How many dissenting votes at the next Fed meeting?
Short Answer
Both the model and the market expect 1 dissenting vote at the April 2026 FOMC meeting, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.
1. Executive Verdict
- The 2026 FOMC is projected to have a slight hawkish tilt.
- Bowman, Waller, and Miran frequently diverge from consensus views.
- Waller and Miran previously dissented together in February 2026.
- Q1 2026 Real GDP growth forecasts show significant divergence.
- Political pressure advocates for narrowing the Federal Reserve's mandate.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 86.0% | 77.7% | Market higher by 8.3pp |
| 0 | 6.0% | 3.5% | Market higher by 2.5pp |
| 2 | 10.0% | 12.4% | Model higher by 2.4pp |
| 3 | 4.0% | 5.1% | Model higher by 1.1pp |
| 4 | 1.0% | 1.3% | Model higher by 0.3pp |
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
This market's price action indicates a consistently low but recently increased probability of dissenting votes at the April 2026 FOMC meeting. For most of its history, the price remained stable near 2.0%, suggesting a strong consensus for a unanimous vote. However, the chart shows a significant upward movement to 6.0% around April 28th. The overall price has been confined to a narrow range between 1.0% and 9.0%, reinforcing the view that a dissent is an unlikely outcome. The trend can be characterized as sideways with a recent bullish spike, establishing a new, higher trading plateau.
The cause for the price jump from 2.0% to 6.0% is not apparent from the provided context, but it coincided with the market's first notable trading activity. The sample data shows that this price increase was accompanied by a volume of 300 contracts, breaking a period of zero trading. This suggests that the initial wave of trading established the higher probability. The total volume of 20,885 contracts indicates a moderate level of market participation. The concentration of volume around this price move suggests trader conviction behind the updated 6.0% probability.
From a technical perspective, the market established an initial floor around the 2.0% level. The recent high of 9.0% acts as the primary resistance level, with the current price of 6.0% serving as a more immediate point of interest. The chart suggests that overall market sentiment is confident that the FOMC vote will be unanimous. A 6.0% price implies a 94% probability of zero dissents. While this probability has tripled from its opening level, it still reflects a strong belief in a consensus outcome among Fed officials for that future meeting.
3. Significant Price Movements
Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.
📈 April 24, 2026: 11.0pp spike
Price increased from 74.0% to 85.0%
Outcome: 1
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
📉 April 18, 2026: 11.0pp drop
Price decreased from 80.0% to 69.0%
Outcome: 1
What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.
4. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
This market resolves to 'Yes' if there is exactly 1 dissenting vote at the FOMC meeting scheduled for April 29, 2026, with the outcome verified by the Federal Reserve; otherwise, it resolves to 'No'. The market opened on March 19, 2026, and will close after the outcome occurs, or by April 29, 2026, at 1:59 PM EDT, with projected payout 30 minutes after closing. The market may close and expire early if the event occurs.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | $0.87 | $0.14 | 86% |
| 2 | $0.10 | $0.91 | 10% |
| 0 | $0.09 | $0.94 | 6% |
| 3 | $0.03 | $1.00 | 4% |
| 4 | $0.01 | $1.00 | 1% |
Market Discussion
Traders overwhelmingly anticipate one dissenting vote at the next Fed meeting, with the market pricing an 86% chance for this outcome. A key point of discussion revolves around the possibility of zero dissents, specifically focusing on member Miran, who some argue might not dissent for a hold vote despite previous tendencies, given recent "less favorable" inflation developments. This contrasts with the strong market consensus for a single dissenting vote.
5. What is the Projected Ideological Makeup of the 2026 FOMC?
The April 2026 FOMC is projected to have a slight hawkish tilt. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting in April 2026 is expected to comprise 12 voting members, whose ideological composition is projected to be 4 outspoken hawks, 5 centrists, and 3 doves [^]. This specific balance suggests a slight hawkish tilt in the committee's overall stance [^]. In the context of monetary policy, "hawks" typically favor tighter policies to combat inflation, while "doves" prioritize economic growth and employment, and "centrists" seek a balanced approach between these objectives [^].
