# Who will visit Venezuela before May?

Before May 1, 2026

Updated: April 29, 2026

Category: Politics

Tags: International

HTML: /markets/politics/international/who-will-visit-venezuela-before-may/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect Charles Myers to visit Venezuela before May 1, 2026, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Trump's Latin America advisors internally debate Venezuela policy options.** - Oil majors actively pursue US licenses for Venezuelan operations.
- Mediators have not detailed specific guarantor agreements for Machado's travel.
- EU policy on Venezuela notably diverges from the US strategy.
- International monitors assess a high risk of post-election crisis in Venezuela.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** **Model**'s **0.0%** **probability** versus **0.6%** **market** implies a 166.7x payout, with research highlighting ongoing political complexities.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Marco Rubio | 0.5% | 0.0% | The provided research focuses exclusively on debates within Donald Trump's advisory circles concerning Venezuela policy, offering no specific evidence or even mention of Marco Rubio's potential travel plans or a visit to Venezuela before May, which makes the debiased anchor of 0.4% a purely speculative estimate. |
| María Corina Machado | 1.1% | 0.0% | The provided background research exclusively details US policy debates on Venezuela and contains no specific information, official statements, or credible reports regarding María Corina Machado's travel plans, leading to a neutral evidence score given the complete lack of relevant data to shift the low debiased probability. |
| Dinorah Figuera | 2.1% | 0.0% | The provided background research details ongoing US policy debates concerning Venezuela, including approaches to the opposition, but offers no specific information, official statements, or credible reports regarding Dinorah Figuera's travel plans to Venezuela. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Marco Rubio | 0.5% | 0.0% |
| María Corina Machado | 1.1% | 0.0% |
| Dinorah Figuera | 2.1% | 0.0% |
| Donald Trump | 0.6% | 0.0% |
| Pete Hegseth | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Edmundo González Urrutia | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Richard Grenell | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Karoline Leavitt | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| JD Vance | 0.4% | 0.0% |
| Jared Kushner | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Nicolás Maduro | 0.5% | 0.0% |
| Jamie Dimon | 0.5% | 0.0% |
| Dan Caine | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Emmanuel Macron | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Larry Fink | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Keir Starmer | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Elon Musk | 0.5% | 0.0% |
| Stephen Miller | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Javier Milei | 1.0% | 0.0% |
| Bill Ackman | 3.0% | 0.0% |

- Expiration: May 1, 2026

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market has exhibited a sideways trend, trading within a very narrow and low-probability range between 0.6% and 2.8%. The price for a "YES" outcome began at 1.1% and has since drifted down to its current level of 0.6%, which also represents the all-time low for the contract. The overall price action has been subdued, with no significant sustained movements, indicating a stable market outlook. The most notable recent price change was a drop from 1.0% to the current 0.6% support level around April 28.

The provided context does not offer a specific reason for any price movements, including the recent decline. Volume analysis shows that trading activity has generally been low, with only 206 contracts traded in total, suggesting limited market participation. However, a spike in volume of 22 contracts coincided with the price drop to 0.6%, which implies that this downward move was driven by a moment of relatively higher conviction among traders. The chart suggests that market sentiment has been consistently pessimistic about a "YES" outcome, never pricing the probability above 2.8%. The current price at the historical low of 0.6% indicates that this skepticism is currently at its peak.

## Contract Snapshot

For Dinorah Figuera, the market resolves to "Yes" if she physically travels to and is present within Venezuela's geographic boundaries before May 1, 2026, with the visit commencing after the market opened on January 3, 2026. Conversely, it resolves to "No" if such a visit is not verifiably reported by the deadline. Physical presence is strictly defined, excluding layovers, virtual appearances, or presence solely within international waters or embassy grounds, and must be corroborated by at least one of the specified news or official sources. The market closes early if the visit occurs, otherwise, it closes on May 1, 2026, at 10:00 AM EDT.

