When will traffic at the Strait of Hormuz return to normal?
Short Answer
The model assigns meaningfully lower odds than the market for traffic at the Strait of Hormuz returning to normal before Jan 1, 2027 (53.0% model vs 71.0% market). This suggests the market may be overestimating the speed of normalization, given persistent high war risk premiums and continued caution from major shipping companies.
1. Executive Verdict
- US military actions cleared Iranian craft; Strait declared "open."
- High war risk premiums continue for Mideast Gulf shipping.
- Major shipping alliances have not downgraded Strait security warnings.
- US Navy maintains active presence; no Carrier Strike Group withdrawal.
- Commercial traffic has not yet returned to normal levels.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Before May 1, 2026 | 11.0% | 6.5% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
| Before May 15, 2026 | 24.0% | 14.1% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
| Before Jun 1, 2026 | 45.0% | 28.4% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
| Before Jul 1, 2026 | 53.0% | 34.9% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
| Before Jan 1, 2027 | 71.0% | 53.0% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
The market has traded between 0.5% and 37.0% YES probability, with a current reading of 0.9%. Total volume: 831,326 contracts.
3. Significant Price Movements
Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.
Outcome: Before May 15, 2026
📉 April 12, 2026: 23.0pp drop
Price decreased from 43.0% to 20.0%
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
Outcome: Before Jun 1, 2026
📈 April 11, 2026: 16.0pp spike
Price increased from 41.0% to 57.0%
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
Outcome: Before May 1, 2026
📉 April 08, 2026: 39.0pp drop
Price decreased from 63.0% to 24.0%
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
📈 April 07, 2026: 31.0pp spike
Price increased from 19.0% to 50.0%
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
Outcome: Before Jul 1, 2026
📉 April 05, 2026: 13.0pp drop
Price decreased from 52.0% to 39.0%
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
4. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
This market resolves to "Yes" if the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz, as reported by IMF PortWatch, is above 60. If this condition is not met before April 15, 2026, the market resolves to "No." The market will close and expire early if the "Yes" condition is fulfilled; otherwise, it closes by April 15, 2026, at 9:59 AM EDT.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Before May 1, 2026 | $0.13 | $0.89 | 11% |
| Before May 15, 2026 | $0.26 | $0.76 | 24% |
| Before Jun 1, 2026 | $0.45 | $0.56 | 45% |
| Before Jul 1, 2026 | $0.57 | $0.46 | 53% |
| Before Jan 1, 2027 | $0.72 | $0.29 | 71% |
Market Discussion
Traders overwhelmingly predict that traffic at the Strait of Hormuz will not return to normal before April 15, 2026, with the "Yes" contract priced at just 0.7¢. Key arguments for "No" highlight that the 7-day moving average of transit calls is currently around 8, far below the required 60, and a reported U.S. naval blockade is actively impeding traffic. While some "Yes" proponents suggest hidden ship movements or quiet transit to facilitate negotiations, this is largely dismissed due to the market's reliance on official IMF PortWatch AIS data, which shows no such increase.
5. What is the current status of naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz?
| US Carrier Strike Group Location | Arabian Sea, entered CENTCOM AOR late January 2026 [^] |
|---|---|
| IRGC Fast Attack Craft Status | All eliminated by March 26, 2026 [^] |
| Strait of Hormuz Condition | Open and clear for commercial traffic as of late March 2026 [^] |
The US Navy maintains active presence, with no Carrier Strike Group withdrawal. The US Navy's 5th Fleet sustains a forward operational posture within the US Central Command area of responsibility. The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) entered the CENTCOM AOR in late January 2026 and was confirmed to be underway in the Arabian Sea as of February 23, 2026 [^]. US warships also transited the Strait of Hormuz on April 11, 2026, marking their first passage since the conflict with Iran began in late January [^]. This demonstrates a continued and active US naval presence, with no reported withdrawal of a US Carrier Strike Group, which typically signals de-escalation.
IRGC fast-attack craft flotillas have significantly diminished their operational posture. In contrast to the US presence, CENTCOM reported conducting strikes throughout March 2026 that destroyed multiple Iranian boats, culminating in the elimination of the last IRGC Navy Fast Attack Craft by March 26, 2026 [^]. Overhead imagery captured on March 22, 2026, supports this assessment, showing the Strait of Hormuz largely clear of Iranian fast-attack craft, with most vessels observed docked at Bandar Abbas [^]. The CENTCOM commander affirmed this operational shift, stating that the Iranian Navy had been "cleared out of the Arabian Gulf" and that the Strait of Hormuz was "open and clear for commercial traffic" as of late March 2026 [^].
