Short Answer

The model assigns meaningfully lower odds than the market for the US acquiring new territory before Jan 21, 2029 (20.6% model vs 38.0% market), citing strong opposition and a lack of official progress on any such proposals.

1. Executive Verdict

  • No official U.S. economic or sovereignty package offered for Greenland.
  • Congress is not commissioning reports supporting Greenland acquisition.
  • The U.S. is not actively negotiating for Pacific Island atolls.
  • Key NATO allies publicly support Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland.
  • Former President Trump's territory proposals have not resulted in transfers.

Who Wins and Why

Outcome Market Model Why
Before Jul 2026 6.0% 2.5% Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence.
Before Jan 2027 13.0% 6.5% Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence.
Before Jan 2028 30.0% 15.7% Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence.
Before Jan 21, 2029 38.0% 20.6% Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence.

Current Context

The United States has not acquired new territory as of March 26, 2026. As of that date, the United States has not acquired any new territory, despite aggressive pursuit of Greenland by Donald Trump. This pursuit has involved threats, tariffs, and negotiations for sovereign base areas around US military sites [^]. However, no binding transfer of sovereignty has occurred [^]. Furthermore, rhetorical threats regarding Canada, the Panama Canal, and Cuba have been made but remain without concrete action [^].
Full annexation of Greenland appears unlikely, facing significant opposition. Experts consider full annexation unlikely due to substantial opposition from multiple parties [^]. Denmark and Greenlanders strongly reject such a move, with 85% of Greenlanders opposing annexation [^]. Additionally, NATO allies oppose the acquisition, and US public support for acquiring Greenland by force or purchase remains low, at 4-11% [^]. Prediction markets reflect this skepticism, pricing low odds for any US territorial acquisition: 11-28% by the end of 2026, and up to 42% by 2029 on Kalshi [^]. While discussions continue regarding limited access deals, no new territory has been added [^].

2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

Historical Price (Probability)

Outcome probability
Date
This market has exhibited a stable, sideways trading pattern, consistently pricing the probability of US territorial acquisition by 2029 at very low levels. The price has remained confined within a narrow range of 4.0% to 9.0% throughout its history, establishing 4.0% as a support level and 9.0% as a resistance ceiling. The current price of 5.0% is near the bottom of this range, reflecting a strong market consensus that the event is highly unlikely. The total volume of 13,787 contracts suggests moderate interest, but the zero-volume trading days indicate that activity can be sporadic, which may contribute to the minor price fluctuations within the established channel.
The minor price movements appear to be reactions to news cycles rather than fundamental shifts in outlook. For instance, temporary spikes towards the 7.0% to 9.0% resistance level likely correspond with headlines about aggressive rhetoric or diplomatic posturing by the Trump administration regarding territories like Greenland. However, these rallies are short-lived and quickly fade back towards the 4-6% baseline. This price action suggests traders view such developments as noise. The market's consistent reversion to the low end of its range indicates that participants require concrete, binding action, not just threats or negotiations, to price in a higher probability.
Overall, the chart indicates a firmly bearish sentiment on the prospect of US territorial expansion. The market has established a clear and persistent consensus that this outcome has less than a 1-in-10 chance of occurring before the 2029 deadline. The inability of any news-driven rallies to break and hold above the 9.0% resistance level shows a high degree of skepticism among traders. The sentiment is that despite political rhetoric, the practical, political, and international barriers to acquiring new territory are perceived as being too significant to overcome within the resolution period.

3. Market Data

View on Kalshi →

Contract Snapshot

The market resolves to YES if the United States gains formal governance or jurisdiction over any new territory outside its sovereignty, or formally announces such an acquisition, before January 21, 2029. This does not include merely leasing territory. If no such acquisition occurs by the deadline, the market resolves to NO, with outcomes verified by The New York Times.

Available Contracts

Market options and current pricing

Outcome bucket Yes (price) No (price) Last trade probability
Before Jul 2026 $0.06 $0.95 6%
Before Jan 2027 $0.14 $0.87 13%
Before Jan 2028 $0.32 $0.73 30%
Before Jan 21, 2029 $0.42 $0.63 38%

Market Discussion

The market currently prices a low probability (38% by January 2029) of the US acquiring new territory. Discussions are limited but include speculation by a "Yes" trader about recent events potentially involving Armenia as a new acquisition. A "No" trader linked the outcome of midterm elections to a decreased likelihood of US expansion, referencing an article titled "The 51st state of delusion." The overall low probability suggests a general consensus against expansion by 2029.

