# How many justices will vote for Trump in the FTC removal case?

Before 2026

Updated: April 29, 2026

Category: Politics

Tags: SCOTUS & courts

HTML: /markets/politics/scotus-courts/how-many-justices-will-vote-for-trump-in-the-ftc-removal-case/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** overwhelmingly agree that 6 justices will vote for Trump in the FTC removal case, with only minor residual uncertainty.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Alito, Kavanaugh, Barrett often limit agency independence.** - Chief Justice Roberts previously limited Humphrey's Executor in Seila Law.
- Arguments highlight the modern FTC's "purely executive" rather than "quasi-judicial" functions.
- Justices Sotomayor and Kagan consistently defend agency independence.
- Oral arguments revealed a clear judicial division on presidential executive power.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** **Market** (**2.0%**) prices higher than **model** (**0.9%**), citing Sotomayor and Kagan's consistent opposition.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 5 | 1.6% | 2.9% | Five justices have consistently shown intent to expand presidential removal power in agency cases. |
| 6 | 86.0% | 82.7% | Six votes are likely if Chief Justice Roberts joins the conservative bloc on narrow grounds. |
| 4 | 4.0% | 3.7% | Four votes are unlikely, as at least five conservative justices favor presidential removal power. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 5 | 1.6% | 2.9% |
| 6 | 86.0% | 82.7% |
| 4 | 4.0% | 3.7% |
| 3 | 4.0% | 3.7% |
| 2 | 2.0% | 1.9% |
| 0 | 2.0% | 0.9% |
| 7 | 3.0% | 1.8% |
| 1 | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| 8 | 1.0% | 0.9% |
| 9 | 1.0% | 0.9% |

- Expiration: August 1, 2026

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

Based on the provided chart data, the price action for this market is completely static. The market has been locked in a sideways trend since its inception, with the probability for a "YES" outcome holding steady at 2.0%. With only four data points available, the market is either very new or highly illiquid. There have been no significant price movements, spikes, or drops to analyze, as the price has not deviated from its opening value.

The lack of price movement is directly attributable to the trading volume pattern and the absence of any new information. An initial volume of 667 contracts established the 2.0% price point. However, subsequent trading activity has been nonexistent, as shown by the zero volume in later data points. Without new trades to facilitate price discovery or external news to shift sentiment, the price has remained unchanged. This low volume suggests a lack of conviction or interest from traders to push the price in either direction.

From a technical standpoint, the 2.0% price level is acting as both the floor (support) and ceiling (resistance), as no trading has occurred at any other price. The market sentiment is unequivocally bearish on a "YES" outcome, with participants assigning it an extremely low probability. The current state of the chart suggests that the initial traders who set the price have a strong consensus, or there is simply insufficient market interest to challenge this initial assessment.

## Significant Price Movements

#### 📉 April 25, 2026: 35.0pp drop

Price decreased from 37.0% to 2.0%

**Outcome:** 2

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

## Contract Snapshot

This Kalshi market resolves to Yes if exactly 6 Supreme Court justices vote in favor of the petitioner in *Trump v. Slaughter*, with a justice's vote counting if they supported a judgment granting relief or dissented in a way that would have granted relief. It resolves to No otherwise, and specifically resolves as 0 votes for the petitioner if the case concludes without a final merits judgment. The market opened December 9, 2025, closes upon the outcome or by August 1, 2026, and only final votes from official Supreme Court documents will be used for resolution.

## Market Discussion

Limited public discussion available for this market.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 | 0.5% | 2.6% | 2% | $3,668.9 | $3,431.9 |
| 1 | 0.5% | 1.7% | 0.5% | $1,501 | $1,501 |
| 2 | 1% | 4.6% | 2% | $4,124.61 | $4,116.61 |
| 3 | 3% | 4% | 4% | $5,698.61 | $4,684.61 |
| 4 | 2% | 4.7% | 4% | $5,713.13 | $4,882.13 |
| 5 | 1.5% | 3% | 1.6% | $12,894.41 | $5,746.68 |
| 6 | 87% | 90% | 86% | $12,250.02 | $9,189.48 |
| 7 | 1% | 3% | 3% | $3,273 | $3,273 |
| 8 | 0.5% | 1% | 1% | $1,496 | $1,496 |
| 9 | 0.5% | 0.9% | 1% | $902 | $902 |

## Which Justices Questioned Humphrey's Executor Precedent in Recent Cases?

Case Challenging For-Cause Removal | Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) [[^]](https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/seila-law-v-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-score-one-for-the-unitary-executive-theory/) |
Justices Calling for Overruling Humphrey's Executor | Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito [[^]](https://scotusblog.com/2020/06/opinion-analysis-court-strikes-down-restrictions-on-removal-of-cfpb-director-but-leaves-bureau-in-place) |
Later Case Affirming Seila Law Reasoning | Collins v. Yellen (2021) [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins_v._Mnuchin) |

