# Which world leaders will leave office in 2026?

Before Jan 1, 2027

Updated: April 28, 2026

Category: Politics

Tags: International

HTML: /markets/politics/international/which-world-leaders-will-leave-office-in-2026/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect Viktor Orbán to leave office in 2026, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Lula da Silva holds an initial lead in March 2026 polling.** - Netanyahu's coalition faces significant challenges; a junior partner issued an ultimatum.
- Limited open-source intelligence exists on Ali Khamenei's recent physical health.
- Direct polling data linking events to Zelenskyy/Netanyahu approval is unavailable.
- Specialists agree China lacks a clear successor to President Xi Jinping.
- **Market** price dropped 9.5 percentage points on April 15, 2026.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** **Market** at 45c prices 13pp higher than the **32%** **model**, possibly due to Netanyahu's coalition challenges.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Xi Jinping | 3.9% | 1.4% | The provided background research exclusively discusses Lula da Silva's election prospects in Brazil, offering no information relevant to Xi Jinping or his potential departure from office in 2026, thus providing no basis to shift from the debiased price. |
| Vladimir Putin | 14.0% | 6.3% | The provided background research exclusively discusses Lula da Silva's election prospects and contains no evidence pertaining to Vladimir Putin leaving office in 2026, thus providing no basis to shift the debiased market price. |
| Keir Starmer | 69.0% | 59.7% | No specific new evidence concerning Keir Starmer's potential departure from office in 2026 was provided, thus the debiased price remains the neutral anchor for assessment. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Xi Jinping | 3.9% | 1.4% |
| Vladimir Putin | 14.0% | 6.3% |
| Keir Starmer | 69.0% | 59.7% |
| Benjamin Netanyahu | 45.0% | 32.0% |
| Gustavo Petro | 98.0% | 97.4% |
| Claudia Sheinbaum | 6.0% | 2.2% |
| Volodymyr Zelenskyy | 14.0% | 6.3% |
| Viktor Orbán | 99.0% | 98.7% |
| Emmanuel Macron | 16.0% | 7.5% |
| Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva | 19.0% | 12.4% |
| Sanae Takaichi | 8.0% | 3.1% |
| Ahmad al-Sharaa | 12.0% | 5.1% |
| Kim Jong Un | 6.9% | 2.6% |
| Recep Tayyip Erdoğan | 6.0% | 2.2% |
| Mark Carney | 2.0% | 0.7% |
| Aleksandar Vučić | 16.0% | 7.5% |
| Christopher Luxon | 56.0% | 44.1% |
| Nayib Bukele | 3.5% | 1.2% |
| Giorgia Meloni | 12.0% | 5.1% |
| Mohammed bin Salman | 1.6% | 0.5% |
| Narendra Modi | 5.0% | 1.8% |
| Javier Milei | 11.0% | 4.6% |
| Cyril Ramaphosa | 13.0% | 5.7% |
| Lee Jae Myung | 11.0% | 4.6% |
| Rodrigo Paz Pereira | 6.0% | 2.2% |
| Daniel Noboa | 3.8% | 1.3% |
| Miguel Díaz-Canel | 58.0% | 46.4% |
| Pedro Sánchez | 24.0% | 13.0% |
| Delcy Rodriguez | 30.0% | 17.8% |
| Jens-Frederik Nielsen | 15.0% | 6.9% |
| Mette Frederiksen | 15.0% | 6.9% |
| Friedrich Merz | 9.1% | 3.6% |
| Frederik X | 3.0% | 1.0% |
| Denis Sassou Nguesso | 4.4% | 1.5% |
| Félix Tshisekedi | 12.0% | 5.1% |
| Irfaan Ali | 5.0% | 1.8% |

- Expiration: January 2, 2027

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This prediction market shows a clear upward trend, with the probability of a world leader leaving office in 2026 increasing from a starting point of 39.0% to its current level of 45.0%. The price has traded within a defined range, establishing a low of 37.0% and a high of 46.0%. A significant movement occurred around late April when the price jumped from 39.0% to 45.0%. As no external news or specific context was provided, the direct cause for this sharp increase in probability cannot be determined from the available information.

The total trading volume of over 13,000 contracts suggests substantial interest and participation in this market. However, the sample data indicates that the recent price increase to 45.0% occurred on very low or zero volume. While the overall market is active, this specific price jump may not be backed by strong conviction, or it could represent a rapid adjustment that the market is still processing. The higher volume figures seen earlier at the 39.0% level suggest that price was a more established point of agreement among traders.

