# Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz? (4/27 - 5/3)

4/27 - 5/3

Updated: April 29, 2026

Category: Politics

Tags: Iran

HTML: /markets/politics/iran/traffic-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-4-27-5-3/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to be Above 30, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Presence of three US Carrier Strike Groups in the Strait.** - US Navy initiated a mine clearance mission in the Strait.
- Iran's IRGC Navy fast-attack craft show elevated activity.
- War risk insurance premiums significantly increased for Strait transit.
- Reported Iranian blockade prompted current US military response.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** At 89c, the **market** prices 4pp higher than the **85%** **model**, suggesting overvaluation despite significant disruption.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Above 40 | 64.0% | 54.0% | Market higher by 10.0pp |
| Above 50 | 40.0% | 29.0% | Market higher by 11.0pp |
| Above 30 | 89.0% | 85.0% | Market higher by 4.0pp |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Above 40 | 64.0% | 54.0% |
| Above 50 | 40.0% | 29.0% |
| Above 30 | 89.0% | 85.0% |
| Above 60 | 17.0% | 21.5% |
| Above 70 | 14.0% | 21.5% |
| Above 80 | 6.0% | 21.5% |
| Above 100 | 37.0% | 21.5% |
| Above 120 | 2.0% | 1.2% |
| Above 90 | 0.0% | 21.5% |
| Above 140 | 0.0% | 0.4% |
| Above 160 | 0.0% | 0.3% |
| Above 180 | 0.0% | 0.2% |
| Above 200 | 0.0% | 0.1% |

- Expiration: May 5, 2026

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market, which speculates on traffic continuing through the Strait of Hormuz, opened with a high probability of 92.0% for a "YES" resolution. The price has since entered a sideways consolidation pattern, trading within a 15-point range between 80.0% and 95.0%. The most significant price action occurred early in the trading period when the probability sharply dropped from its opening level to a low of 81.0% before partially recovering. The current price of 88.0% reflects a slight decrease in confidence from the market's opening assessment.

The sharp drop to 81.0% was the most notable event and was accompanied by a significant volume spike of over 347 contracts, accounting for the vast majority of the total volume traded. With no specific news or external context provided, this price movement appears to be the result of internal market dynamics, such as a large seller entering the market. The price found strong support around the 80.0% to 81.0% level, as the high volume indicates that buyers met the selling pressure and pushed the price back up to 88.0%. This price action suggests the market sentiment remains strongly skewed towards a "YES" outcome, but the initial volatility indicates some underlying uncertainty. The market has since established an equilibrium around 88.0%, reflecting a stable but watchful consensus.

## Significant Price Movements

#### 📈 April 28, 2026: 33.0pp spike

Price increased from 34.0% to 67.0%

**Outcome:** Above 40

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

## Contract Snapshot

This market resolves to Yes if the total number of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz, summed daily from April 27, 2026, to May 3, 2026, is above 50. Conversely, it resolves to No if the total is 50 or below. The official data source for verification is IMF PortWatch, and the market is projected to resolve and pay out on May 5, 2026, at 9:30 AM EDT.

## Market Discussion

Traders are primarily discussing the significant discrepancies between the official IMF PortWatch data, which resolves the market, and other online shipping traffic sources like Windward AIS. This inconsistency creates frustration and uncertainty, with some speculating that official numbers might undercount actual traffic while others predict lower counts similar to the previous week based on past IMF reports. There's a general consensus that the official data is unreliable and unpredictable, making accurate forecasting challenging.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Above 100 | 3% | 10% | 37% | $12.94 | $12.94 |
| Above 120 | 4% | 8% | 2% | $10 | $10 |
| Above 140 | 1% | 9% | 0% | $0 | $0 |
| Above 160 | 1% | 4% | 0% | $0 | $0 |
| Above 180 | 1% | 3% | 0% | $0 | $0 |
| Above 200 | 2% | 3% | 0% | $0 | $0 |
| Above 30 | 87% | 88% | 89% | $706.86 | $535.33 |
| Above 40 | 61% | 63% | 64% | $1,716.74 | $1,393.86 |
| Above 50 | 36% | 37% | 40% | $1,433.5 | $1,139.53 |
| Above 60 | 19% | 20% | 17% | $506.26 | $487.26 |
| Above 70 | 14% | 15% | 14% | $343.59 | $263.17 |
| Above 80 | 8% | 14% | 6% | $132.05 | $132.05 |
| Above 90 | 5% | 12% | 0% | $0 | $0 |

