Which world leaders will leave office in 2026?
Short Answer
Both the model and the market overwhelmingly agree that Viktor Orbán is most likely to leave office in 2026, with only minor residual uncertainty.
1. Executive Verdict
- Viktor Orbán confirmed leaving office and resigned his parliament seat post-April 2026.
- Gustavo Petro's term constitutionally ends in 2026, prohibiting his re-election.
- The October 2026 Israeli election could precipitate Benjamin Netanyahu's departure.
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy faces wartime threats; Mohammed bin Salman faces internal political risks.
- Low-probability elite breakdown or coup attempts could remove Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xi Jinping | 2.4% | 0.8% | Leadership changes are not widely anticipated during this period. |
| Vladimir Putin | 12.0% | 5.1% | Domestic stability concerns and the Ukraine conflict challenge his ongoing leadership. |
| Keir Starmer | 71.0% | 62.2% | Current polling suggests his Labour Party is highly likely to win the next UK general election. |
| Benjamin Netanyahu | 50.0% | 39.5% | Domestic political instability and ongoing regional conflicts fuel calls for his resignation. |
| Gustavo Petro | 97.0% | 97.0% | He faces significant political challenges and a contentious reform agenda jeopardizing his term. |
Current Context
Numerous countries worldwide are scheduled to hold significant elections throughout 2026. Uganda is set for a general election on January 15 [^][^][^]. In the Republic of the Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who has been in power for 41 years and has previously bypassed age and term limits, is expected to seek another term in the March 15 election [^]. Across the Americas, Colombia has a presidential election scheduled for May 31, and Peru will hold one on April 12 [^][^]. The United States will conduct midterm elections on November 3, 2026, contesting all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 of the 100 seats in the Senate [^][^][^]. These midterms include gubernatorial elections in 39 states and territories, with California and Florida guaranteeing new leadership due to term-limited governors [^]. In Europe, a presidential election is slated for Portugal on January 18, and a parliamentary election for Hungary on April 12 [^][^]. Bulgaria has a parliamentary election on April 19 and a presidential election in November [^]. Asia will see a general election in Bangladesh on February 12, legislative elections in Vietnam on March 15, and a Knesset election in Israel by October 27, which will be closely watched [^][^][^].
Prediction markets identify several world leaders with varying probabilities of leaving office. Both models and prediction markets anticipate Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, potentially leaving office in 2026, with prediction markets placing his probability at 49% [^][^][^]. The parliamentary election in Hungary on April 12, 2026, will serve as a key test for his prolonged tenure [^][^]. Gustavo Petro, President of Colombia, shows a high probability (98%) of leaving office in 2026 in some prediction markets, though supporting research for this figure is not strong [^]. Other leaders with notable probabilities include Miguel Díaz-Canel, President of Cuba, with a 62% chance of leaving, and Christopher Luxon, Prime Minister of New Zealand, with a 53% chance [^]. Furthermore, prediction markets also mention Xi Jinping of China, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine as leaders with lower probabilities of departing office in 2026 [^].
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
This prediction market has exhibited a clear upward trend, with the probability of a world leader leaving office in 2026 rising from a low of 39.0% to its current price of 50.0%. A significant movement occurred between late April and early May, when the price jumped from 39.0% to 50.0%. This price increase appears to be linked to the market's growing awareness of the numerous significant elections scheduled for 2026. As detailed in recent news, countries like Uganda, the Republic of the Congo, Colombia, and Peru are all expected to hold major elections, each presenting a potential path for a leadership change and thus a "YES" resolution for this market.
The volume patterns suggest growing conviction behind the upward price movement. Trading volume was notably higher during the price surge in early May compared to the volume at the market's lower levels in late April. This indicates that the move toward a higher probability was backed by substantial market participation. The price of 50.0% has emerged as a key psychological level, suggesting traders currently view the outcome as a toss-up. The market's all-time high of 54.0% represents a potential resistance level, while the starting price of 39.0% acted as an initial support. Overall, the price action and volume indicate a strengthening market sentiment that at least one world leader will vacate their position during the specified timeframe, driven by the packed international electoral calendar.
3. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
This market resolves to Yes if Benjamin Netanyahu officially announces his intention to leave or actually leaves the office of Prime Minister of Israel before January 1, 2027, excluding temporary absences or death. If neither event occurs by that date, the market resolves to No, with the market closing by January 1, 2027, at 10:17 PM EST. Payout is projected 30 minutes after closing, and insider trading is prohibited.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Viktor Orbán | $1.00 | $0.01 | 100% |
| Gustavo Petro | $0.97 | $0.03 | 97% |
| Keir Starmer | $0.71 | $0.30 | 71% |
| Christopher Luxon | $0.56 | $0.48 | 53% |
| Benjamin Netanyahu | $0.50 | $0.51 | 50% |
| Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva | $0.20 | $0.81 | 19% |
| Volodymyr Zelenskyy | $0.17 | $0.84 | 16% |
| Emmanuel Macron | $0.15 | $0.86 | 14% |
| Vladimir Putin | $0.12 | $0.89 | 12% |
| Aleksandar Vučić | $0.11 | $0.90 | 11% |
| Giorgia Meloni | $0.14 | $0.88 | 10% |
| Ahmad al-Sharaa | $0.10 | $0.90 | 9% |
| Cyril Ramaphosa | $0.14 | $0.94 | 9% |
| Mark Carney | $0.03 | $0.98 | 7% |
| Daniel Noboa | $0.08 | $0.95 | 7% |
| Recep Tayyip Erdoğan | $0.08 | $0.93 | 7% |
| Kim Jong Un | $0.07 | $0.94 | 6% |
| Sanae Takaichi | $0.07 | $0.94 | 6% |
| Lee Jae Myung | $0.07 | $0.95 | 6% |
| Rodrigo Paz Pereira | $0.06 | $0.94 | 6% |
| Javier Milei | $0.06 | $0.95 | 5% |
| Narendra Modi | $0.07 | $0.95 | 5% |
| Nayib Bukele | $0.05 | $0.97 | 5% |
| Mohammed bin Salman | $0.06 | $0.95 | 4% |
| Xi Jinping | $0.02 | $0.98 | 2% |
| Claudia Sheinbaum | $0.04 | $0.98 | 2% |
| Miguel Díaz-Canel | $0.63 | $0.38 | 62% |
| Delcy Rodriguez | $0.29 | $0.74 | 26% |
| Pedro Sánchez | $0.27 | $0.74 | 26% |
| Jens-Frederik Nielsen | $0.13 | $0.88 | 17% |
| Mette Frederiksen | $0.16 | $0.85 | 15% |
| Friedrich Merz | $0.14 | $0.87 | 13% |
| Denis Sassou Nguesso | $0.08 | $0.93 | 12% |
| Félix Tshisekedi | $0.08 | $0.96 | 12% |
| Frederik X | $0.04 | $0.97 | 5% |
| Irfaan Ali | $0.05 | $0.95 | 5% |
Market Discussion
Traders are actively discussing the likelihood of various world leaders leaving office in 2026, with a strong interest in expanding the market to include more leaders like Daniel Ortega. For Miguel Díaz-Canel, a key argument against him leaving ("No" position) suggests improving US-Cuba relations, including compromises on blockades and prisoner releases, might stabilize his position. While specific "Yes" arguments for the listed leaders are not detailed in the snippets, the market probabilities indicate significant perceived risk for Díaz-Canel (62%), Christopher Luxon (53%), and Benjamin Netanyahu (50%).
4. What political factors surrounding the April 2026 Hungarian election and the October 2026 Israeli election could precipitate the departures of Viktor Orbán and Benjamin Netanyahu?
| Orbán's Rule Length | 16 years [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Orbán Party Seat Change | from 135 to 52 seats [^] |
| Netanyahu Election Date | October 2026 [^] |
Viktor Orbán's 16-year rule concluded after a significant election defeat. His party experienced a substantial loss in the April 2026 Hungarian election, leading him to concede defeat and step down from his parliamentary seat [^][^][^]. His party's representation notably decreased from 135 seats to 52 seats [^]. This outcome is largely attributed to domestic political issues, including concerns over corruption, an increasing authoritarian drift, and a broad rejection of Orbán's "illiberal" model by both the public and political elites [^][^][^].