From a technical perspective, the market has established a support level near the low of 37.0% and is currently testing resistance near its peak of 46.0%. The consistent upward movement reflects a growing bullish sentiment among participants. Traders are increasingly pricing in a higher likelihood of the event's occurrence, with the current 45.0% price indicating that the market views the departure of a world leader as a near even-money proposition.

## Significant Price Movements

#### 📉 April 15, 2026: 9.5pp drop

Price decreased from 13.0% to 3.5%

**Outcome:** Cyril Ramaphosa

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

## Contract Snapshot

Here's a summary of the contract rules for the "Benjamin Netanyahu" market:

1.  **What exactly triggers a YES resolution**
    The market resolves to "Yes" if Benjamin Netanyahu officially announces his intention to leave, or actually leaves, the office of Prime Minister of Israel before January 1, 2027. An official announcement must be reported by a listed source agency, made by the person or an authorized representative, and specify departure within one year. "Leaving office" includes resignation, termination, removal, impeachment, recall, or term expiration without renewal; forced departures also qualify.
2.  **What triggers a NO resolution**
    The market resolves to "No" if Benjamin Netanyahu has not officially announced his departure or actually left office by January 1, 2027. Temporary absences, delegation of duties, or death do not constitute "leaving office" for a "Yes" resolution. An announcement specifying departure in more than one year also prevents a "Yes" resolution.
3.  **Key dates/deadlines**
    The market opened on November 11, 2025, at 10:00 AM EST. It closes early if the "Yes" outcome occurs, or otherwise by January 1, 2027, at 10:17 PM EST. Payouts are projected 30 minutes after closing.
4.  **Any special settlement conditions**
    Death does not count as leaving office for a "Yes" resolution in this contract. However, Kalshi generally resolves markets to the last traded price prior to death, with the Exchange having discretion to determine fair value if needed. The market closes early if a "Yes" outcome is triggered.

## Market Discussion

Limited public discussion available for this market.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ahmad al-Sharaa | 11% | 12% | 12% | $23,610.95 | $8,680 |
| Aleksandar Vučić | 12% | 14% | 16% | $9,291.54 | $3,136.54 |
| Benjamin Netanyahu | 44% | 45% | 45% | $273,171.93 | $99,577.2 |
| Cyril Ramaphosa | 4% | 12% | 13% | $3,266.5 | $2,824.5 |
| Claudia Sheinbaum | 6% | 6.5% | 6% | $126,348.29 | $51,107.07 |
| Daniel Noboa | 5% | 11% | 3.8% | $879 | $326 |
| Delcy Rodriguez | 29% | 30% | 30% | $13,492.78 | $4,389.85 |
| Emmanuel Macron | 14% | 16% | 16% | $51,476.83 | $23,174.67 |
| Friedrich Merz | 9.2% | 13% | 9.1% | $5,867.78 | $2,230.78 |
| Félix Tshisekedi | 5% | 10% | 12% | $563.84 | $228 |
| Frederik X | 3% | 5% | 3% | $2,686 | $1,396 |
| Giorgia Meloni | 12% | 16% | 12% | $4,961.11 | $3,149.11 |
| Gustavo Petro | 96% | 98% | 98% | $161,587.69 | $45,341.69 |
| Irfaan Ali | 2% | 9% | 5% | $421 | $170 |
| Jens-Frederik Nielsen | 15% | 17% | 15% | $8,434 | $2,255 |
| Javier Milei | 6% | 10% | 11% | $3,549.6 | $1,751.6 |
| Kim Jong Un | 2.4% | 6.9% | 6.9% | $20,298.92 | $9,983.54 |
| Keir Starmer | 69% | 70% | 69% | $341,185.73 | $135,391.64 |
| Lee Jae Myung | 6% | 11% | 11% | $2,286.48 | $1,603.48 |
| Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva | 19% | 20% | 19% | $37,595.65 | $12,286.27 |
| Mohammed bin Salman | 2% | 7% | 1.6% | $3,839 | $1,899 |
| Mark Carney | 3% | 7% | 2% | $9,838.44 | $6,820.04 |
| Miguel Díaz-Canel | 58% | 59% | 58% | $522,004.27 | $222,943.9 |
| Mette Frederiksen | 16% | 19% | 15% | $6,640 | $3,099 |
| Nayib Bukele | 1% | 6% | 3.5% | $5,393 | $4,515 |
| Narendra Modi | 5% | 8% | 5% | $3,705 | $1,507 |
| Christopher Luxon | 52% | 56% | 56% | $9,221.53 | $5,548 |
| Pedro Sánchez | 23% | 24% | 24% | $20,184.46 | $7,996.72 |
| Recep Tayyip Erdoğan | 7% | 9.9% | 6% | $17,130.73 | $9,886.43 |
| Rodrigo Paz Pereira | 6% | 7% | 6% | $1,897 | $299 |
| Sanae Takaichi | 6.3% | 8% | 8% | $34,208.71 | $15,504.71 |
| Denis Sassou Nguesso | 8.1% | 12% | 4.4% | $951 | $588 |
| Viktor Orbán | 98.3% | 99% | 99% | $89,717.88 | $48,190.03 |
| Vladimir Putin | 13% | 14% | 14% | $374,546.69 | $227,064.13 |
| Volodymyr Zelenskyy | 15% | 16% | 14% | $90,453.92 | $28,627.88 |
| Xi Jinping | 3.7% | 3.8% | 3.9% | $585,145.68 | $173,894.07 |

