Short Answer

Both the model and the market expect 'Yes' regarding another country leaving OPEC in 2026, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

1. Executive Verdict

  • UAE's ambitious crude oil capacity expansion creates divergence pressure.
  • Venezuelan opposition leader envisions ignoring OPEC oil production quotas.
  • U.S. NOPEC bill's late 2026 legislative progress remains unclear.
  • Market probability for this event spiked significantly on April 28, 2026.
  • No formal rejection of 2027 OPEC+ production baseline by year-end.

Who Wins and Why

Outcome Market Model Why
Yes 52.0% 61.8% A country may exit to pursue independent oil production targets unconstrained by OPEC quotas.

2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

Historical Price (Probability)

Outcome probability
Date
This prediction market, which asks if another country will leave OPEC in 2026, has an overall upward trend. The market opened with a 37.0% probability, suggesting the outcome was considered unlikely. However, on April 28, 2026, the price experienced a significant and rapid spike of 21.0 percentage points, jumping from its starting price to a high of 58.0%. Since this peak, the price has pulled back slightly and appears to be consolidating around its current level of 52.0%. The cause of this sharp upward movement is not clear from the available context, as no specific news or developments were provided.
The price action suggests a distinct shift in market sentiment from bearish to bullish. The initial spike to 58.0% occurred on relatively low volume, but subsequent trading volume increased as the price settled to 52.0%, indicating broader participation and price discovery following the initial shock. The 58.0% mark now acts as a key resistance level, while the new price around 52.0% could be forming a new support level. The fact that the price has sustained itself above the critical 50% threshold indicates that traders, on average, now believe another country leaving OPEC in 2026 is a more likely than not event.

3. Significant Price Movements

Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.

📈 April 28, 2026: 21.0pp spike

Price increased from 37.0% to 58.0%

Outcome: Yes

What happened: No supporting research available for this anomaly.

4. Market Data

View on Kalshi →

Contract Snapshot

The market resolves to YES if any OPEC member state officially announces its departure before January 1, 2027. This announcement must be a formal commitment (e.g., treaty signing, official press release by authorized ministers) and not preliminary discussions, leaked documents, or conditional agreements, with eligible sources including a range of major news outlets. If no such official announcement occurs by the deadline, the market resolves to NO. The market opened on April 28, 2026, and will close early upon the event's occurrence, or by December 31, 2026, at 11:59 PM EST if the event does not happen.

Available Contracts

Market options and current pricing

Outcome bucket Yes (price) No (price) Last trade probability
Yes $0.54 $0.47 52%

Market Discussion

Limited public discussion available for this market.

5. What Drives the UAE's Oil Production Capacity Expansion and Policy Independence?

UAE 2027 Capacity Goal5.0 million b/d [^]
UAE H2 2026 Quota (May 2026)3.2 million b/d [^], [^]
UAE Policy Independence Stated GoalDesire for "full control on production" and protecting "national interests" [^], [^]
The United Arab Emirates exhibits the largest production capacity disparity among the countries reviewed. The UAE has set an ambitious crude oil production capacity target of 5 million barrels per day (b/d) by 2027 [^]. This goal significantly exceeds its assigned OPEC+ production quota, which stood at 3.2 million b/d for May 2026 [^], [^]. This substantial difference of 1.8 million b/d between its planned future capacity and current quota positions the UAE as having the largest gap among the specified nations [^], [^], [^].
The UAE's state-owned oil company explicitly links future investments to 'policy independence'. Statements from the company indicate a clear strategy to align future investments with a desire for greater autonomy [^]. The UAE has voiced frustration regarding quotas that do not accurately reflect its actual production capabilities or its substantial investments in capacity expansion projects [^]. Actions such as past considerations of withdrawing from OPEC are seen as strategic efforts to protect national interests and achieve "full control on production," signaling a strong push for independence in its oil output and investment decisions [^].
Iraq and Nigeria lack explicit capacity goals or policy independence statements directly comparable to the UAE. The provided research does not detail specific 2027-2030 production capacity expansion goals for either Iraq or Nigeria, making a direct comparison of their quota disparities challenging. While both Iraq and Nigeria have disputed their assigned OPEC+ quotas of 4.28 million b/d and 1.7 million b/d, respectively, for May 2026, the available information does not include explicit statements from their state-owned oil companies directly linking future investment to 'policy independence' in the same manner as the UAE [^], [^], [^].

6. What Was the Status of NOPEC Legislation and Diplomatic Warnings in H2 2026?

NOPEC Bill Legislative Progress (H2 2026)Not detailed in provided sources [^].
ELEVATE Act of 2026 (S. 4034) StatusIntroduced in 119th Congress; H2 2026 status not specified [^].
Diplomatic Warnings to Smaller OPEC Members (H2 2026)No information found in provided research [^].
Specific legislative progress of the U.S. 'NOPEC' bill in late 2026 is unclear. Research indicates that detailed advancements for the U.S. 'NOPEC' (No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels) bill during the second half of 2026 are not specified in available sources. Although the "ELEVATE Act of 2026 (S. 4034)" was introduced in the 119th Congress, its particular progress, such as committee approvals or floor votes, within H2 2026 remains undescribed [^]. The concept of NOPEC legislation is a recurring theme, with earlier versions including H.R. 3081 in the 118th Congress and H.R.2393 in the 117th Congress [^].
No diplomatic warnings to U.S.-aligned OPEC members were found. The provided research contains no information about direct diplomatic warnings issued by the U.S. State or Treasury Departments to smaller, U.S.-aligned OPEC members such as Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, or Congo. These potential warnings, concerning 'anti-competitive behavior' during the latter half of 2026, are not mentioned in the sources, which primarily focus on U.S. legislative matters rather than specific diplomatic engagements.