## What was Iran's IRGC naval posture in Strait of Hormuz by April 27?

Initial Patrols (April 24) | Multiple groups (5-10 boats each) actively patrolling [[^]](https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/04/24/867170.htm) |
Peak Concentration (April 23) | 33 IRGC fast-attack craft near Kargan coast [[^]](https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2026/04/23/satellite-image-captures-unusual-activity-in-strait-of-hormuz-33-irgc-fast-attack-fleet-near-kargan-coast.html) |
Posture by April 27 | Decreased from peak, but higher than normal dispersed patrols [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/april-26-maritime-intelligence-daily-2/) |

**The IRGC Navy fast-attack craft showed significantly elevated activity**

The IRGC Navy fast-attack craft showed significantly elevated activity. In the initial 48 hours of the 72-hour period leading up to April 27th, fast-attack craft flotillas from Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island maintained a heightened and active posture in the Strait of Hormuz. Satellite imagery from April 24th indicated multiple groups, typically comprising 5-10 boats each, actively patrolling the waters north of the Strait, frequently operating in swarm formations, sometimes near commercial shipping lanes, and conducting maneuvers [[^]](https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/04/24/867170.htm). This activity was part of a broader surge in IRGC Navy presence observed since April 20th [[^]](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-22-2026/). On April 23rd, a substantial concentration of 33 IRGC fast-attack craft was specifically identified near the Kargan coast [[^]](https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2026/04/23/satellite-image-captures-unusual-activity-in-strait-of-hormuz-33-irgc-fast-attack-fleet-near-kargan-coast.html). Other vessels from Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island conducted regular patrols, often in groups of 8-12, signaling a consistent and elevated presence [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/april-23-maritime-intelligence-daily/).

Activity decreased but IRGC Navy posture remained elevated. As the 72-hour period progressed towards April 27th, maritime intelligence sources indicated a reduction in the intensity and overall number of IRGC vessels. By April 26th and continuing into April 27th, the high number of fast-attack craft had decreased from the peak observed earlier in the week, with a steady reduction over the preceding 24-48 hours [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/april-26-maritime-intelligence-daily-2/). Despite this reduction, the IRGC had not fully reverted to its pre-surge posture, instead maintaining a higher-than-normal number of vessels dispersed for patrols across the area [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/april-26-maritime-intelligence-daily-2/). While the most intense swarming activities may have subsided, the IRGC Navy's operational presence from its key bases remained elevated compared to typical levels [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/april-26-maritime-intelligence-daily-2/). During this timeframe, shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained muted [[^]](https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/04/27/867344.htm).

## How Do War Risk Insurance Premiums Impact Strait of Hormuz Shipping?

War Risk Premium per Transit | Millions of dollars [[^]](https://www.ibtimes.com.au/strait-hormuz-war-risk-insurance-costs-soar-millions-per-transit-amid-ongoing-middle-east-tensions-1866519) |
Premium for US/UK/Israeli Ships | Up to three times more [[^]](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156502/US-UK-and-Israeli-ships-charged-three-times-more-than-others-for-Middle-East-war-cover) |
Joint War Committee Action | Expanded 'Listed Areas' in Gulf [[^]](https://www.i-law.com/ilaw/doc/view.htm?id=451626) |

**War risk insurance premiums have significantly increased for Strait of Hormuz transit**

War risk insurance premiums have significantly increased for Strait of Hormuz transit. The Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's of London has expanded its "Listed Areas" to include parts of the Gulf, which directly impacts vessels navigating the Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://www.i-law.com/ilaw/doc/view.htm?id=451626). This expansion has caused war risk insurance costs to potentially rise to millions of dollars per transit for vessels through the Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://www.ibtimes.com.au/strait-hormuz-war-risk-insurance-costs-soar-millions-per-transit-amid-ongoing-middle-east-tensions-1866519). Notably, vessels flagged in the US, UK, and Israel face substantially higher charges, with Middle East war cover costing up to three times more than for other nations [[^]](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156502/US-UK-and-Israeli-ships-charged-three-times-more-than-others-for-Middle-East-war-cover). Despite these escalating regional risks, Lloyd's CEO has stressed the critical importance of ensuring the continued availability of war coverage [[^]](https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2026/03/19/336370.htm), as governments are increasingly becoming "insurers of last resort" [[^]](https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/04/how-middle-east-war-turning-governments-into-insurers-last-resort/).

