Which countries will normalize relations with Israel before 2027?
Short Answer
The model sees potential mispricing: Colombia at 46.4% model vs 58.0% market, suggesting the market may be overestimating the likelihood of Colombia normalizing relations with Israel before 2027.
1. Executive Verdict
- Saudi Arabia requires independent nuclear fuel cycle for normalization.
- Public information on Indonesian normalization-related domestic unrest is limited.
- Aid packages for Oman and Mauritania normalization remain publicly undisclosed.
- U.S. Senate whip count for a Saudi defense treaty is unavailable.
- Research lacks details on imminent IRGC-Quds covert operations against Saudi/UAE.
- Internal analysis suggests lower likelihood than current market expectations.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 20.0% | 7.5% | The market's 10.1% debiased probability correctly reflects the difficulty of normalization, but Saudi Arabia's reported abandonment of a U.S. defense treaty due to an ongoing stalemate with Israel suggests the probability is even lower. |
| Lebanon | 24.0% | 8.5% | The background research details the stalled and complex demands for Saudi Arabia's normalization but entirely omits Lebanon, strongly suggesting the 13% market price is overvalued given Lebanon's deeply entrenched anti-Israel factions and the absence of any credible path to normalization before 2027, despite speculative scenarios of drastic political shifts. |
| Syria | 13.0% | 5.7% | The provided background research exclusively details Saudi Arabia's demands for normalization with Israel and offers no information regarding Syria, providing no evidence to shift the debiased anchor. |
| Indonesia | 14.0% | 6.3% | The provided background research focuses exclusively on Saudi Arabia's demands for normalization and contains no information specific to Indonesia, making it neutral evidence for this outcome relative to the market's debiased price. |
| Oman | 10.0% | 4.1% | The provided background research details Saudi Arabia's demands for normalization with Israel, offering no specific evidence regarding Oman to support or contradict the debiased market price of 4.1%. |
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
Based on the chart data for the market "Which countries will normalize relations with Israel before 2027?", the price action indicates a prolonged sideways trend. The market has been trading within a very narrow 6-point range, with a clear support level established around 19% and resistance near 25%. The current price of 20% is identical to its starting price, reinforcing the lack of a definitive long-term trend. This tight channel suggests that traders have maintained a consistent, low-probability outlook on the event occurring. There was a brief spike to 24% in late April 2026, but it was quickly sold off, returning to the 20% level, demonstrating the strength of the resistance in the mid-20s.
Without any accompanying news or specific context provided, the direct cause for short-term fluctuations, such as the rise to 24% and subsequent fall, cannot be determined from the price data alone. These movements occurred on zero reported volume for those specific dates, which could suggest that the price changes were driven by very few trades or adjustments in offers rather than a broad shift in market activity. The overall trading volume of 11,130 contracts indicates that there has been significant interest in the market over its lifetime, but the lack of volume during specific price moves implies that these shifts may not have been backed by strong conviction.
Overall, the market sentiment appears stable and skeptical. The consistent trading below the 25% level indicates that participants collectively assess the probability of another country normalizing relations with Israel before 2027 at a relatively low 1-in-5 chance. The failure of the price to break out of its established range suggests an equilibrium where new information has not been significant enough to fundamentally alter the market's long-term forecast.
3. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
This market resolves to Yes if Israel and Colombia normalize diplomatic relations and ratify an agreement before January 1, 2027. If these conditions are not met, the market resolves to No. The market will close early if normalization occurs, or by January 1, 2027, at 10:00 am EST otherwise, with outcomes verified by The New York Times and Israel.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia | $0.58 | $0.46 | 58% |
| Lebanon | $0.24 | $0.77 | 24% |
| Saudi Arabia | $0.20 | $0.81 | 20% |
| Indonesia | $0.14 | $0.90 | 14% |
| Syria | $0.13 | $0.88 | 13% |
| Mauritania | $0.12 | $0.94 | 12% |
| Oman | $0.10 | $0.94 | 10% |
| Belize | $0.12 | $0.90 | 10% |
| Djibouti | $0.13 | $0.91 | 9% |
| Maldives | $0.11 | $0.93 | 5% |
| Comoros | $0.14 | $0.95 | 5% |
Market Discussion
Traders are debating the true meaning of "normalization" for Colombia, with some arguing existing relations make a "Yes" outcome misaligned with the market's premise, while others hold out for further developments. For Lebanon, key arguments against normalization center on the distinction between a ceasefire and full diplomatic relations, compounded by Hezbollah's influence, though some traders remain optimistic about long-term potential. There is no clear consensus, with significant skepticism regarding both Lebanon's feasibility and the interpretation of Colombia's current diplomatic status.
4. What are Saudi Arabia's key demands for normalization with Israel?
| Nuclear Fuel Production | Right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium on its own soil [^] |
|---|---|
| IAEA Protocol Exemption | Seeks exemption from signing an Additional Protocol of the IAEA [^] |
| U.S. Defense Treaty Status | Reportedly abandoned pursuit of U.S. defense treaty [^] |
Saudi Arabia's core nuclear demands center on independent fuel cycle capabilities. Its non-negotiable terms for a civilian nuclear program include the right to domestically enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, alongside unfettered access to nuclear fuel production capabilities [^]. A key demand also involves not being required to sign the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which typically mandates more intrusive inspections [^]. Reports indicate that the United States has shown an openness to relaxing certain nonproliferation 'guardrails' in response to these Saudi requests [^].
Saudi Arabia has withdrawn its demand for a U.S. security pact. While initially a central condition for normalizing relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia reportedly abandoned its pursuit of a U.S. defense treaty by November 2024 [^]. This decision was attributed to the continued stalemate concerning normalization with Israel, leading to the security pact no longer being considered part of Saudi Arabia's "final price" for normalization due to a lack of progress on the Israeli front [^].
5. What Potential Domestic Unrest Could Arise from Indonesian-Israel Normalization?
| Nahdlatul Ulama Stance | Publicly rebuked members for meeting Israel's president, signaling strong disapproval [^] |
|---|---|
| Indonesian Govt. Position | Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly asserted no normalization with Israel [^] |
| Potential for Unrest | Significant potential for domestic unrest from major Muslim organizations [^] |
Specific internal government assessments on unrest are not publicly available. While private polling or risk assessments by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu RI) regarding domestic unrest from groups like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are not publicly accessible, available public information indicates strong opposition to engagement with Israel from Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations. The Kemlu RI has publicly stated that there is no normalization with Israel, underscoring the extreme sensitivity of this issue [^].
Key religious groups demonstrate potential for significant domestic unrest. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, publicly rebuked its members for meeting with Israel’s president. This action clearly demonstrated strong disapproval and suggested a likelihood of 'public backlash' against any normalization efforts [^].
The Indonesian government is highly sensitive to potential instability. The strong stance of these organizations, combined with a general public sentiment against actions involving Israel, implies that the government is acutely aware of the potential for significant instability should normalization be announced [^]. Although a precise government threshold for political instability is not explicitly defined, the robust public and organizational opposition strongly suggests that normalization would carry a high risk of exceeding such a threshold.
6. Are Specific Normalization Aid Packages Offered to Oman, Mauritania?
| Mauritania Normalization Incentives | Broadly described economic and security aid, not specified (No formal offers detailed) [^] |
|---|---|
| Oman Strategic Dialogue | Held January 2026, reaffirmed US support for defense and economic reforms; no specific aid linked to normalization [^] |
| Mauritania IMF Agreement | Staff-level agreement April 2026 (Extended Fund Facility, Extended Credit Facility, Resilience and Sustainability Facility); not linked to normalization [^] |
Specific normalization-linked aid packages for Oman and Mauritania remain undisclosed. Available web research indicates that concrete economic and military aid packages directly tied to normalization efforts with Israel, formally offered to Oman and Mauritania in ongoing back-channel discussions, are not detailed in public sources. While broader discussions of potential incentives and cooperation exist, specific offers are not specified.