**Justices Thomas and Gorsuch challenged *Humphrey's Executor* in *Seila Law***

Justices Thomas and Gorsuch challenged *Humphrey's Executor* in *Seila Law*. In *Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau* (2020), the Supreme Court ruled the for-cause removal protection for the CFPB Director unconstitutional [[^]](https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/seila-law-v-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-score-one-for-the-unitary-executive-theory/). While Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion limited the scope of existing precedents like *Humphrey's Executor* and *Morrison v. Olson*, it did not explicitly overrule them [[^]](https://scotusblog.com/2020/06/opinion-analysis-court-strikes-down-restrictions-on-removal-of-cfpb-director-but-leaves-bureau-in-place). However, Justice Thomas, in a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch, contended that these precedents were "wrongly decided" and ought to have been explicitly overturned, maintaining that all for-cause removal protections for executive branch officials are unconstitutional [[^]](https://scotusblog.com/2020/06/opinion-analysis-court-strikes-down-restrictions-on-removal-of-cfpb-director-but-leaves-bureau-in-place).

Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito reinforced calls to overrule *Humphrey's Executor*. Subsequently, in *Collins v. Yellen* (2021), the Court again found similar for-cause removal protection for the FHFA director unconstitutional, relying on its reasoning from *Seila Law* [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins_v._Mnuchin). In this case, Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito each authored or joined concurrences, reiterating their position that the *Humphrey's Executor* line of cases was wrongly decided and advocated for their overruling [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins_v._Mnuchin).

## What narrow grounds distinguish FTC from Humphrey's Executor decision?

Basis for Distinguishing FTC from Humphrey's | Modern FTC's expanded "purely executive" functions like enforcement and prosecution [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/) |
Legal Precedent Cited | Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reasoning on presidential removal [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/) |
Target of Removal Protection Challenge | FTC commissioners, especially the Chair, exercising core executive functions [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/) |

**Petitioners argue the modern FTC performs core executive functions**

Petitioners argue the modern FTC performs core executive functions.
Arguments for narrowly distinguishing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from the 1935 *Humphrey's Executor* decision center on the evolution of the FTC's roles. Petitioners and amici contend that the modern FTC now exercises "purely executive" functions, such as law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution, which differ significantly from the "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers initially described in *Humphrey's Executor* [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/). This distinction suggests that "for cause" removal protections, while potentially suitable for agencies with non-executive roles, are unconstitutional when applied to officers performing core executive duties [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/379414/20251010163717598_25-332PetrBr.pdf).

Arguments extend *Seila Law* principles to the multi-member FTC structure.
Legal arguments also draw upon the reasoning of *Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*, which affirmed the President's authority to remove a single director of an independent agency wielding significant executive power [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/). While the FTC is structured as a multi-member commission, arguments apply *Seila Law*'s principles by asserting that the "for cause" removal protection for FTC commissioners, particularly the Chair, unconstitutionally limits presidential control over these expanded executive functions [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/). This approach aims to narrow *Humphrey's Executor* to its original context, where agency functions were considered "non-executive," while acknowledging the FTC's current role as a significant executive enforcement body [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/is-humphreys-executor-headed-for-slaughter/).

## What is Justices Sotomayor and Kagan's Stance on Presidential Removal Power?

Core Stance | Oppose expansive unitary executive theory, favor congressional authority [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/01/did-justice-kagan-debilitate-the-administrative-state/). |
Precedent for Removal Limits | Humphrey's Executor v [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/01/did-justice-kagan-debilitate-the-administrative-state/). United States (1935) upheld for-cause removal for FTC Commissioners [4, p.17-19] [[^]](https://www.scotusblog.com/?p=536109). |
Dissent on Agency Design | Argued for judicial deference to Congress in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (2020) [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_new_0pm1.pdf). |

**Justices Sotomayor and Kagan champion congressional authority over agencies**

Justices Sotomayor and Kagan champion congressional authority over agencies. They consistently oppose expansive interpretations of the unitary executive theory, advocating for Congress's authority to structure the executive branch and protect the independence of administrative agencies. In *Trump v. Slaughter*, they are expected to emphasize the historical tradition of independent agencies, the constitutional validity of for-cause removal for officers with quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions, and a textualist view that Article II does not grant the President unlimited removal power over all executive officers.

Their dissents underscore limits on presidential power. In prior separation-of-powers cases concerning administrative agencies, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have consistently supported limits on presidential removal power. For example, in *Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau* (2020), Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented, arguing for judicial deference to Congress on agency design and warning against interpretations of the unitary executive theory that would undermine agency independence [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_new_0pm1.pdf). Similarly, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, reinforced their position on the importance of independent agencies and congressional prerogatives in her dissent in *Collins v. Yellen* (2021) [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins_v._Yellen).