De-escalation regarding IRGC fast-attack craft is now largely evident. While the US Navy maintains a robust operational presence, the IRGC Navy's fast-attack craft flotillas appear to have largely returned to their bases or been neutralized, with CENTCOM declaring the Arabian Gulf clear of their operational threat in the Strait of Hormuz. This constitutes a significant shift toward de-escalation concerning the IRGC fast-attack craft presence as an immediate threat within the Strait, aligning with the indicator of IRGC vessels returning to their bases [^]. However, US forces continue to conduct strikes against Iranian military infrastructure [^].
6. How Do War Risk Premiums Reflect Strait of Hormuz Threat?
| Standard Tanker APs | 0.4% to 0.7% of hull value (mid-March 2026) [^] |
|---|---|
| Specific Vessel APs | Over 1% of hull value (mid-March 2026) [^] |
| Pre-escalation APs | 0.05% to 0.1% of hull value [^] |
War risk Additional Premiums have significantly increased for tankers in the Mideast Gulf. The Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's of London has expanded its designated high-risk zone to include a wider area of the Mideast Gulf, encompassing the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, and Gulf of Oman [^]. As of mid-March 2026, Additional Premiums (APs) for standard tankers transiting this zone typically range from 0.4% to 0.7% of a vessel's hull value for a seven-day voyage [^]. Certain vessel types or nationalities face even higher rates, with some operators reportedly paying 1% or more of the hull value for a single trip [^]. These elevated rates represent a substantial increase from pre-escalation levels, when war risk coverage for the region generally cost between 0.05% and 0.1% of hull value [^]. This surge means war risk insurance can now amount to "double-digit millions of dollars per trip" for some vessels [^].
Increased premiums reflect heightened threat perceptions by insurers. The JWC's designation of "Listed Areas" for war risk exclusions necessitates these Additional Premiums, directly reflecting insurers' assessment of elevated threats [^]. This perception extends to specific vessel characteristics; for instance, ships flagged in the US, UK, and Israel have reportedly been charged three times more than others for Middle East war cover, indicating a differentiated risk assessment based on flag [^]. A sustained decline in these Additional Premium percentages would serve as a direct market-based signal that major insurers perceive a reduced threat level, often preceding an actual resumption of normal traffic and activity in the Strait of Hormuz.
7. Have Strait of Hormuz Security Warnings Been Downgraded?
| Maersk Stance | Remained cautious regarding Strait of Hormuz transit (April 2026 [^]) |
|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz Traffic | Not regularly transiting (April 2026 [^]) |
| Tanker Association Guidance | No explicit formal downgrade of security warnings (April 2026 [^]) |
Major container shipping alliances have not formally downgraded security warnings for the Strait of Hormuz. There is no available evidence to indicate that significant container shipping alliances, including 2M, Ocean Alliance, and THE Alliance, or tanker associations like INTERTANKO, have officially reduced their security warnings for transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, reports from April 2026 suggest a continued cautious approach and ongoing disruption. For instance, Maersk, a key member of the 2M alliance, maintained a careful stance on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, even following a US-Iran ceasefire, noting that while "transit opportunities" might emerge, the situation remained tense [^]. Additionally, a CNN Business report on April 9, 2026, confirmed that commercial vessels were not regularly utilizing the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that traffic had not returned to normal levels [^].
Advisory guidance does not signal eased Strait of Hormuz security. While INTERTANKO and INTERCARGO have issued advisories to their members regarding the situation in the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, these publicly accessible documents do not explicitly state a formal downgrade of security warnings that would permit a return to pre-disruption transit conditions [^]. These advisories appear to offer general operational guidance for navigating a potentially hazardous environment rather than a direct instruction to lessen previous security precautions. Furthermore, a MARAD advisory from early 2026 continued to highlight "Military Operations and Potential Retaliatory Strikes by Iranian Forces and Proxy Forces" in the region [^], which typically prompts heightened security warnings rather than a reduction. The available information consistently points to ongoing risks and a cautious stance by major shipping entities.