The FOMC's structure includes permanent and rotating regional bank presidents. The 12 voting members of the FOMC are consistently made up of the seven members of the Board of Governors, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents who serve one-year rotational terms [^]. For 2026, the four rotating voting members will be the Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, Dallas, Philadelphia, and San Francisco [^]. These presidents will replace those from Boston, Cleveland, Richmond, and St. Louis, who were voting members in the previous year [^]. An analysis by MNI, which factored in these scheduled rotations and the current Board of Governors, produced this projected ideological spectrum for April 2026, confirming the slight hawkish tilt compared to the prior year [^].
6. What Economic Indicator Diverges Most in Q1 2026 Forecasts?
| Most Divergent Indicator | Real GDP growth (Non-Fed models vs [^]. FOMC) [^] |
|---|---|
| Atlanta Fed Q1 2026 Real GDP Forecast | 2.1% [^] |
| FOMC 2026 Real GDP Projection (Q4/Q4) | 1.8% [^] |
Real GDP growth shows the most significant Q1 2026 forecast divergence. This economic indicator is forecasted by non-Fed models to diverge most significantly from the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections for Q1 2026, establishing a clear catalyst for potential policy disagreement between the two perspectives. Specifically, the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model projects a notably stronger outlook compared to the FOMC's broader yearly projection for Real GDP [^].
The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model projects stronger near-term growth. It estimates real GDP growth for Q1 2026 at 2.1% [^]. This contrasts with the FOMC's median projection for real GDP growth for the entire year 2026, measured on a Q4/Q4 basis, which stands at 1.8% [^]. This results in a 0.3 percentage point difference, indicating a stronger near-term growth outlook from the non-Fed model than the FOMC's overall yearly projection [^].
Real GDP offers the most quantifiable Q1 2026 divergence. While other economic indicators, such as inflation, have been considered for potential divergence, available research does not provide a specific, quantifiable nowcast for Q1 2026 from non-Fed sources that can be directly compared to the FOMC's projections with numerical precision for the same period. Although changes in CEO inflation expectations for Q1 2026 were noted [^] and general divergence in short-term inflation expectations was discussed [^], a precise nowcast rate for direct comparison is absent. Therefore, the difference in Real GDP projections represents the most clearly quantifiable and significant divergence for Q1 2026 based on the provided information [^].
7. Which FOMC Members Often Diverge from Consensus Views?
| Michelle Bowman Dissent | September 2024 against a rate cut [^] |
|---|---|
| Christopher Waller Dissent | February 2026 against holding rates steady [^] |
| Adriana Miran Dissent | February 2026 against holding rates steady [^] |
Several individuals frequently dissent from the median 'dot plot' projection. Based on recent Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, Michelle Bowman, Christopher Waller, and Adriana Miran have shown a historical frequency of issuing dissenting opinions or delivering public speeches that diverge from the median 'dot plot' projection. Their past actions indicate they are notable individuals likely to hold divergent views at the April 2026 meeting [^], with specific economic conditions triggering their deviations from the majority consensus.
Michelle Bowman consistently advocates a more hawkish monetary policy stance. In September 2024, she notably dissented against a rate cut, which marked the first such dissent from a Federal Reserve governor in decades [^]. This deviation was prompted by the committee's decision to ease monetary policy, reflecting Bowman's preference for maintaining higher interest rates or even raising them further. Her stance suggests concerns about persistent inflation or a belief that monetary policy was not yet sufficiently restrictive to achieve price stability [^], highlighting a more cautious approach to policy easing than the committee's majority.
Christopher Waller and Adriana Miran recently diverged on rate policy decisions. They publicly broke ranks in February 2026 when the Federal Reserve decided to hold the federal funds rate steady at 3.50% [^]. Their dissent occurred during a period characterized by "growing internal discord" within the FOMC. This specific disagreement with maintaining the current interest rate level demonstrates their tendency to diverge from the majority view when the Federal Reserve opts to hold rates or resists immediate policy adjustments [^]. This behavior aligns with an earlier January 2026 FOMC meeting where two dissenters were noted when the Federal Reserve "refused to cut" and shifted "hawkish" in its statement [^].
