Miguel Díaz-Canel leaves office?

Miguel Díaz-Canel holds formal power, but hardliners maintain significant behind-the-scenes influence. Díaz-Canel serves as Cuba's President and First Secretary of the Communist Party, marking him as the first civilian leader in over six decades, having been personally selected by Raúl Castro ^{[^]}. Despite these official roles, reports indicate that Díaz-Canel has encountered difficulties in fully consolidating his personal authority, with some hardliners viewing him as an outsider ^{[^]}. The true balance of power frequently resides with veteran hardliners, particularly Raúl Castro, who, even after his retirement from formal leadership, remains a highly influential figure behind the scenes, maintaining substantial control over the military and intelligence services ^{[^]}. His son, General Alejandro Castro Espín, often referred to as "Cuba's prince in the shadows," further reinforces this hardline influence, wielding considerable sway within intelligence and security, advising his father, and identified as a potential successor to Díaz-Canel ^{[^]}.

Recent MININT appointments demonstrate Raúl Castro's continued hardline authority. Personnel changes within the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) highlight the sustained hardline influence and Raúl Castro's active role. In June 2025, Raúl Castro publicly promoted General Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas to the position of Minister of the Interior ^{[^]}. This direct intervention in a crucial security appointment underscores Castro's ongoing authority and the hardliners' sustained control over MININT, solidifying their alignment within the institution ^{[^]}. While Álvaro López Miera holds the title of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) ^{[^]}, the overarching control of the military and intelligence apparatus is broadly attributed to Raúl Castro and the hardline faction ^{[^]}. These developments confirm that the Castro family and their hardline allies retain substantial sway over Cuba's critical security and military establishments, influencing the operational context for Díaz-Canel's leadership ^{[^]}.

Cuba currently experiences severe electrical blackouts, reaching unprecedented levels. Some areas are facing outages of up to 20 hours daily ^{[^]}. The electricity shortfall has reached record levels, with power outages exceeding a 1,300 MW deficit ^{[^]}. While specific average daily blackout hours immediately prior to the July 2021 protests are not detailed, the current "record levels" and "up to 20-hour daily blackouts" observed in 2024 indicate a significantly more severe situation than that period ^{[^]}.

Inflation projections indicate a substantial increase in the cost of essential goods. The real annual inflation rate in Cuba is projected to reach 70% in 2025 ^{[^]}. This figure stands in stark contrast to the Cuban government's officially reported 14% ^{[^]}. Such high projected inflation indicates a highly distressed economic environment, where the costs of essential goods, including food, are likely to increase at rates exceeding those that previously contributed to social unrest ^{[^]}.

Non-state media consistently report visible changes in Miguel Díaz-Canel's physical appearance. Independent outlet CiberCuba highlighted in March 2026 his "physical deterioration," which has fueled online discussions and memes about the stress on the Cuban regime ^{[^]}. Cuban sociologist Rafael Rojas also observed "signs of wear and fatigue" in November 2025, contrasting Díaz-Canel's current look with his earlier image ^{[^]}. Specific descriptions from 2026 note him appearing "paler, thinner, and with bags under his eyes," a significant shift from his physical state when he assumed the presidency in 2018 ^{[^]}. These changes are largely interpreted by the public as "wear and tear" from his demanding role ^{[^]}.

Reported absences are brief, not indicative of significant health issues. While a "reappearance after a silent weekend" was noted in March 2026 ^{[^]}, the short duration of this absence and the accompanying context do not strongly suggest it resulted from a prolonged or unexplained health problem ^{[^]}. The credible reporting from non-state-controlled media primarily centers on his visible physical condition and public interpretations of "wear and tear," rather than evidence of significant health declines leading to extended periods out of public view ^{[^]}.

Direct evidence of elite MININT unit disloyalty remains scarce. While direct evidence concerning the morale and loyalty of elite Ministry of the Interior (MININT) units within Cuba is limited, broader opposition within the Cuban military apparatus has been noted, with a Cuban writer reporting in April 2026 about "Cuban military officials opposed to the regime" ^{[^]}. Concurrently, Cuba significantly weakened its security presence abroad through the withdrawal of thousands of Cuban security forces, including MININT personnel, from Venezuela in early 2026 ^{[^]}. This exodus is primarily understood as a strategic withdrawal under pressure, rather than an indication of widespread internal disloyalty or refusal to follow orders from within Cuba's elite MININT brigades operating domestically.

Government support for security forces underscores their continued importance. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel publicly embraced State Security in March 2026, stating, "We owe them so much," thereby highlighting the government's reliance on these forces ^{[^]}. Despite Cuba's economic challenges, a January 2026 assessment by the CIA offered a mixed view on the government's stability, noting no immediate signs of institutional collapse due to widespread disloyalty ^{[^]}. Furthermore, there have been no widespread reports from dissident groups or foreign intelligence indicating unusual purges, large-scale defections, or widespread refusals to follow orders specifically within the elite MININT brigades operating inside Cuba.

Preparations for the 9th Congress are underway, involving provincial sessions and leadership [^] . The 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) is scheduled for April 2026, with procedural preparations already underway ^{[^]}. As part of these preparations, provincial extraordinary plenary sessions have been held across Cuba to establish working methods for the year 2026 ^{[^]}. Miguel Díaz-Canel, President and First Secretary of the PCC, has actively participated in these stages, including chairing a plenary session in eastern Cuba where he underscored the importance of municipal prosperity ^{[^]}.

Díaz-Canel acknowledged internal party issues but faces no clear challenge [^] . He has publicly noted internal issues within the Communist Party, specifically mentioning a "lack of unity" and calling for "change from within the Party" ^{[^]}. He has also, at times, assigned blame for these issues to the party membership ^{[^]}. However, available sources do not indicate any unusual public statements or private maneuvers by provincial party leaders or key military figures that directly suggest a challenge to Díaz-Canel's expected re-nomination. On the contrary, Díaz-Canel has echoed calls for military readiness and focused on national defense against external aggression, which suggests alignment rather than dissent from prominent figures ^{[^]}.

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