Specific arguments will counter the unitary executive theory. To counter the unitary executive theory in *Trump v. Slaughter*, the justices will likely champion arguments from the respondent's brief. They are expected to highlight Congress's longstanding authority to define offices and place removal limitations, particularly for officers performing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions [4, p.11-12]. A key argument they would champion is the precedent established in *Humphrey's Executor v. United States* (1935) [4, p.17-19]. They would also likely argue that a broadly construed unitary executive theory "has never been the law" [4, p.13, 20-21] and that the "Necessary and Proper" Clause empowers Congress to structure the executive branch, including establishing independent agencies with removal protections [4, p.22-23].

## What are the implications of overturning FTC's for-cause protection for independent agencies?

Impact on Agencies | Far-reaching implications for independence and functioning of independent agencies like SEC [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384521/20251114123148197_25-332%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf) |
Market Stability | Would undermine market stability and public confidence [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384527/20251114124728704_25-332_Amicus%20Brief.pdf) |
Agency Vulnerability | Agencies would become vulnerable to immediate political shifts and leadership changes [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384527/20251114124728704_25-332_Amicus%20Brief.pdf) |

**Amicus briefs warn of widespread consequences for agency independence**

Amicus briefs warn of widespread consequences for agency independence. Briefs filed by former government officials and leaders of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) strongly contend that a ruling against the FTC's 'for-cause' protection would have "far-reaching implications" for the independence and functioning of numerous other independent agencies, specifically naming the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384521/20251114123148197_25-**332%**20Amicus%20Brief.pdf). These filings emphasize that the question presented in *Trump v. Slaughter* directly affects "the proper functioning of dozens of other independent agencies whose essential work fosters **market** stability" [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384527/20251114124728704_25-332_Amicus%20Brief.pdf). They assert that such a decision would "eliminate a critical structural safeguard," leaving agencies vulnerable to immediate and profound shifts in leadership and policy with every change in presidential administration [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384527/20251114124728704_25-332_Amicus%20Brief.pdf).

These arguments highlight significant pragmatic concerns for **market** stability. The briefs present compelling legal and historical arguments that underscore the vital role of agency independence in maintaining stability and effective governance, asserting that removing for-cause protection would "undermine **market** stability and public **confidence**" [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384527/20251114124728704_25-332_Amicus%20Brief.pdf). While these arguments effectively highlight significant pragmatic concerns regarding increased political influence and the potential for independent agencies to become instruments of presidential will, they do not offer specific quantitative data, statistics, or empirical studies directly demonstrating an immediate destabilization of the SEC or the Federal Reserve [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-332/384521/20251114123148197_25-**332%**20Amicus%20Brief.pdf).

## What Judicial Split Emerged in Trump v. Slaughter Oral Arguments?

Originalist Interpretive Focus | Article II's original public meaning, unitary executive theory [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/25-332_7lhn.pdf) |
Pragmatic Interpretive Focus | Practical consequences, settled expectations of independent agencies [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/25-332_7lhn.pdf) |
Case Name | Trump v. Slaughter (25-332) [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/25-332_7lhn.pdf) |

**A clear judicial division emerged regarding presidential executive power**

A clear judicial division emerged regarding presidential executive power. During oral arguments in Trump v. Slaughter (25-332), Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas primarily focused their questions on the original public meaning of Article II's vesting clause and the President's executive power [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/25-332_7lhn.pdf). These justices probed the "text of Article II" and the "original understanding" of presidential authority, frequently emphasizing the unitary executive theory and challenging precedent from an originalist perspective [1, p. 12-15, 28-31, 32-35, 36-39, 6-7, 11].

Conversely, three justices focused on agencies' practical consequences and stability. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson predominantly explored the practical implications and decades of settled expectations for independent agencies [[^]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/25-332_7lhn.pdf). Justice Sotomayor expressed significant concern about potential "disruption" and "chaos" that could result from unfettered presidential removal power, highlighting "decades of history" and "settled expectations" for agencies [1, p. 16-20]. Justice Kagan underscored the "long history" and "practical reality" of independent agency operations and the potential "impact on the independence" of regulatory bodies [1, p. 21-24]. Justice Jackson echoed these concerns, inquiring about the "practical effect" of overturning precedent on the "stable functioning of government" and agencies' ability to fulfill their missions without political interference, also noting "precedential history" and public reliance [1, p. 40-43].

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Expiration:** August 01, 2026
- **Closes:** August 01, 2026

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

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## Historical Resolutions

No historical resolution data available for this series.

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.