Which countries will normalize relations with Israel before 2027?
Short Answer
The model sees potential mispricing for Colombia normalizing relations with Israel before 2027, with Colombia at 40.7% model vs 53.0% market, suggesting a divergence in expected outcomes.
1. Executive Verdict
- Saudi Arabia stipulates specific conditions for normalization with Israel.
- Covert security and economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel is expanding.
- Saudi Arabia's normalization incentives focus on strategic gains with the U.S.
- Potential Trump and Biden administrations show differing Abraham Accords expansion strategies.
- A potential Trump administration may boost Abraham Accords expansion efforts.
- Indonesia and Mauritania hold fundamentally different stances on Israeli normalization.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 19.0% | 7.7% | Saudi Arabia is expected to normalize relations with Israel before 2027. |
| Lebanon | 14.0% | 6.3% | Lebanon is expected to normalize relations with Israel before 2027. |
| Syria | 6.0% | 2.2% | Syria is expected to normalize relations with Israel before 2027. |
| Indonesia | 5.4% | 2.0% | Indonesia is expected to normalize relations with Israel before 2027. |
| Oman | 9.9% | 4.0% | Oman is expected to normalize relations with Israel before 2027. |
Current Context
Saudi Arabia maintains its condition for normalizing relations with Israel. As of May 25, 2026, Saudi Arabia reaffirmed that it would not normalize relations with Israel without a clear, irreversible pathway to Palestinian statehood [^][^]. Despite this stance, former President Trump publicly urged several nations, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, to join the Abraham Accords. This push, reported on May 27, 2026, was framed within a broader regional context, linking it to an Iran-war/region framework [^][^].
Geopolitical efforts and market predictions reflect ongoing normalization discussions. A prediction market example, such as the Polymarket question "Israel and Saudi Arabia normalize relations before 2027?", assesses the probability of such an event [^]. This market defines resolution as "Yes" only if both nations officially announce the establishment of diplomatic relations by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET [^]. At the time of capture, the crowd probability for this outcome stood at approximately 13% [^].
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
The price for this market has remained in a relatively stable, sideways pattern, trading within a range of 14% to 34% throughout its history. The market opened at a 20% probability and is currently trading at 19%, indicating no significant long-term shift in sentiment. A notable recent movement includes a dip to 17% around May 20, followed by a slight recovery to 19% by May 27. This modest increase coincides with reports of former President Trump's public push for several Arab nations to normalize relations with Israel. However, the price remains low, likely anchored by Saudi Arabia's reaffirmation on May 25 that it would not normalize relations without a pathway to Palestinian statehood.
The market's price action suggests a clear resistance level near 34% and a support level around 14%. The total traded volume of 8,970 contracts indicates that there has been significant interest in this market over time. However, the sample data points for recent dates show zero volume, which suggests that the latest price adjustments occurred on very light trading activity. This low recent volume could indicate a lack of strong conviction from traders or that the market is waiting for a more significant catalyst before making a decisive move.
Overall, the chart reflects a market with persistent skepticism about the likelihood of another country normalizing relations with Israel before 2027. The current price of 19% shows that traders assign a low probability to this outcome. Sentiment appears to be more heavily influenced by the stated conditions of key regional players like Saudi Arabia rather than by political rhetoric. The inability of the price to break above the established range, coupled with low recent trading volume, suggests that the market expects the current geopolitical stalemate to continue.
3. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
A YES resolution occurs if Israel and Colombia normalize diplomatic relations and ratify an agreement before January 1, 2027. A NO resolution occurs if this condition is not met by the deadline. The market will close early if the event happens, otherwise it closes by January 1, 2027, 10:00am EST, with outcomes verified using The New York Times and Israel's government website (gov.il/en).
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia | $0.56 | $0.47 | 53% |
| Saudi Arabia | $0.22 | $0.79 | 19% |
| Lebanon | $0.16 | $0.87 | 14% |
| Djibouti | $0.12 | $0.91 | 13% |
| Mauritania | $0.11 | $0.94 | 12% |
| Belize | $0.12 | $0.90 | 10% |
| Maldives | $0.10 | $0.95 | 10% |
| Oman | $0.11 | $0.94 | 10% |
| Iran | $0.17 | $0.95 | 6% |
| Syria | $0.09 | $0.94 | 6% |
| Indonesia | $0.10 | $0.95 | 5% |
| Comoros | $0.13 | $0.96 | 5% |
Market Discussion
The market discussion primarily focuses on Colombia, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon normalizing relations with Israel before 2027. While Colombia holds the highest market probability, some traders argue existing diplomatic relations are being misinterpreted, or express skepticism about the market's chosen news sources. Lebanon's prospects are debated, with some optimistically viewing ceasefire deals as a precursor to normalization, while others strongly question whether such agreements meet the criteria and highlight Hezbollah's influence as a significant impediment.