4. What Economic and Sovereignty Proposals Has the U.S. Offered Greenland?

Official US proposals to GreenlandNo specific economic or sovereignty packages, including rare earth mineral rights or direct financial transfers exceeding Denmark's annual block grant, have been officially proposed (Web Research Results) [^]
Danish annual block grant to GreenlandApproximately 4.3-4.5 billion DKK or $600-675 million (Web Research Results, 10) [^]
Greenlandic parties' stance on sovereignty"Red line" (Web Research Results) [^]
No official U.S. economic or sovereignty package has been presented to Greenland. U.S. negotiators have not officially offered specific economic or sovereignty packages to Greenland's Naalakkakersuisut, including grants of rare earth mineral rights or direct financial transfers exceeding Denmark's annual block grant [Web Research Results]. The annual Danish block grant to Greenland is approximately 4.3-4.5 billion DKK, which translates to roughly $600-675 million [Web Research Results, 10]. Although internal U.S. discussions reportedly considered inducements such as per-person payments up to $100,000, potentially totaling around $6 billion, or a Compact of Free Association, these concepts were not officially proposed to the Naalakkakersuisut [Web Research Results, 3, 6]. Public reports have indicated discussions led by U.S. officials regarding a "framework" for U.S. access to rare earth minerals and "total access" to parts of Greenland for security purposes [Web Research Results, 4, 5]. Former President Trump publicly stated that rare earth mineral rights were part of his Greenland plan, but specific terms for such grants or lump-sum payments above the block grant have not been officially presented [^].
Greenlandic parties have not privately responded to specific U.S. offers. No sourced private responses from key members of the Siumut or Inuit Ataqatigiit parties regarding specific U.S. economic and sovereignty proposals have been found, consistent with the absence of official proposals [Web Research Results]. Publicly, these parties, along with the Naalakkakersuisut, led by Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen of Demokraatit, have consistently emphasized that sovereignty is considered a "red line" and firmly reject any compromise on this issue [Web Research Results]. While acknowledging that increased U.S. interest could potentially advance Greenland's path toward independence, their public statements focus on cooperation for access and security rather than any transfer of territory [Web Research Results].

5. Is Congress Commissioning Reports for Greenland Acquisition by 2029?

Targeted Reports for AcquisitionNo evidence commissioned by key committees for specific framing [Web Research Results, 1, 2, 3, 7] [^]
Broader Congressional InterestStrategic importance discussed; legislative proposals exist [Web Research Results, 5, 6] [^]
Acquisition by 2029 ProspectNo strong legislative groundwork identified [Web Research Results] [^]
No specific reports frame Greenland acquisition as a security imperative [^] . Relations - EveryCRSReport.com">[^]. There is no evidence indicating that key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or House Foreign Affairs Committee are commissioning Congressional Research Service (CRS) or Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports specifically framing the acquisition of Greenland as a national security imperative to counter Chinese or Russian Arctic expansion [Web Research Results] [^]. While existing CRS reports address U.S [^]. security interests in Greenland and Arctic competition, these were not specifically commissioned by the committees for the explicit purpose of advocating for acquisition [Web Research Results, 1, 2, 3, 7] [^]. Broader congressional discussions acknowledge Greenland's strategic importance [^]. Despite the absence of targeted reports, Greenland's strategic importance and potential acquisition as a national security need are present in other congressional activities [^]. Some senators have emphasized Greenland's strategic value and resource potential in discussions [Web Research Results, 5] [^]. Additionally, legislative efforts like the "Greenland Annexation and Statehood Act" have proposed annexation to bolster U.S [^]. national security [Web Research Results, 6] [^]. However, these hearings and bills are not accompanied by specific CRS or GAO requests focused on framing acquisition as a security imperative [Web Research Results, 4] [^]. Legislative groundwork for Greenland acquisition appears limited [^]. The lack of specific CRS or GAO report commissions by key committee members, particularly those focused on framing acquisition as a national security imperative, suggests that strong legislative groundwork for the U.S [^]. to acquire new territory like Greenland by 2029 is not being laid [Web Research Results] [^]. This assessment is further supported by considerations such as potential opposition from Denmark and Greenland, and possible tensions with NATO allies [Web Research Results] [^].

6. Did Trump Threaten Article XI or Link Greenland Base Renewals to Sovereignty?

Formal Article XI ThreatNo formal threat to invoke Article XI [^]
Base Agreement LinkageNo formal linkage to time-bound territorial concessions [^]
Denmark/Greenland StanceFirmly rejected sovereignty discussions [^]
The Trump administration did not formally threaten invoking Article XI. The administration did not formally threaten to invoke Article XI of the 1951 US-Denmark Greenland Defense Agreement. While former President Trump expressed interest in acquiring Greenland in 2019, an idea rejected by Danish and Greenlandic leaders, there is no evidence that this interest evolved into a formal threat to invoke Article XI [^]. Article XI itself outlines procedures for the removal of U.S. property upon the agreement's termination, requiring mutual consent for its conclusion rather than serving as a unilateral withdrawal clause for the United States [^].
Base agreement renewals were not linked to territorial concessions. The Trump administration also did not link the renewal of base agreements at Pituffik/Thule Air Base to specific, time-bound concessions on territorial sovereignty or expanded sovereign base areas. Despite the administration's efforts to push for expanded U.S. access or control over base areas, particularly at Pituffik Air Base, no sources indicate that the renewal of base agreements was formally tied to time-bound territorial concessions [^]. Denmark and Greenland consistently rejected any suggestions concerning sovereignty, establishing these as "red lines" during discussions [^]. Greenland's Premier Kim Kielsen explicitly stated that sovereignty would not be an issue for discussion in future talks regarding U.S. bases, rebuffing suggestions from the Trump administration [^].