Benjamin Netanyahu faces significant political challenges before Israel's 2026 election. As of late April 2026, polls indicate he could lose his governing majority if elections were held sooner [^]. A primary reason for his potential departure centers on a failure of coalition arithmetic, which might necessitate adding new parties to retain his position as prime minister [^]. Constraints from the right-wing opposition, such as reluctance to form a government with Arab support, could lead to political deadlock or internal factional splits that ultimately unseat him [^]. Additional factors contributing to his declining popularity include his ongoing legal battles over bribery and fraud charges, his controversial leadership on judicial reforms, and various accountability and security failures [^].
5. What evidence supports the high prediction market odds of Gustavo Petro leaving office in 2026, given Colombia's presidential election is not scheduled until May 31?
| Presidential Term Conclusion | 2026 [^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Next Presidential Election | May 31, 2026 [^][^][^] |
| Petro's Approval Rating (early 2026) | 47-54% [^][^][^][^] |
President Gustavo Petro's term is constitutionally limited, ending in 2026. He is prohibited from seeking re-election [^][^][^]. Colombia's next presidential election is set for May 31, 2026, with a potential runoff on June 21, 2026 [^][^][^]. The new administration is expected to take office on August 7, 2026, ensuring Petro's departure before January 1, 2027, which aligns with prediction market resolution criteria [^].
Petro's administration faces significant political and legal challenges. Colombia is marked by high political polarization, with President Petro often adopting a confrontational stance towards other government branches [^]. His coalition lost control of the Senate, impeding the passage of key reforms in healthcare, labor, and education, some of which Congress has already rejected [^][^]. Critics have voiced concerns about a potential constitutional crisis, particularly regarding Petro's proposals for a constituent assembly, which would require congressional approval he currently lacks [^]. Additionally, the government has been "tainted by corruption scandals" [^]. Reports from March 2026 indicated a U.S. investigation into whether Petro met with drug traffickers and solicited donations for his 2022 presidential campaign, though he has not been charged [^].
Security and economic issues persist, alongside fluctuating public approval. The government's "Total Peace" policy has not substantially improved security, with an escalation of violence from non-state armed groups [^]. The assassination of a presidential hopeful in 2025 has also evoked fears of renewed political violence [^][^][^]. Economically, Colombia is grappling with substantial fiscal pressures, including an elevated fiscal deficit and persistent inflation [^][^][^]. Despite these numerous challenges, some polls conducted in early 2026 showed a rebound in President Petro's approval ratings, reaching between 47% and 54%, suggesting a degree of resilience within his support base [^][^][^][^].
6. How do the primary threats to Volodymyr Zelenskyy's leadership in wartime Ukraine compare to the internal political risks facing Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia during 2026?
| Zelenskyy Approval Rating | 67% in 2025 [^][^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia Projected Deficit | $44 billion for 2026 [^][^][^] |
| Ukraine Election Pressure | 2026 from international partners [^][^] |
Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership in 2026 faces direct and volatile threats stemming from the ongoing war. The prospect of significant territorial loss or a prolonged stalemate could severely undermine public morale and confidence in his leadership [^][^]. While his approval ratings initially soared, they stabilized at around 67% in 2025, partly attributed to corruption scandals involving his associates [^][^][^][^][^]. Despite martial law constitutionally prohibiting elections, there is pressure from international partners, including the United States, to organize national elections in 2026, which would necessitate legal and constitutional amendments and could lead to a loss of power [^][^]. Any peace agreement perceived as making too many concessions could be "catastrophic" for his standing and might provoke radical elements [^][^]. Reports from early 2026 also suggest an unfolding power struggle within Ukraine, notably involving military general Kyrylo Budanov, whose high approval ratings signal a potential internal challenge [^].
Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership risks in 2026 are systemic, primarily economic and social. Ambitious "giga-projects" like NEOM are being scaled back and delayed due to mounting costs, fiscal deficits, and fluctuating oil revenues, with the kingdom projecting a deficit of approximately $44 billion for 2026 [^][^][^]. The challenge lies in maintaining fiscal stability and introducing new financial burdens on the younger population without the traditional state welfare, which could lead to public discontent if economic benefits do not materialize broadly [^][^]. While MBS has introduced social reforms appealing to the youth, these changes risk opposition from the ultraconservative religious establishment [^][^][^][^]. By 2026, MBS has consolidated near-total control over all levers of power, having sidelined rivals within the royal family and implemented "high-tech totalitarianism" to monitor and suppress dissent [^][^][^][^]. The long-term stability of this centralized power structure, especially upon formal succession, remains a factor, with significant changes unlikely unless a severe black swan event occurs [^].