## Market Discussion

The market shows a strong consensus that Dinorah Figuera (2.1%), María Corina Machado (1.1%), and Javier Milei (1%) are highly unlikely to visit Venezuela before May 2026, as indicated by their very low "Yes" probabilities. There are no explicit textual arguments provided in the discussion content for or against these listed individuals visiting. However, the "Activity" feed reveals some traders speculating about other figures not currently listed, such as Marco Rubio, Donald Trump, and Charles Myers, suggesting a broader interest in who might visit Venezuela.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bill Ackman | 0% | 0.9% | 3% | $411.3 | $369.3 |
| Dan Caine | 0% | 1.7% | 1% | $4,734 | $1,498 |
| Dinorah Figuera | 1.8% | 2.1% | 2.1% | $64,128.45 | $32,985.68 |
| Donald Trump | 0% | 0.6% | 0.6% | $25,266.65 | $12,709.65 |
| Edmundo González Urrutia | 1% | 2% | 1% | $19,756.72 | $8,413.22 |
| Emmanuel Macron | 0.2% | 0.5% | 1% | $4,697 | $2,471 |
| Elon Musk | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.5% | $2,531.01 | $1,026 |
| Jamie Dimon | 0% | 0.4% | 0.5% | $4,924.74 | $2,871 |
| JD Vance | 0.4% | 1.5% | 0.4% | $11,994.43 | $3,472.9 |
| Jared Kushner | 1% | 2% | 1% | $9,865.6 | $4,536.6 |
| Javier Milei | 1% | 1.1% | 1% | $996.96 | $326 |
| Karoline Leavitt | 0% | 1.1% | 1% | $14,219.65 | $6,434.21 |
| Keir Starmer | 0% | 0.5% | 1% | $3,129 | $1,444 |
| Larry Fink | 0% | 0.5% | 1% | $4,470.46 | $1,681.46 |
| María Corina Machado | 1.3% | 1.9% | 1.1% | $127,196.84 | $37,984.79 |
| Marco Rubio | 0% | 0.4% | 0.5% | $177,649.04 | $49,709.45 |
| Nicolás Maduro | 0.2% | 0.9% | 0.5% | $6,929.85 | $3,703.85 |
| Pete Hegseth | 0.3% | 1% | 1% | $23,194.03 | $6,761.33 |
| Richard Grenell | 0% | 3.9% | 1% | $15,236.85 | $3,225.85 |
| Stephen Miller | 0% | 1.6% | 1% | $1,549.18 | $588.34 |

## What Are the Debates on Trump's Venezuela Policy Options?

Trump Advisory Divide | Internal battle exists on Venezuela policy [[^]](https://inkstickmedia.com/how-a-battle-inside-trumps-team-could-decide-venezuelas-fate/) |
Direct Engagement View | Policy paper explores engagement with Maduro regime [[^]](https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/policy-innovation-series/strategic-engagement-in-venezuela-advancing-u.s-interests-under-an-america-first-agenda-v5.pdf) |
Pressure & Opposition Support | Heritage Foundation and Project 2025 advocate pressure on Maduro [[^]](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvvjw8pdvo) |

**An internal debate exists within Donald Trump's Latin America advisory circles regarding optimal Venezuela policy**

An internal debate exists within Donald Trump's Latin America advisory circles regarding optimal Venezuela policy. This ongoing "internal battle" centers on whether to pursue direct engagement with the Maduro regime or exclusively support the opposition Unitary Platform (PUD) [[^]](https://inkstickmedia.com/how-a-battle-inside-trumps-team-could-decide-venezuelas-fate/). While advisors are engaged in informal policy deliberations, specific details of any "back-channel communications" remain undisclosed to the public [[^]](https://inkstickmedia.com/how-a-battle-inside-trumps-team-could-decide-venezuelas-fate/).

One perspective favors direct engagement to advance U.S. interests. This approach is highlighted in policy papers such as "Strategic Engagement in Venezuela: Advancing U.S. Interests Under an America-First Agenda v5," which explores the potential benefits of direct interaction with the Maduro regime [[^]](https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/policy-innovation-series/strategic-engagement-in-venezuela-advancing-u.s-interests-under-an-america-first-agenda-v5.pdf). This strategy aligns with a pragmatic, transactional foreign policy aimed at achieving specific U.S. objectives through direct talks or conditional interactions with Venezuela's current authorities [[^]](https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/policy-innovation-series/strategic-engagement-in-venezuela-advancing-u.s-interests-under-an-america-first-agenda-v5.pdf).

Conversely, others advocate for sustained pressure and exclusive opposition support. Organizations linked to the Trump campaign, including the Heritage Foundation and those involved with Project 2025, generally champion this strategy. The Heritage Foundation's "Ten Steps for U.S. Policy on Venezuela" typically emphasizes sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and robust backing for democratic forces, often implicitly or explicitly arguing against direct engagement that could legitimize the Maduro regime [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/americas/report/ten-steps-us-policy-venezuela). Project 2025's "roadmap" for Trump's policy also calls for "re-hemisphering" in Latin America, signifying a firm stance against adversarial regimes like Maduro's [[^]](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvvjw8pdvo).