7. Is the U.S. Acquiring Pacific Island Atolls for Military Use?

Atoll Cession NegotiationsNone active with Kiribati or Tuvalu for military use or climate resettlement [Web Research Results] [^]
Primary US Engagement FocusRenewal/expansion of existing COFAs with Palau, RMI, FSM [Web Research Results, 3, 5, 6, 7] [^]
New COFA ProposalsPrimarily from think tanks/academic institutions, not active government negotiations for territory cession [^]
The U.S. is not actively negotiating for Pacific Island atolls. There are no active U.S. State Department or Pentagon negotiations with financially distressed Pacific Island nations, such as Kiribati or Tuvalu, regarding ceding sovereign atolls for U.S. military use in exchange for climate resettlement programs or Compact of Free Association-style economic aid [Web Research Results]. While the U.S. maintains a robust presence in the Pacific, its focus is not on acquiring new territory from these nations. Past speculation regarding U.S. territory acquisition has primarily centered on Greenland, not new atolls in the Pacific [Web Research Results].
Instead, U.S. engagement prioritizes existing Compacts of Free Association (COFA). The U.S. prioritizes the renewal and expansion of existing COFA agreements with three sovereign nations: the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) [Web Research Results, 3, 5, 6, 7]. These foundational COFA agreements are central to the U.S.-Pacific Islands Partnership, providing substantial economic assistance, development programs, and access to U.S. defense capabilities. In return, the U.S. gains exclusive military access and strategic denial rights over vast areas of the Pacific, all without involving the transfer of sovereignty over territory [Web Research Results, 5, 6, 7].
Proposals for new COFAs are mainly academic discussions. Discussions regarding potential new Compacts of Free Association, such as with Kiribati, are primarily proposed by think tanks and academic institutions, rather than being active, government-to-government negotiations for the cession of territory [^]. Overall, current U.S. policy in the Pacific emphasizes partnership, economic aid, and defense cooperation through existing frameworks rather than territorial acquisition [^].

8. Do Key NATO Allies Support Denmark's Sovereignty Over Greenland?

Canada's StanceStrong solidarity with Greenland and Denmark [^]
United Kingdom's StanceGreenland's future is Denmark and Greenland's decision [^]
Private Diplomatic PressureNo evidence of private pressure from ambassadors in Copenhagen [Web Research Results summary] [^]
Key NATO allies publicly support Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland. Canada has consistently expressed strong solidarity with Greenland and Denmark regarding Greenland's future and sovereignty [^]. This alignment has been emphasized through diplomatic engagements, such as meetings between Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Greenland’s and Denmark’s Ministers for Foreign Affairs [^]. The United Kingdom has also explicitly backed Denmark, affirming that Greenland's future is a decision for Denmark and Greenland alone, not for the United States [^]. This position was reportedly communicated, with the then-US President responding to UK and broader European concerns regarding the acquisition of Greenland [^]. These statements reinforce a stance of solidarity with Denmark, rejecting any external claims to Greenland's territory.
No private diplomatic pressure on Denmark from these allies is evident. Research indicates no available sources suggesting that the private stances of Canada or the UK differ from their public affirmations of support for Denmark's sovereignty. Furthermore, no evidence suggests that Canadian, Norwegian, or UK ambassadors in Copenhagen are signaling anything other than solidarity with Denmark, or are privately pressuring Denmark to accommodate US strategic interests. Diplomatic intelligence has not revealed any such pressure from these allies [Web Research Results summary].

9. What Could Change the Odds

Key Catalysts

The United States has not acquired any new territory as of March 26, 2026 [^] . Despite this, former President Trump has proposed several potential acquisitions, including Greenland, regaining control of the Panama Canal, involvement in Gaza redevelopment, and the annexation of Canada as the 51st state [^]. However, none of these proposals have resulted in a transfer of sovereignty [^]. Prediction markets indicate low probabilities for such acquisitions, with Polymarket showing odds of 11-28% for Greenland's acquisition by 2026 or 2027, and PredictIt placing the likelihood of any Greenland land acquisition in 2026 at 14% [^]. A Kalshi market for similar events is currently open with a timeline extending to 2029 [^].

Key Dates & Catalysts

  • Expiration: March 01, 2026
  • Closes: January 21, 2029

10. Decision-Flipping Events

  • Trigger: The United States has not acquired any new territory as of March 26, 2026 [^] .
  • Trigger: Despite this, former President Trump has proposed several potential acquisitions, including Greenland, regaining control of the Panama Canal, involvement in Gaza redevelopment, and the annexation of Canada as the 51st state [^] .
  • Trigger: However, none of these proposals have resulted in a transfer of sovereignty [^] .
  • Trigger: Prediction markets indicate low probabilities for such acquisitions, with Polymarket showing odds of 11-28% for Greenland's acquisition by 2026 or 2027, and PredictIt placing the likelihood of any Greenland land acquisition in 2026 at 14% [^] .

12. Historical Resolutions

Historical Resolutions: 1 markets in this series

Outcomes: 0 resolved YES, 1 resolved NO

Recent resolutions:

  • KXUSAEXPANDTERRITORY-26MAR01: NO (Mar 01, 2026)