7. What is the availability and historical reliability of public opinion polling for the key 2026 national elections in Hungary, Israel, and Brazil?
| Hungary 2022 Fidesz-KDNP poll underestimation | ~16–20 points [^] |
|---|---|
| Hungary Závecz average deviation | ~4.9 percentage points [^] |
| Brazil AtlasIntel sample size | 5,008 [^] |
Hungarian public opinion polling is available but shows significant historical reliability issues. While availability is high, with multiple institutes frequently releasing polls, its historical reliability exhibits identifiable bias [^]. One tracker noted a 2022 independent poll underestimation of Fidesz-KDNP by approximately 16–20 points [^]. Additionally, the pollster Závecz showed an average final pre-election deviation of about 4.9 percentage points from actual results [^]. Despite these reliability concerns, reports predict that Hungary's incumbent Viktor Orbán is expected to lose the 2026 election, ending his 16-year rule [^][^].
Polling for Israel and Brazil is highly available, but reliability concerns persist. For the 2026 Israeli legislative election, polling availability is high, with ongoing polls listed and election-silence rules noted [^]. However, reliability varies significantly across pollster groups; an analysis highlighted that five out of seven major firms consistently reported a bloc stalemate, whereas two others (Filber and Direct Polls) indicated a comfortable coalition victory, suggesting systematic differences rather than random variation [^]. In Brazil, 2026 national presidential polling availability is very strong [^]. AtlasIntel, for instance, conducted fieldwork from April 22–27, 2026, with a sample size of 5,008 and a ±1% margin of error [^]. Aggregators and trackers compile numerous poll releases registered with the TSE [^][^]. Despite this strong current availability, the provided sources primarily document the present closeness of the race rather than offering a cross-cycle historical polling error metric for Brazil's 2026 elections [^].
8. What are the most credible, albeit low-probability, 'black swan' scenarios that could lead to the departures of Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin in 2026?
| Xi Jinping Departure Scenario | Elite breakdown or coup attempt before December 31, 2026 [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Putin Coup Concerns Began | Early March 2026 [^][^][^] |
| Xi Jinping Risk Dynamics | After January 2026, tied to PLA general purges [^][^][^] |
Credible, low-probability scenarios for leadership changes involve elite breakdown or coup attempts. For Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin to depart office by the end of 2026, the most credible yet low-probability "black swan" scenarios entail an elite breakdown or a coup attempt, resulting in their permanent removal [^][^]. Xi Jinping's highly centralized and purge-driven governance style is linked to a weakening of institutional capacity and an increased risk of catastrophic miscalculation or elite breakdown [^][^][^]. This heightened risk is specifically anticipated after January 2026, including potential purges or investigations of top People's Liberation Army generals like Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli [^][^][^].
Putin's Kremlin expresses ongoing concerns regarding potential plots and assassination attempts. Intelligence reports indicate that since early March 2026, the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin have voiced concerns about leaks and the potential for a "plot or coup attempt" [^][^][^]. These concerns have particularly focused on the possibility of drone assassination attempts carried out by members of the Russian political elite, which has led to a tightening of Putin's personal security measures [^][^][^].
9. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
In Hungarian politics, Viktor Orbán confirmed leaving the Prime Minister's office following an election defeat to Péter Magyar post-April 2026 [^] . He resigned his parliament seat in April 2026 [^][^]. Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, with a 69% market probability, is facing backlash in the May 7, 2026 UK local elections due to plummeting approval [^][^]. Christopher Luxon also faces low approval, holding a 56% market probability, amid what is described as a global incumbency curse as of March-May 2026 [^].
French President Emmanuel Macron has only a 16% probability to leave office in 2026; his term is scheduled to end in May 2027 [^] . Macron plans full political retirement post-term [^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Expiration: January 08, 2027
- Closes: January 02, 2027
10. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: In Hungarian politics, Viktor Orbán confirmed leaving the Prime Minister's office following an election defeat to Péter Magyar post-April 2026 [^] .
- Trigger: He resigned his parliament seat in April 2026 [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, with a 69% market probability, is facing backlash in the May 7, 2026 UK local elections due to plummeting approval [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Christopher Luxon also faces low approval, holding a 56% market probability, amid what is described as a global incumbency curse as of March-May 2026 [^] .
12. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
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