

Greece showed a strong negative correlation between debt crises and EU support. During the Eurozone debt crisis, Greece experienced a significant widening of its 10-year bond spread against the German Bund, clearly surpassing the 400 basis point threshold defining a sovereign debt crisis. The spread exceeded 300 basis points in January 2010 ^{[^]}, surged to over 1,000 basis points by April 2010 ^{[^]}, and remained high at 800 basis points in August 2010 ^{[^]}. Concurrently, public support for EU membership among Greeks plummeted from 55% in 2010 to just 27% by May 2012 ^{[^]}. This demonstrates a strong negative correlation, where an intensified debt crisis paralleled a substantial decrease in public support for EU membership.

Italy lacked direct evidence for crisis correlation but saw declining EU sentiment. The available research does not explicitly detail instances where Italy's 10-year bond spread against the German Bund consistently surpassed the 400 basis point threshold ^{[^]}. Therefore, a direct correlation between this specific crisis measurement and public support for EU membership in Italy cannot be definitively established from the provided information. However, Italy did experience a broader decline in public sentiment towards the EU during the crisis period, with favorable views dropping from 85% in 2007 to 46% by 2012 ^{[^]}. This indicates a general trend of diminished support during times of economic uncertainty, even without meeting the specific bond spread crisis definition.

In France, new anti-EU movements lack detailed funding and mobilization data. Génération Frexit, established in 2022, advocates for a referendum on leaving the European Union (EU) ^{[^]}. Another Eurosceptic movement, French Future, formed in 2023 under Florian Philippot's leadership, also proposes a "Frexit" referendum ^{[^]}. While these movements aim to influence French politics, information regarding their direct funding, social media follower counts, or large-scale grassroots mobilization events is not specified ^{[^]}. The broader landscape of Frexit movements includes the Popular Republican Union (UPR), founded in 2007, which secured 1.17% of votes in the 2019 European elections, indicating a measurable, albeit fringe, level of support ^{[^]}.

Italy's Italexit party shows electoral support but lacks detailed operational data. Italexit per l'Italia was founded in July 2020 by Gianluigi Paragone, establishing it as a relatively new political entrant prior to the 2022 national elections ^{[^]}. The party's platform is strongly Eurosceptic, advocating for Italy's withdrawal from the EU and the Eurozone ^{[^]}. In the 2022 Italian general election, Italexit received 1.9% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies and 1.87% for the Senate; however, it did not elect any representatives ^{[^]}. Despite its participation in national elections implying a degree of organizational capacity and voter outreach, specific data concerning the party's direct funding, social media engagement statistics, or details on its grassroots mobilization efforts are not specified ^{[^]}.

Upcoming elections are scheduled across several European nations. Hungary's next parliamentary election is set for April 12, 2026 ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}. France will conduct its next presidential election in April 2027 ^{[^]}, followed by a legislative election in June 2027 ^{[^]}. Italy's general election is mandated no later than September 2027 ^{[^]}, and Greece's next parliamentary election must occur by June 2027 ^{[^]}.

The French presidential election in 2027 is a key catalyst. This event is considered the most probable to instigate a government change that could lead to a referendum pledge, primarily due to figures like Marine Le Pen ^{[^]}. Le Pen has previously committed to holding a 'Frexit' referendum if she is elected President of France ^{[^]}. While other countries, such as Hungary, anticipate significant political shifts—for instance, with the emergence of the Tisza Party ^{[^]}, ^{[^]}—current information does not indicate similar EU referendum pledges for Hungary, Italy, or Greece.

Catalyst analysis unavailable.