4. What specific, credible steps towards a two-state solution would be required to satisfy Saudi Arabia's conditions for normalization with Israel before 2027?
| Conditions for normalization | Resolution of Gaza conflict and establishment of an independent Palestinian state based on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as capital [^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Evolution of Saudi's demands | Hardened from a "credible pathway" to "irreversible steps" toward Palestinian state recognition and establishment [^][^][^] |
| Normalization status (May 2026) | Not on the current agenda and highly unlikely before 2027 [^][^][^] |
Saudi Arabia demands specific steps for normalization with Israel. To achieve normalization with Israel before 2027, Saudi Arabia has stipulated conditions that include the prior resolution of the conflict in Gaza. This must be succeeded by the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, defined by the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem designated as its capital [^][^][^]. Saudi Arabia's position has evolved, strengthening from an initial demand for a "credible pathway" to a two-state solution to now requiring "irreversible steps" towards the actual recognition and establishment of a Palestinian state [^][^][^]. However, the specific actions or sequence comprising these "irreversible steps" remain undefined [^][^][^][^][^][^].
Normalization appears unlikely given current regional political dynamics. As of May 2026, Saudi Arabia has indicated that normalization with Israel is not currently under consideration and will not proceed with talks before upcoming Israeli elections [^][^]. The prevailing political environment in 2026, influenced by factors such as the ongoing conflict in Gaza, broader regional instability, and internal Israeli political dynamics, makes the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia highly improbable before 2027 [^][^].
5. What evidence exists of covert security or economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel that indicates a trajectory towards normalization?
| Regional Security Construct | Includes Saudi Arabia and Israel for air-defense coordination by 2024 [^] |
|---|---|
| Airspace Access | Saudi Arabia opened airspace to all carriers, including Israel (2022-07-14) [^] |
| Normalization Status | Not currently on Saudi Arabia's agenda (February 2026) [^] |
Covert security and economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel is expanding. A CENTCOM-operated “Regional Security Construct” reportedly includes both nations, emphasizing air-defense coordination and the integration of radar and sensor data with US systems by 2024 [^]. This initiative aligns with earlier discussions reported in 2022 concerning joint defense strategies against Iran [^]. Economically, Saudi Arabia signaled increased connectivity by opening its airspace to all air carriers, including flights from Israel, in July 2022 [^].
Saudi Arabia maintains a cautious stance on full normalization with Israel. As of February 2026, normalization with Israel is not considered an immediate priority for the Kingdom, which cites specific conditions and risk factors [^]. Furthermore, a May 2026 report indicated that Saudi Arabia would likely delay any significant normalization measures until after upcoming Israeli parliamentary elections, underscoring ongoing political uncertainties despite signs of developing ties [^].
6. How do the primary economic and security incentives for normalizing relations with Israel differ between Saudi Arabia and Oman?
| Saudi Arabia's primary incentives for normalization | Formal defense treaty with U.S., advanced U.S. defense technology, civil nuclear energy support [^][^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Oman's diplomatic strategy | Prioritizes regional neutrality, mediation capacity, and domestic legitimacy [^][^][^] |
| Likelihood of normalization before 2027 | Unlikely as of May 2026 [^][^][^] |
Saudi Arabia's primary incentives for normalizing relations with Israel are centered on strategic gains with the U.S., specifically securing a formal defense treaty, gaining access to advanced American defense technology, and obtaining support for its civil nuclear energy program [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] . The Kingdom also aims to elevate its regional leadership position. This potential diplomatic shift is considered transformative and hinges critically on establishing a credible pathway to a Palestinian state [^][^][^].
Oman, in contrast, adheres to a distinct 'middle-of-the-road' diplomatic approach emphasizing regional neutrality, its mediation capabilities, and domestic legitimacy [^] [^] [^] . - MEPIN™">[^][^]. Consequently, it views normalization with Israel as a lower-priority policy and has declined to independently join the Abraham Accords [^][^][^]. Oman is therefore unlikely to normalize relations until Saudi Arabia proceeds or until broader regional conflicts substantially de-escalate [^][^][^][^][^][^]. For both nations, the conflict in Gaza has significantly hindered progress, rendering normalization with Israel before 2027 improbable as of May 2026, due to unresolved preconditions [^][^][^].
7. How might the diplomatic strategies for expanding the Abraham Accords differ between a potential Trump administration and a continuing Biden administration in 2025-2026?
| Trump Admin Strategy | High-pressure "grand bargain" tying Abraham Accords expansion to Iran conflict settlement (May 2026) [^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Israel-Saudi Normalization Probability | 13%–24% before January 1, 2027 (as of April/May 2026) [^][^][^][^] |
| First Central Asian Abraham Accords Expansion | Kazakhstan, early 2026, focusing on cybersecurity and water management [^] |
Potential Trump and Biden administrations show differing Abraham Accords expansion strategies. As of May 2026, a potential Trump administration would adopt a high-pressure "grand bargain" strategy. This approach would explicitly mandate that key Muslim-majority nations, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, join the Abraham Accords as a condition for participation in a broader regional settlement to end the ongoing conflict with Iran [^][^][^][^]. This strategy contrasts with the prior Biden administration's focus on incremental diplomacy and regional integration through mechanisms like the Lowey Fund [^][^].