Major tanker operators have not publicly announced specific Strait of Hormuz rerouting protocols. Based on available sources, there are no explicit public announcements from major tanker operators such as Frontline or Euronav detailing rerouting or convoy protocols specifically for the Strait of Hormuz. However, broader regional tensions have led some shipping lines to alter routes; for example, Maersk rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope due to escalating tensions in the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait [[^]](http://today.reuters.com/world/middle-east/maersk-pauses-sailings-through-suez-canal-bab-el-mandeb-strait-citing-escalating-2026-03-01/). Despite these rerouting patterns observed in other regions, vessel tracking data shows a convoy of tankers in the Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://boereport.com/2026/04/18/convoy-of-tankers-is-seen-crossing-strait-of-hormuz-vessel-tracking-data-shows/). Furthermore, reports indicate that 34 Iran-linked tankers have bypassed a US naval blockade within the area [[^]](https://www.thedefensenews.com/news-details/34-Iran-Linked-Tankers-Bypass-US-Naval-Blockade-in-the-Strait-of-Hormuz-Data-Shows/). These observations suggest ongoing, high-risk maritime traffic continues through the Strait of Hormuz.

## What US Navy Carrier Strike Groups Are in the Strait of Hormuz?

Number of Carrier Strike Groups | Three [[^]](https://news.usni.org/2026/04/27/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-april-27-2026), [[^]](https://breakingdefense.com/2026/04/three-carriers-operate-in-middle-east-for-first-time-since-2003-centcom/) |
Deployed CSG Names | USS Gerald R. Ford, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS Abraham Lincoln [[^]](https://news.usni.org/2026/04/27/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-april-27-2026), [[^]](https://www.twz.com/sea/carrier-tracker-as-of-april-26-2026), [[^]](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/carrier-tracker-april-26-2026-173543456.html) |
Active US Navy Operation | Mine clearance mission in Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4457220/us-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/), [[^]](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/u-s-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/), [[^]](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/u-s-navy-stages-for-mine-clearance-as-hormuz-blockade-begins-showing-strain/) |

**The US Navy's 5th Fleet has three Carrier Strike Groups deployed**

The US Navy's 5th Fleet has three Carrier Strike Groups deployed. As of late April 2026, the US Navy's 5th Fleet has deployed three Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) to its area of responsibility, marking the first time since 2003 that three carriers have been present in the Middle East [[^]](https://news.usni.org/2026/04/27/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-april-27-2026), [[^]](https://breakingdefense.com/2026/04/three-carriers-operate-in-middle-east-for-first-time-since-2003-centcom/). These include the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CSGs. These groups are reported to be operating in the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman, in close proximity to the Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://news.usni.org/2026/04/27/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-april-27-2026), [[^]](https://www.twz.com/sea/carrier-tracker-as-of-april-26-2026), [[^]](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/carrier-tracker-april-26-2026-173543456.html).

US forces began a mine clearance mission in the Strait of Hormuz. Simultaneously, US forces initiated a critical mine clearance mission within the Strait of Hormuz, commencing around April 26, 2026 [[^]](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4457220/us-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/), [[^]](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/u-s-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/), [[^]](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/u-s-navy-stages-for-mine-clearance-as-hormuz-blockade-begins-showing-strain/). This operation directly addresses a reported 'Hormuz blockade' and falls within the **market** period of April 27 - May 3. The mission serves to ensure unimpeded passage through international waters, indicating active naval operations directly impacting traffic through the Strait [[^]](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4457220/us-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/), [[^]](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/u-s-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/), [[^]](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/u-s-navy-stages-for-mine-clearance-as-hormuz-blockade-begins-showing-strain/).

## Did Iran's Oil Exports Decrease Before April 27, 2026?

April vs. March Exports | More oil exported in first 24 days of April than all of March (TankerTrackers.com [[^]](https://www.facebook.com/100092723281109/posts/tankertrackers-iran-exported-more-oil-in-first-24-days-of-april-than-all-of-marc/876567788777323/)) |
Daily Export Volume | 1.5 million barrels a day as of April 20th (The Middle East Insider [[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/20/iran-dark-fleet-2026-oil-exports-sanctions/)) |
Unused Oil Storage | Shrank to 22 days or less by April 27th (Kpler [[^]](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-27/iran-s-unused-oil-storage-shrinks-to-22-days-or-less-kpler-says)) |

**Iran's crude and condensate exports showed no anomalous decrease before April 27**

Iran's crude and condensate exports showed no anomalous decrease before April 27. AIS tanker tracking data from various sources indicates no anomalous decrease in Iran's crude oil and condensate exports through the Strait of Hormuz just prior to April 27, 2026. Instead, available data suggests a continuation and even an increase in export activity. For instance, TankerTrackers.com reported that Iran exported more oil in the first 24 days of April than it did in the entirety of March [[^]](https://www.facebook.com/100092723281109/posts/tankertrackers-iran-exported-more-oil-in-first-24-days-of-april-than-all-of-marc/876567788777323/). Furthermore, Vortexa affirmed that Iran continued its crude exports despite a US blockade [[^]](https://boereport.com/2026/04/23/iran-continues-crude-exports-despite-us-blockade-vortexa-says/), with The Middle East Insider noting that 1.5 million barrels a day were still being moved as of April 20th [[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/20/iran-dark-fleet-2026-oil-exports-sanctions/).