## Are Oil Majors Securing Venezuela Sanctions Relief Licenses?

Chevron License Status | In talks for expanded Venezuela oil license; U.S. "moving fast" [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-moving-fast-expand-chevrons-venezuela-license-energy-secretary-wright-tells-2026-01-16/) |
Other Companies Applying | Repsol, ENI, Maurel & Prom are applying for U.S. licenses [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/repsol-maurel-prom-applying-us-licenses-export-venezuelan-oil-sources-say-2026-01-15/) |
Sanctions Relief Basis | Linked to electoral agreement between Venezuelan government and opposition [[^]](https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/united-states-issues-significant-new-sanctions-relief-for-venezuelas-oil-and-gas-sector) |

**Oil majors actively pursue US licenses for Venezuelan operations**

Oil majors actively pursue US licenses for Venezuelan operations. Chevron is actively engaged in discussions with the U.S. government, seeking an expanded license for its operations in Venezuela, with the U.S. reportedly moving quickly to facilitate this [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-moving-fast-expand-chevrons-venezuela-license-energy-secretary-wright-tells-2026-01-16/). Chevron was anticipated to receive an expanded license, which would enable broader operations in Venezuela [[^]](http://today.reuters.com/business/energy/chevron-expected-receive-expanded-venezuela-license-us-this-week-oil-industry-2026-01-14/). Concurrently, other major European oil companies, including Repsol, ENI, and Maurel & Prom, are also pursuing U.S. licenses to permit the export of Venezuelan oil [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/repsol-maurel-prom-applying-us-licenses-export-venezuelan-oil-sources-say-2026-01-15/).

Sanctions relief for Venezuela stems from a political agreement. Significant sanctions relief granted to Venezuela's oil and gas sector by the United States, notably through the issuance of General License 41 by OFAC, was a direct consequence of an electoral agreement. This agreement was reached between the Unitary Platform and representatives of Nicolás Maduro in Barbados [[^]](https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/united-states-issues-significant-new-sanctions-relief-for-venezuelas-oil-and-gas-sector). This broadly links the easing of sanctions to political concessions within the country [[^]](https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/united-states-issues-significant-new-sanctions-relief-for-venezuelas-oil-and-gas-sector).

No direct quid-pro-quo terms are specified for individual licenses. The available information does not specify additional quid-pro-quo terms negotiated directly between OFAC and these individual oil majors for their specific licenses, beyond the framework set by the broader political agreement [[^]](https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/united-states-issues-significant-new-sanctions-relief-for-venezuelas-oil-and-gas-sector). Furthermore, the provided sources do not indicate that a high-level visit is a prerequisite for the finalization of these particular sanctions relief licenses [[^]](https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/united-states-issues-significant-new-sanctions-relief-for-venezuelas-oil-and-gas-sector).

## Are Norway, Colombia, or Brazil mediating Machado's travel guarantees?

Norway's Role in Venezuelan Dialogue | Ongoing mediator, welcomed by Maduro government [[^]](https://regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-conflict-resolution/norways_engagement/venezuela_negotiations/id2674295/) |
Colombia's Proposal for Venezuela | Transitional government proposed by President Petro [[^]](https://en.brasil247.com/americalatina/petro-propoe-governo-de-transicao-na-venezuela) |
Guarantor Agreements for Machado | Current operational status not detailed in sources [[^]](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article314890934.html) |

**Mediators have not detailed specific guarantor agreements for Machado**

Mediators have not detailed specific guarantor agreements for Machado. Third-party mediators, including Norway, Colombia, and Brazil, have not provided specific messaging or current operational status regarding a new round of negotiations focused on guarantor agreements that would allow for the safe international travel and return of opposition leader María Corina Machado. While Norway continues its role as a welcomed mediator in the Venezuelan Dialogue and Negotiation Process, its engagement is generally described as supporting a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Venezuelan political crisis [[^]](https://regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-conflict-resolution/norways_engagement/venezuela_negotiations/id2674295/). Colombian President Gustavo Petro has proposed a transitional government for Venezuela, but the available sources do not provide specific details on Colombia's current operational status or messaging related to new negotiations for guarantor agreements concerning Machado's safe return [[^]](https://en.brasil247.com/americalatina/petro-propoe-governo-de-transicao-na-venezuela). Specific messaging from Brazil on these particular guarantor agreements is also not detailed in the available information.

Machado plans return, but specific guarantor negotiations are absent. María Corina Machado has expressed her intention to return to Venezuela and has been involved in discussions regarding a transition plan [[^]](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article314890934.html). The United States has linked Venezuelan elections to reforms and Machado's return [[^]](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article315449877.html). Machado supports a U.S. transition plan and rejects power-sharing with criminal networks [[^]](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article314490512.html). However, these accounts do not specify active guarantor agreement negotiations involving third-party mediators to facilitate her safe international travel and return [[^]](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article314890934.html).