## How is Lula da Silva's 2026 presidential election lead trending?

Lula 1st Round Lead (March) | 6 points (Datafolha, March 9, 2026 [[^]](https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2026/03/vantagem-de-lula-para-flavio-bolsonaro-no-1o-turno-e-de-6-pontos-38-a-32.shtml)) |
Lula 1st Round Lead (April) | 4 points (Datafolha, April 14, 2026 [[^]](https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2026/04/lula-tem-39-no-1o-turno-e-flavio-bolsonaro-aparece-com-35.shtml)) |
2nd Round Scenario (March & April) | Tied (Datafolha [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/lula-flavio-bolsonaro-even-brazil-election-second-round-datafolha-poll-shows-2026-04-11/)) |

**Polling in March 2026 revealed Lula da Silva holding an initial lead**

Polling in March 2026 revealed Lula da Silva holding an initial lead. In a Datafolha poll conducted on March 9, 2026, President Lula da Silva led Flávio Bolsonaro by six points in the first round of Brazil's presidential election, securing **38%** of the vote compared to Bolsonaro's **32%** [[^]](https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2026/03/vantagem-de-lula-para-flavio-bolsonaro-no-1o-turno-e-de-6-pontos-38-a-32.shtml). This early polling also indicated a persistent tie between the two candidates in a simulated second-round contest [[^]](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2026/03/datafolha-poll-flavio-consolidates-position-and-ties-with-lula-in-runoff.shtml). For leaders like Lula da Silva facing elections by the end of 2026, head-to-head polling against Flávio Bolsonaro shows an overall narrowing trend in the first round and a persistent tie in potential runoffs [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/articles/ten-elections-watch-2026).

Lula's first-round advantage diminished slightly from March to April. A Datafolha poll released on April 14, 2026, indicated that Lula da Silva held **39%** support in the first round, while Flávio Bolsonaro had **35%**, narrowing Lula's lead to four points [[^]](https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2026/04/lula-tem-39-no-1o-turno-e-flavio-bolsonaro-aparece-com-35.shtml). Concurrently, an April 11, 2026, Datafolha poll continued to show Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro statistically even in a hypothetical second-round matchup [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/lula-flavio-bolsonaro-even-brazil-election-second-round-datafolha-poll-shows-2026-04-11/).

## Which Political Coalitions Faced Shrinking Majorities Recently?

Netanyahu Coalition Status | Lost parliamentary majority July 16, 2025 [[^]](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/16/netanyahu-loses-majority-as-second-ultra-orthodox-party-quit-coalition_6743436_4.html), [[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/16/israeli-ultra-orthodox-party-quits-government-as-netanyahu-loses-majority), [[^]](https://globalpost.com/stories/netanyahu-loses-majority-after-another-party-leaves-coalition-government/) |
Shas Ultimatum | Threatened to block 2026 budget over draft law in March 2026 [[^]](http://store.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-882362), [[^]](http://live.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-882362), [[^]](https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/shas-state-budget-charedi-draft-bill-uece8z9m) |
Tusk Coalition Status | Potential loss of parliamentary majority as of April 2026 [[^]](https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/04/polish-pm-tusks-coalition-government-may-lose-its-parliamentary-majority/) |

**Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition faced significant challenges, including a major ultimatum from a junior partner**