7. Which OPEC Nation's Opposition Plans to Ignore Quotas?

Libya's OPEC+ Quota StatusNot currently subject to OPEC+ quotas [^]
Venezuela Opposition Oil ProjectionCould quintuple oil production (María Corina Machado) [^]
Nigeria 2026 Budget AssessmentFaced 'unrealistic revenue assumptions' criticism [^]
Venezuela's opposition leader explicitly envisions exceeding OPEC oil commitments. In Venezuela, a major opposition figure has publicly articulated a vision for oil production that would significantly exceed current levels and implicitly ignore OPEC commitments. In March 2026, prominent opposition leader María Corina Machado stated that Venezuela "could quintuple its oil production once democracy is restored" [^]. While this statement projects for a future democratic government rather than an officially submitted budget model, it represents a public declaration for a drastic increase in oil output by a significant opposition leader. Such an increase would inherently disregard and significantly exceed any current or likely future OPEC commitments for Venezuela. Machado has also advocated for transparency, security in energy investments, and the full privatization of the oil industry [^].
Libya's budget avoids OPEC quota conflicts due to its exemption. For Libya, the premise of exceeding OPEC commitments is not applicable due to unique circumstances. Amidst a surge in its oil production, Libya approved its first unified state budget in over a decade in April 2026 [^]. However, Libya's oil production is not currently subject to OPEC+ quotas because of ongoing internal conflict [^]. Consequently, Libya's budget planning processes would not involve deliberately ignoring such commitments.
Nigeria's budget scrutiny did not involve defiant oil production targets. In Nigeria, available research does not indicate that major opposition leaders or finance ministry officials are publicly modeling national budgets based on oil production levels that explicitly ignore and significantly exceed the country's OPEC commitments. The 2026 national budget did face scrutiny from the Senate in February 2026 due to concerns over "unrealistic revenue assumptions," and opposition figure Atiku reacted to its passage [^]. However, the criticism from the Senate focused on general revenue assumptions rather than specific oil production targets that would defy OPEC quotas [^].

8. Was Any OPEC Nation Censured for Non-Compliance in 2026?

Research Coverage Start DateJanuary 4, 2026 [^]
Research Coverage End DateApril 9, 2026 [^]
Censure Status for Late 2026Undeterminable due to lack of information [^]
Available research covers OPEC activities only through early Q2 2026. The provided web research, comprising official OPEC communiqués and press releases, details events and statements from January 4, 2026, to April 9, 2026 [^]. These sources focus specifically on the first quarter and early second quarter of 2026.
No information exists for the final two 2026 ministerial meetings. The available research does not include any communiqués or minutes from these specific meetings, which fall outside the covered period. Consequently, based solely on these sources, it is not possible to determine if any OPEC member nation was formally censured or threatened with a suspension of voting rights for 'persistent non-compliance' with production cut agreements or mandatory data submission requirements during those specific late 2026 meetings.

9. Was a 2027 OPEC+ production baseline rejected in late 2026?

2027 Baselines PlanAdopted in May 2025 [^]
UAE Withdrawal from OPEC+Effective May 1, 2026 [^]
OPEC+ Output November 2025Held steady; agreed on capacity mechanism [^]
Final 2026 OPEC+ meeting saw no formal 2027 baseline rejection. Insider reports from specialized energy press did not indicate that any specific country's delegation formally rejected the proposed 2027 production baseline during the final OPEC+ ministerial meeting of 2026, nor were there reports of a negotiation deadlock or a walk-out. In fact, OPEC+ members had already agreed on a plan for 2027 baselines as early as May 2025 [^]. Furthermore, OPEC+ reportedly maintained oil output and established a capacity mechanism in November 2025 [^], and by April 2026, the group agreed to increase oil output under specific future conditions [^].
UAE exited OPEC+ before the final 2026 ministerial meeting. The most significant related event identified was the withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from both OPEC and OPEC+, which was announced on April 28, 2026, and became effective May 1, 2026 [^]. This departure, while a major development for the alliance, occurred prior to the final 2026 ministerial meeting and represented a complete organizational exit rather than an in-meeting rejection of a proposed baseline by a member country.

10. What Could Change the Odds

Key Catalysts

Catalyst analysis unavailable.

Key Dates & Catalysts

  • Strike Date: January 01, 2027
  • Expiration: January 08, 2027
  • Closes: January 01, 2027

11. Decision-Flipping Events

  • Trigger: Catalyst analysis unavailable.

13. Historical Resolutions

No historical resolution data available for this series.