## How Does EU Policy on Venezuela Differ from US Strategy?

EU Stance on US Plan | Rejected U.S.-backed plan for Venezuela, insisting on opposition leader Machado's inclusion [[^]](https://www.latintimes.com/eu-rejects-us-backed-plan-venezuela-transition-says-process-must-include-opposition-leader-593224). |
French Presidential Engagement | President Macron held talks with Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado [[^]](https://bbc.bm/frances-macron-holds-talks-with-venezuelan-opposition-leader-machado). |
Venezuela's Diplomatic Interest | Expressed interest in establishing a 'new agenda' with the EU and the UK [[^]](https://www.bssnews.net/news/350640). |

**Evidence indicates a notable divergence between EU and US policies on Venezuela**

Evidence indicates a notable divergence between EU and US policies on Venezuela. The European Union explicitly rejected a U.S.-backed transition plan, emphasizing the necessity of including opposition leader María Corina Machado [[^]](https://www.latintimes.com/eu-rejects-us-backed-plan-venezuela-transition-says-process-must-include-opposition-leader-593224). This distinct approach saw the EU focusing on a democratic transition, while the U.S., under the Trump administration, was characterized by a pursuit of oil reserves [[^]](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/05/eu-bets-on-venezuelas-democratic-transition-as-trump-goes-after-oil-reserves). Furthermore, the EU's High Representative issued a statement addressing the 'aftermath of the U.S. intervention' in Venezuela, underscoring an independent European position [[^]](http://eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-aftermath-us-intervention-venezuela_en). France, a prominent EU member, has also declared its role in resolving international political crises, including Venezuela, signaling an autonomous foreign policy stance [[^]](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/declaration-du-gouvernement-sur-le-role-de-la-france-dans-la-prevention-et-la-resolution-des-crises).

High-level European engagement with Venezuelan opposition figures is clearly evident. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron held talks with Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado [[^]](https://bbc.bm/frances-macron-holds-talks-with-venezuelan-opposition-leader-machado). However, the provided research does not explicitly detail the frequency or seniority of undisclosed meetings between officials from France's or the UK's foreign ministries and their Venezuelan government counterparts. While the UK Foreign Secretary made a statement on Venezuela to the House [[^]](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2026/01/mil-260105-ukfcdo02.htm) and the French Foreign Minister discussed Venezuela with G7 counterparts [[^]](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/french-foreign-minister-discusses-venezuela-ukraine-with-g7-counterparts/3792875), these actions indicate high-level engagement with the issue and coordination among European powers, rather than direct bilateral meetings with Venezuelan government officials.

## What Do Observers Say About Venezuela's 2024 Election Credibility?

Carter Center Election Assessment | "Lacked minimum conditions for a credible process" and "did not comply with international standards", democracy "thwarted" [[^]](https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html)) |
European Union Concerns | "Deep concern regarding the integrity and transparency" and "deep concern about irregularities" [[^]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-10-2024-0037_EN.html) |
Stratfor Intelligence Projection | "Continued political instability" if Maduro clings to power illegitimately [[^]](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-maduro-clinging-power-means-venezuela) |

**International monitors unanimously assess a high risk of post-election crisis**

International monitors unanimously assess a high risk of post-election crisis. Following the July 28, 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, the Carter Center strongly condemned the process, stating it "lacked minimum conditions for a credible process" and "did not comply with international standards" [[^]](https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html)). Their assessment concluded that "democracy was thwarted in Venezuela" [[^]](https://www.cartercenter.org/stories/center-finds-democracy-thwarted-in-venezuela/), pointing to a fundamental illegitimacy of the results. Similarly, the European Union, through its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Parliament motions, conveyed "deep concern regarding the integrity and transparency of the presidential elections" and highlighted "deep concern about irregularities reported" [[^]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-10-2024-0037_EN.html). These bodies consistently called for adherence to democratic principles and a peaceful, democratic resolution, signaling significant international rejection of the electoral outcome [[^]](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-publication-interim-report-un-panel-experts-presidential_en).

Intelligence firms reinforce concerns, projecting prolonged instability and mediation. Stratfor analyzed that "Maduro clinging to power" through illegitimate means will lead to "continued political instability" in Venezuela [[^]](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-maduro-clinging-power-means-venezuela). This perspective, complemented by analyses from other intelligence firms, indicates a deeply polarized political landscape and the potential for increased domestic unrest and international pressure as a direct consequence of the disputed election [[^]](https://boz.substack.com/p/venezuela-post-election-scenario). The collective assessment from these diverse sources, encompassing electoral integrity and geopolitical risk, paints a clear picture of a nation on the brink of prolonged political and social unrest due to the widespread perception of an unfree and unfair election. This critical situation, marked by international condemnation and domestic instability, significantly raises the **probability** of an urgent international mediation visit to de-escalate the crisis and foster dialogue, likely before the second quarter of 2025.

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Expiration:** May 08, 2026
- **Closes:** May 01, 2026

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

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## Historical Resolutions

**Historical Resolutions:** 1 markets in this series

**Outcomes:** 1 resolved YES, 0 resolved NO

**Recent resolutions:**

- KXVISITVENEZUELA-26MAY01-CMYE: YES (Mar 25, 2026)

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.