Mauritania may receive US incentives for Israel normalization, but specifics are vague. Reports suggest the United States may offer various incentives, including security assistance and economic aid, to encourage Mauritania's normalization with Israel [^]. These potential benefits are generally described as deepening economic and security cooperation and providing tangible benefits for Mauritania's development [^]. However, the exact nature, amounts, or formal offers of such aid explicitly linked to normalization discussions are not specified. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff-level agreement with Mauritania in April 2026 for various facilities is noted, but this is presented as part of Mauritania's ongoing economic engagement with the IMF and is not described as being linked to potential normalization with Israel [^].
Oman has no detailed normalization-linked aid packages in current reports. The available research does not detail any specific 'normalization-linked' economic or military aid packages being formally offered to Oman. The U.S. and Oman held their Third Strategic Dialogue in January 2026, where the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to supporting Oman's defense capabilities and welcomed Oman's commitment to economic reforms [^]. This dialogue covered security cooperation, economic growth, trade, and investment, but the joint statement does not link these areas of cooperation or any specific aid packages to potential normalization with Israel [^]. Oman has previously expressed a complex regional stance, including regret regarding Israeli and U.S. military operations against Iran [^].
7. Is There Bipartisan Support for a U.S.-Saudi Defense Treaty?
| Required Senate Votes | 67 votes for ratification [^] |
|---|---|
| Senator Graham's Confidence | Believes "we can get to 67, and I think we will" [^] |
| Key Conditions for Support | Israeli normalization and human rights concerns [^] |
A precise Senate whip count for a U.S.-Saudi defense treaty is not publicly available. Ratification of any such treaty would necessitate 67 votes in the U.S. Senate [^]. Despite the lack of an exact tally, there are strong indications of increasing bipartisan support for such an agreement. Key senators on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have expressed optimistic views, with Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) believing the required 67 votes can be secured, and Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) observing growing support for the pact within the Senate [^].
Support for a defense pact hinges on critical conditions, even from past critics. Prominent critics of Saudi Arabia, such as Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), have indicated an openness to the general concept of a defense agreement [^]. However, this openness is contingent upon significant conditions, primarily ensuring the treaty's effectiveness in securing Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia and adequately addressing human rights concerns. Meeting these specific conditions would be vital for gaining broader acceptance, particularly among senators who have historically been critical of Saudi Arabia [^].
8. Are IRGC-Quds Covert Operations Against Saudi/UAE Imminent?
| Briefed Covert Operations | No specific operations briefed to leadership identified in sources [^]. |
|---|---|
| Normalization Trigger Link | No specific link to a normalization announcement as a trigger identified [^]. |
| 30-Day Deployment Window | No specific 30-day timeframe for deployment identified [^]. |
The provided research does not detail specific, prepared covert operations by Iran's IRGC-Quds Force that have been briefed to its leadership for deployment against Saudi or Emirati interests within 30 days of a normalization announcement. The available information also does not attribute such specific operational plans or details to Mossad or DIA intelligence assessments.
General IRGC-Quds Force capabilities were discussed in the research. While the available sources discuss the IRGC-Quds Force's general capabilities and proxy networks [^], and one report mentions a broader 'plot to attack Saudi Arabia' [^], none of these specifically outline plots briefed to leadership, tied to a normalization announcement as a trigger, or within a 30-day timeframe. Additionally, source [^] mentions Mossad only in the context of Saudi-Israeli coordination against Iran, rather than providing details on Iranian operational plans from a Mossad perspective.
9. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
Catalyst analysis unavailable.
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Expiration: January 01, 2027
- Closes: January 01, 2027
10. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Catalyst analysis unavailable.
12. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
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