Structural challenges hinder Saudi-Israel normalization despite new accord expansions. Despite these differing administrative approaches, prediction markets as of April/May 2026 assign a low probability, typically 13%–24%, to Israel and Saudi Arabia normalizing relations before January 1, 2027 [^][^][^][^]. This low probability is attributed to structural obstacles, the unresolved Gaza conflict, and Saudi requirements for a credible Palestinian statehood pathway [^][^][^][^]. In a distinct development, Kazakhstan became the first country to expand the Abraham Accords into Central Asia in early 2026, focusing on areas such as cybersecurity and water management [^].
8. What are the key differences in domestic political opposition to normalization with Israel between Indonesia and Mauritania?
| Mauritania previous normalization | Normalized in 1999, severed by March 2010 [^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Indonesian public opinion on Israel | 80% unfavorable toward Israel (June 2025 poll) [^][^] |
| Mauritania anti-normalization fatwa | Reportedly issued by 200 scholars and Imams in 2021 [^] |
Indonesia and Mauritania hold fundamentally different stances on Israeli normalization. Mauritania previously established diplomatic ties with Israel in 1999 but severed them by March 2010, primarily due to significant public outrage over Israeli military actions in Gaza, reflecting persistent public discomfort [^][^][^]. In contrast, Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation, has never formally recognized Israel, consistently aligning its foreign policy with the Palestinian cause [^][^][^].
Domestic opposition significantly constrains normalization efforts in both nations. In Mauritania, this opposition was powerful enough to reverse an existing diplomatic relationship, with parliamentarians calling for the criminalization of normalization and some political figures facing arrest for their views [^][^][^]. A 2021 fatwa, reportedly issued by 200 Mauritanian scholars and Imams, further prohibits normalization [^]. For Indonesia, opposition is a deeply ingrained and continuous constraint, making any move towards rapprochement highly risky due to the strong potential for mass protests and significant backlash from religious leaders, which could erode governmental legitimacy [^][^][^]. A June 2025 poll indicated 80% of the Indonesian public holds unfavorable views toward Israel [^][^].
Current diplomatic status reflects persistent opposition and specific conditions. Mauritania explicitly ended its ties, and its government has denied reports in 2023 and 2025 about potential renewed discussions, as public sentiment remains strongly opposed [^][^][^]. Indonesia consistently states that normalization is conditional on achieving Palestinian independence, a prerequisite strongly supported by its population, and has denied any plans for diplomatic ties without this fulfillment [^][^][^][^]. This "Palestinian veto" acts as a significant democratic limitation on Indonesian leaders [^].
9. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
While one market indicates a 53% chance of normalization, another analysis suggests this might be an overestimation, placing the probability at 46.4% [^] . Prediction markets generally show low probabilities for specific countries, ranging from 8% to 19% for Saudi Arabia and 1% to 14% for Lebanon [^]. Bullish catalysts for normalization include active U.S. mediation, particularly under a Trump administration, which has linked agreements to broader regional peace efforts, including a potential deal with Iran [^][^][^][^][^][^][^]. Additionally, the promise of economic benefits and aid packages can motivate countries [^][^][^], along with shared regional concerns about Iran's influence [^][^].
Key impediments, or bearish catalysts, include the lack of significant progress toward a two-state solution and Palestinian sovereignty, which is a major stumbling block for many Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Oman [^] [^] [^] . Saudi Arabia's stance is heavily contingent on progress toward a clear and binding pathway for a Palestinian state, a condition currently opposed by Israel's government, making normalization by 2027 appear challenging despite past discussions [^][^][^][^]. Regional conflicts, such as the ongoing conflict in Gaza and heightened tensions in Lebanon, have fueled anti-Israel sentiment, rendering normalization politically challenging for leaders [^][^][^]. Lebanon's prospects for full normalization before 2027 are considered low due to ongoing Israeli military actions in Lebanon and explicit rejections by its Prime Minister, despite U.S.-hosted talks in May 2026 aimed at a comprehensive peace agreement [^][^][^]. Moreover, internal instability, as demonstrated by Sudan's delayed formal ratification of its October 2020 agreement due to ongoing internal instability, can delay or derail normalization processes [^][^][^]. Furthermore, declining U.S. public support for Israel could potentially impact future U.S. diplomatic leverage [^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Expiration: January 01, 2027
- Closes: January 01, 2027
10. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: While one market indicates a 53% chance of normalization, another analysis suggests this might be an overestimation, placing the probability at 46.4% [^] .
- Trigger: Prediction markets generally show low probabilities for specific countries, ranging from 8% to 19% for Saudi Arabia and 1% to 14% for Lebanon [^] .
- Trigger: Bullish catalysts for normalization include active U.S.
- Trigger: Mediation, particularly under a Trump administration, which has linked agreements to broader regional peace efforts, including a potential deal with Iran [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] .
12. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
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