8. Why Does Iran Send Conflicting Strait of Hormuz Signals?
| IRGC Media Stance | Strait of Hormuz declared closed or warning of closure [^] |
|---|---|
| Foreign Ministry Stance | Committed to safe navigation; open to respecting parties [^] |
| Analyst Interpretation | Iran sends contradictory signals, 'soft abroad, tough at home' [^] |
Iranian rhetoric on the Strait of Hormuz significantly diverges between official bodies. IRGC-affiliated media, such as Fars News, publish hardline statements, including reports that Iran's leader declared the Strait would remain closed [^] and that the military threatened complete closure if the U.S. bombed power plants [^]. These outlets also highlight aggressive actions, such as the IRGC escalating a blockade with tanker attacks [^]. In contrast, the Iranian Foreign Ministry and other official channels emphasize Iran's commitment to ensuring safe navigation through the Strait [^] and clarify its status [^]. The Foreign Ministry has stated that the Strait remains open to parties respecting Iran's trade and navigational rights [^], with the Foreign Minister even signaling a conditional halt to Iranian military operations [^].
This rhetorical divergence suggests the Strait's status serves internal political leverage. Analysts indicate Iran frequently sends contradictory signals regarding the Strait of Hormuz [^], adopting a strategy of 'talking soft abroad, tough at home' [^]. This dual approach allows hardline elements, often echoed through IRGC-affiliated media, to project strength and resolve to a domestic audience. Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry maintains a more diplomatic and conditionally open stance for international consumption. Such conflicting statements imply that resolving issues related to the Strait may depend more on navigating domestic power struggles within Iran than on solely external international diplomacy [^].
9. Were US, EU, or Iranian diplomatic aircraft tracked to Muscat, Oman?
| Identified US Aircraft | Gulfstream C-37A and C-37B models [^] |
|---|---|
| Identified Iranian Flight ID | "IRAN05" with flight status [^] |
| Muscat Travel Evidence | No explicit flight tracking of US, EU, or Iranian aircraft to Muscat [^] |
No direct evidence confirms unannounced diplomatic or intelligence flights to Muscat. Web research did not explicitly detail flight tracking evidence for unannounced travel by US, EU, or Iranian diplomatic or intelligence aircraft to Muscat, Oman. While types of aircraft commonly associated with such US activities were identified, specifically US Air Force Gulfstream C-37A and C-37B models known for high-level government and diplomatic transport [^], sources did not specify recent flight paths or destinations indicating travel to Muscat. Additionally, a US Navy MQ-4C was tracked on an ISR mission over the Strait of Hormuz, suggesting regional intelligence activity, but this did not involve a diplomatic flight to Muscat [^].
Iranian flight identifiers lacked specific Muscat destination details. For Iranian aircraft, the flight identifier "IRAN05" was found with flight tracking status and history [^]; however, the available sources did not explicitly detail its travel to Muscat, Oman. The research similarly yielded no information regarding unannounced EU diplomatic or intelligence flights to Muscat. General regional flight data, including an Omani-registered aircraft (A4OAE) and departures from Muscat International Airport, offered broader context without confirming the specific inbound diplomatic or intelligence travel that was sought [^].
10. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
Catalyst analysis unavailable.
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Strike Date: March 17, 2026
- Expiration: June 30, 2026
- Closes: January 01, 2027
11. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Catalyst analysis unavailable.
13. Related News
Last updated: April 13, 2026, 12:22 UTC
Hormuz Normalization Timeline Pushed Out Amid US Blockade News
The prediction market for a return to normal shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz saw a significant, negative repricing during trading on Sunday, April 12, 2026. Probabilities fell sharply across ...
Last updated: April 13, 2026, 12:22 UTC
Hormuz Traffic Timeline Pushed Back Sharply Amid New Tensions
Probabilities for a near-term return to normal shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz fell sharply across the board in the session dated April 08, 2026. The repricing appears to be a direct reaction...
Last updated: April 13, 2026, 12:22 UTC
Hormuz Market Prices In Rapid Reopening After US-Iran Ceasefire
In a significant repricing on Tuesday, April 07, 2026, prediction markets drastically pulled forward the expected timeline for a return to normal traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Probabilities surged ...
14. Historical Resolutions
Historical Resolutions: 1 markets in this series
Outcomes: 0 resolved YES, 1 resolved NO
Recent resolutions:
- KXHORMUZNORM-26MAR17-B260401: NO (Apr 01, 2026)
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