Shrinking oil storage capacity supports the conclusion of sustained exports. The status of Iran's oil storage further corroborates the finding of sustained, rather than decreased, exports. As of April 27, 2026, Kpler stated that Iran’s unused oil storage had shrunk to 22 days or less [[^]](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-27/iran-s-unused-oil-storage-shrinks-to-22-days-or-less-kpler-says). This reduction in available storage capacity, which was also noted by Discovery Alert amid the US blockade [[^]](https://discoveryalert.com.au/iran-oil-storage-crisis-us-blockade-export-collapse-2026/), implies that export volumes were maintained at a level that prevented the accumulation of excess crude and condensate. This trend suggests active export management, rather than a pre-planned disruption aimed at minimizing economic losses through reduced exports.

## Where to Find Historical Strait of Hormuz Daily Transit Data?

Specific historical calculations | Not directly presented in current information [[^]](https://hormuzmonitor.com/live-ship-data/) |
MacroMicro data reference | Daily Transit Calls & Transit Trade Volume for Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://en.macromicro.me/charts/94482/imf-strait-of-hormuz-number-of-ships-and-transit-volume) |
IMF Portwatch data | Daily transit call data available for direct download [[^]](https://data-download.imf.org/climatedata/portwatch-chokepoints-indicators.html?portid=chokepoint22) |

**Specific pre-calculated vessel transit statistics are not directly available**

Specific pre-calculated vessel transit statistics are not directly available. Web research did not directly provide the pre-calculated mean and standard deviation for daily vessel transits through the Strait of Hormuz for April 27 - May 3 in 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, key resources have been identified for obtaining the granular historical data needed for such calculations.

Key sources for granular transit data have been identified. MacroMicro, referencing IMF data, provides "Daily Transit Calls & Transit Trade Volume" specifically for the Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://en.macromicro.me/charts/94482/imf-strait-of-hormuz-number-of-ships-and-transit-volume). Additionally, the IMF's Portwatch initiative serves as an important resource, offering "chokepoints indicators" that include daily transit call data available for direct download [[^]](https://data-download.imf.org/climatedata/portwatch-chokepoints-indicators.html?portid=chokepoint22).

Further analysis is required to establish a non-conflict baseline. To establish a non-conflict baseline for comparison with current traffic, it would be necessary to access and analyze the daily transit call data from these identified sources for the specified periods in 2021, 2022, and 2023 [[^]](https://en.macromicro.me/charts/94482/imf-strait-of-hormuz-number-of-ships-and-transit-volume), [[^]](https://data-download.imf.org/climatedata/portwatch-chokepoints-indicators.html?portid=chokepoint22). This analysis would then allow for the calculation of the mean and standard deviation for vessel transits.

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Strike Date:** May 05, 2026
- **Expiration:** August 03, 2026
- **Closes:** May 05, 2026

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Related Research Reports

- [EU has a new member before 2030?](/markets/politics/international/eu-has-a-new-member-before-2030/)
- [Will Trump's birthright citizenship order come into effect?](/markets/politics/scotus-courts/will-trump-s-birthright-citizenship-order-come-into-effect/)
- [Which countries will normalize relations with Israel before 2027?](/markets/politics/international/which-countries-will-normalize-relations-with-israel-before-2027/)
- [Which of these African leaders will leave office next?](/markets/politics/international/which-of-these-african-leaders-will-leave-office-next/)

## Historical Resolutions

**Historical Resolutions:** 13 markets in this series

**Outcomes:** 1 resolved YES, 12 resolved NO

**Recent resolutions:**

- KXHORMUZWEEKLY-26APR26-T90: NO (Apr 28, 2026)
- KXHORMUZWEEKLY-26APR26-T80: NO (Apr 28, 2026)
- KXHORMUZWEEKLY-26APR26-T70: NO (Apr 28, 2026)
- KXHORMUZWEEKLY-26APR26-T60: NO (Apr 28, 2026)
- KXHORMUZWEEKLY-26APR26-T50: NO (Apr 28, 2026)

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.