8. Will Political Pressure Impact Fed's Dual Mandate in Early 2026?
| Hill's Mandate Stance | Advocates narrowing Fed's mandate to price stability [^] |
|---|---|
| Employment Mandate Bill | Legislation reintroduced to eliminate employment mandate [^] |
| Warsh Confirmation Hearing | Scheduled for April 21, 2026 [^] |
The House Financial Services Committee actively advocates for a narrower Federal Reserve mission. Its Chairman, Hill, has explicitly stated that 'distracting 'mandates'' have diluted the Federal Reserve's core mission of price stability [^]. He has demonstrated a legislative agenda to address this by reintroducing a bill aimed at focusing the Federal Reserve solely on curbing inflation, directly challenging the existing dual mandate [^]. This stance is reinforced by other committee members, such as Representative Lucas, who emphasizes the appropriateness of Congress's active involvement in discussions regarding the Federal Reserve [^]. This sustained legislative effort, combined with a broader trend of GOP lawmakers questioning the dual mandate [^], indicates a concentrated political push to redefine the Fed's responsibilities following the 2024 election cycle.
The Senate Banking Committee hearings offer a significant platform for scrutinizing the Fed. This committee will be a critical venue for exerting political pressure, particularly during the Kevin Warsh Fed chair confirmation hearing scheduled for April 21, 2026 [^]. While Senate Banking Committee Chairman Scott has emphasized the importance of an independent Federal Reserve focused on the 'American Dream' [^], such high-profile confirmation hearings invariably provide a platform for intense scrutiny of the Fed's policy framework, including its interpretation and execution of the dual mandate. Furthermore, a Congressional 'Fed-watchdog task force' began a broad review of the U.S. central bank in February 2025 [^], indicating a systemic and continuing effort by Congress to scrutinize the Fed's operations.
Combined legislative and oversight efforts could provoke a 'political' dissent. This confluence of specific legislative actions, public statements from key committee chairs, and a significant confirmation hearing in close proximity to the April 2026 FOMC meeting creates an environment where political pressure on the Fed's dual mandate could indeed be significant enough to provoke a 'political' dissent from an FOMC member at that meeting.
9. When Were Federal Reserve Governors' Confirmation Hearings Before April 2026?
| Michelle W. Bowman Hearing Date | April 10, 2025 [^] |
|---|---|
| Stephen Miran Confirmation Date | September 15, 2025 [^] |
| Terms Covered by Research | Before April 2026 [^] |
One specific Senate confirmation hearing date is available for Governor Michelle W. Bowman. For new Federal Reserve Board of Governors whose terms began before April 2026, Governor Michelle W. Bowman had a Senate nomination hearing for Vice Chair for Supervision on April 10, 2025 [^]. This hearing provided an opportunity for lawmakers to question Governor Bowman, who was subsequently confirmed for the role [^].
Stephen Miran was confirmed as Governor, but his hearing date is unclear. Stephen Miran was confirmed as a Federal Reserve Governor on September 15, 2025 [^]. While his term as a Governor began before April 2026, the exact date of his Senate confirmation hearing is not specified within the provided web research results, with only his date of confirmation available [^]. These confirmation processes are crucial for gaining insight into a nominee's policy perspectives and potential alignment or divergence from the Federal Reserve Chair's consensus.
10. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
Catalyst analysis unavailable.
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Expiration: May 06, 2026
- Closes: April 29, 2026
11. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Catalyst analysis unavailable.
13. Historical Resolutions
Historical Resolutions: 5 markets in this series
Outcomes: 1 resolved YES, 4 resolved NO
Recent resolutions:
- KXFOMCDISSENTCOUNT-26MAR-4: NO (Mar 18, 2026)
- KXFOMCDISSENTCOUNT-26MAR-3: NO (Mar 18, 2026)
- KXFOMCDISSENTCOUNT-26MAR-2: NO (Mar 18, 2026)
- KXFOMCDISSENTCOUNT-26MAR-1: YES (Mar 18, 2026)
- KXFOMCDISSENTCOUNT-26MAR-0: NO (Mar 18, 2026)
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