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition faced significant challenges, including a major ultimatum from a junior partner. Although occurring before the most recent quarter, Netanyahu lost his parliamentary majority on July 16, 2025, when a second ultra-Orthodox party exited his government, leading to a significant reduction in his coalition's strength [[^]](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/16/netanyahu-loses-majority-as-second-ultra-orthodox-party-quit-coalition_6743436_4.html), [[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/16/israeli-ultra-orthodox-party-quits-government-as-netanyahu-loses-majority), [[^]](https://globalpost.com/stories/netanyahu-loses-majority-after-another-party-leaves-coalition-government/). More recently, in March 2026, Shas, an ultra-Orthodox junior coalition partner, publicly threatened to vote down the 2026 state budget [[^]](http://store.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-882362), [[^]](http://live.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-882362), [[^]](https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/shas-state-budget-charedi-draft-bill-uece8z9m). This ultimatum stipulated that the budget would only pass if a haredi (ultra-Orthodox) draft law was enacted first [[^]](http://store.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-882362), [[^]](http://live.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-882362), [[^]](https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/shas-state-budget-charedi-draft-bill-uece8z9m). Netanyahu faced a March 2026 deadline to pass the budget, with failure risking early elections [[^]](https://jewishinsider.com/2026/03/israel-netanyahu-elections-haredi-conscription-budget/), a situation heavily influenced by the haredi enlistment issue [[^]](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-884755). The state budget ultimately passed following a 'haredi greenlight,' indicating the ultimatum's demands were met [[^]](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-884856).

Other parliamentary leaders have not experienced similar coalition stability issues recently. There is no indication that leaders such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni or UK Labour leader Keir Starmer have seen their ruling coalition's majority shrink in the last quarter. Furthermore, their junior coalition partners have not publicly issued ultimatums or threatened to defect over specific upcoming legislative votes. However, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's coalition government faces the possibility of losing its parliamentary majority as of April 2026 [[^]](https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/04/polish-pm-tusks-coalition-government-may-lose-its-parliamentary-majority/).

## What are the latest health observations for Khamenei and Putin?

Ali Khamenei Recent Health | No detailed OSINT observations on gait, speech fluency, or unscheduled absences over past 90 days (Based on provided research [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/intelligence-assessment-warns-iranian-attacks-us-following-khameneis-death-2026-03-02/)) |
Vladimir Putin Public Absence | Not appeared in public since Easter [[^]](https://theukrainianreview.info/mysterious-disappearance-vladimir-putin-has-not-appeared-in-public-since-easter/) |
Vladimir Putin Physical Health | Bulging veins, limps, and uncontrollable shaking observed [[^]](https://www.aol.com/entertainment/bulging-veins-limps-uncontrollable-shaking-104800518.html) |

**Open-source intelligence provides limited observations on Ali Khamenei's recent physical health**

Open-source intelligence provides limited observations on Ali Khamenei's recent physical health. Over the past 90 days, publicly available open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyses offer limited specific observations concerning Ali Khamenei's physical health, particularly regarding changes in gait, speech fluency, or unscheduled absences from key events. The provided sources primarily discuss speculative future events, such as an intelligence assessment warning of Iranian attacks following his death in 2026 [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/intelligence-assessment-warns-iranian-attacks-us-following-khameneis-death-2026-03-02/), and a potential future public address prior to hypothetical future events in 2026 [[^]](https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/recent-irans-khameneis-latest-public-address-before-he-was-killed-by-us-israeli-airstrikes/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBOTQ1NjI4MDIyMDI2UlAx). Therefore, specific data points on recent changes to his physical health in these areas are not present within the research.

Vladimir Putin's recent appearances show notable absences and reported physical changes. In contrast, recent public appearances and analyses concerning Vladimir Putin have highlighted several observations. Reports indicate a notable absence from public view, with Putin not having appeared in public since Easter [[^]](https://theukrainianreview.info/mysterious-disappearance-vladimir-putin-has-not-appeared-in-public-since-easter/). Regarding physical manifestations, observers have noted 'limps,' alongside 'bulging veins and uncontrollable shaking,' as 'recent health fears' [[^]](https://www.aol.com/entertainment/bulging-veins-limps-uncontrollable-shaking-104800518.html). His characteristic 'Gunslinger's Gait' has been previously linked to KGB training, suggesting a long-standing physical trait rather than a recent health-related change [[^]](https://en.azvision.az/news/25824/new-study-links-putins-gunslingers-gait-to-kgb-training--video.html). Additionally, one report references a 'leaked video' that purportedly reveals significant health concerns, suggesting his 'days are suddenly numbered' [[^]](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/leaked-video-reveals-putin-days-141003868.html). However, the provided sources do not offer specific details on changes in his speech fluency over the past 90 days.

## How Do Battlefield Events Impact Zelenskyy, Netanyahu Approval Ratings?

Zelenskyy Trust | 87% (December 2025) [[^]](https://kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1584&lang=eng&page=1) |
Zelenskyy Trust | 62% (January 23-29, 2026) [[^]](https://kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1584&lang=eng&page=1) |
Netanyahu Satisfaction | 15% satisfied (mid-January 2024) [[^]](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53456) |

**Direct polling data linking events to approval is unavailable**

Direct polling data linking events to approval is unavailable. Research indicates that specific data directly correlating the domestic approval ratings of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to distinct battlefield events within a 30-day window is not readily available. The provided information primarily tracks overall trust and satisfaction levels over broader periods, rather than immediate shifts attributable to specific military gains or losses for either leader.

President Zelenskyy's trust ratings show high levels, with some fluctuations. For Ukraine, polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) demonstrates a general trend of high trust in President Zelenskyy throughout the conflict, though with fluctuations. Trust levels were reported at **87%** in December 2025, decreasing to **62%** in a January 2026 survey [[^]](https://kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1584&lang=eng&page=1). Earlier data also indicated **91%** trust in December 2023 and **90%** in September 2023 [[^]](https://www.kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1368&lang=eng&page=1). While these reports detail the "Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy" over several years [[^]](https://www.kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1542&lang=eng&page=1), they do not establish a direct correlation between changes in approval and identifiable battlefield events within a 30-day period.

Prime Minister Netanyahu consistently faces low public satisfaction ratings. In Israel, a mid-January 2024 survey by The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) revealed low satisfaction with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, with only **15%** satisfied and **70%** dissatisfied [[^]](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53456). This report notes that satisfaction with the Prime Minister's performance has been "consistently low since the outbreak of the war" [[^]](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53456). Similar to the data for President Zelenskyy, this information reflects a prevailing sentiment rather than a measurable response of approval ratings to specific battlefield developments within the requested timeframe.

## Who Are the Likely Successors to China's Xi Jinping and Iran's Khamenei?

China Succession Status | No clear consensus; Xi Jinping avoids naming a successor [[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/who-will-succeed-xi-jinping/) |
Iran Principal Candidate 1 | Seyed Mojtaba Khamenei (Council on Foreign Relations [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran)) |
Iran Principal Candidate 2 | President Ebrahim Raisi (Council on Foreign Relations [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran)) |

**Specialists agree China lacks a clear successor to Xi Jinping**

Specialists agree China lacks a clear successor to Xi Jinping. Think tank experts at institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations and CSIS concur that Xi Jinping has deliberately avoided naming an heir, instead focusing on consolidating his personal authority and promoting loyalists within the party structure [[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/who-will-succeed-xi-jinping/). While individuals like Premier Li Qiang and Central Secretariat member Cai Qi have risen to prominent positions due to their close loyalty to Xi, they are seen as key figures in his inner circle rather than designated successors [[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/who-will-succeed-xi-jinping/). Recent purges within the military and party have further solidified Xi's control over crucial levers of power, rather than empowering any potential successors [[^]](https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-xis-unprecedented-purges-chinas-military-key-developments-and-potential). Consequently, there is no strong consensus among specialists on a top two likely successor slate for Xi Jinping, as the system remains opaque and heavily influenced by his personal authority.

Iran has no publicly designated successor for Supreme Leader Khamenei. Specialists at institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations consistently identify Seyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's second son, and President Ebrahim Raisi as the two principal candidates for succession [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran). Mojtaba Khamenei is assessed to hold significant influence within key security and intelligence apparatuses, including paramilitary organizations like the Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), despite possessing fewer public religious credentials compared to Raisi [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran). Ebrahim Raisi, benefiting from his current role as president, maintains a high public profile and has a strong background in the judiciary, affording him a prominent position within the state’s political structure [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran). While neither candidate has definitively gained control of key military or economic levers of power in a way that clearly signals a predetermined succession, Mojtaba’s deep ties to Iran’s security apparatus and Raisi’s constitutional role place them in highly influential positions ahead of any potential transition [[^]](https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran).

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Expiration:** January 08, 2027
- **Closes:** January 02, 2027

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

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## Historical Resolutions

**Historical Resolutions:** 1 markets in this series

**Outcomes:** 0 resolved YES, 0 resolved NO

**Recent resolutions:**

- KXLEADERSOUT-27JAN01-AKHAIRA: SCALAR (Mar 01, 2026)

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.