# When will traffic at the Strait of Hormuz return to normal?

Transit calls

Updated: June 12, 2026

Category: Politics

Tags: International

HTML: /markets/politics/international/when-will-traffic-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-return-to-normal/

## Short Answer

**The model assigns meaningfully lower odds (70.4% model vs 84.0% market) than the market for traffic at the Strait of Hormuz returning to normal before Jul 1, 2027.** This divergence is driven by the Strait's continued high-risk classification, elevated insurance premiums, and near historic low traffic, all strongly indicating a delayed return.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - The IMO maintains a high-risk classification, keeping insurance premiums elevated.** - Current Strait of Hormuz traffic remains drastically low, near historic lows.
- The proposed US-Iran MOU is not yet officially endorsed amidst security incidents.
- Significant structural challenges and war-risk premiums persist for recovery.
- **Market** sentiment suggests normal traffic recovery is more likely later in 2026.
- A vast gap exists between current and pre-crisis normal transit levels.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** Octagon's **0.5%** **model** implies a 100x payout at 1c, contrasting the **market**'s **1.0%** amid ongoing high-risk, low-traffic conditions.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Before Jun 15, 2026 | 1.0% | 0.5% | Significant structural challenges make reaching normal transit thresholds by June 15, 2026, especially challenging. |
| Before Jul 1, 2026 | 16.0% | 8.2% | Normal traffic faces significant structural challenges, including high-risk classification and extreme war-risk insurance premiums. |
| Before Aug 1, 2026 | 39.0% | 21.2% | Normal traffic remains delayed by continuing security incidents and the unendorsed US-Iran MOU proposal. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Before Jun 15, 2026 | 1.0% | 0.5% |
| Before Jul 1, 2026 | 16.0% | 8.2% |
| Before Aug 1, 2026 | 39.0% | 21.2% |
| Before Sep 1, 2026 | 44.0% | 24.6% |
| Before Oct 1, 2026 | 54.0% | 35.8% |
| Before Nov 1, 2026 | 61.0% | 42.3% |
| Before Dec 1, 2026 | 63.0% | 44.3% |
| Before Jan 1, 2027 | 70.0% | 51.8% |
| Before Apr 1, 2027 | 80.0% | 64.6% |
| Before Jul 1, 2027 | 84.0% | 70.4% |

- Expiration: July 1, 2027

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market is characterized by a low-probability sideways trend, with the price trading in a band between 1.0% and 18.0%. After opening at 6.0%, the market has experienced a significant recent decline, dropping to its current price of 1.0%. This downward movement occurred even as news emerged that the United States and Iran are reportedly nearing an agreement to reopen the Strait. The price drop suggests traders are not convinced by the diplomatic progress, likely due to persistent security risks, including reports of US forces engaging with Iranian drones in the area. The market appears to be pricing in the ongoing conflict risk over the potential for a near-term resolution.

With a total volume of over 763,000 contracts, there is significant trader interest in this outcome. The price chart shows that 1.0% is functioning as a support level, representing the market's historical low. Conversely, the 18.0% mark has acted as a strong resistance ceiling that the price has failed to break. The overall price action indicates a deeply bearish sentiment among traders. The descent to the lowest possible price point suggests a strong consensus that a return to normal traffic is highly unlikely within the market's timeframe, with the recent positive headlines failing to shift this conviction.

## Significant Price Movements

### Outcome: Before Aug 1, 2026

#### 📈 June 11, 2026: 18.0pp spike

Price increased from 18.0% to 36.0%

**What happened:** The primary driver of the 18.0 percentage point spike appears to be a conflicting announcement from the U.S. military on June 11, 2026, which stated that the Strait of Hormuz was "open" despite Iran's declaration of a complete closure and claims of striking vessels [[^]](https://gcaptain.com/u-s-military-says-hormuz-open-after-iran-declares-strait-closed/)[[^]](https://gulfbusiness.com/en/2026/gcc/pgsa-says-strait-of-hormuz-completely-closed-amid-latest-us-strikes/)[[^]](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/iran-announces-closure-of-strait-of-hormuz-to-all-vessels-amid-renewed-us-attacks/3963390)[[^]](https://americastrikes.com/articles/2026-06-11-iran-closes-hormuz-strikes-ships-strait/). This traditional news, potentially interpreted by some market participants as signaling an imminent resolution or forced reopening, likely drove optimism for traffic returning to normal before Aug 1, 2026 [[^]](https://gcaptain.com/u-s-military-says-hormuz-open-after-iran-declares-strait-closed/). However, the broader context indicated continued hostilities and a long-term shift towards contested control [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/)[[^]](https://www.maritimenews.com/iran-conflict-maritime-disruptions/iran-tightens-hormuz-controls-us-blockade)[[^]](https://bylinetimes.com/2026/06/01/no-one-can-reopen-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-that-is-the-new-regional-order/). Social media was not a primary driver, as no activity supporting an early resolution was identified.

#### 📉 June 03, 2026: 9.0pp drop

Price decreased from 30.0% to 21.0%

**What happened:** Based on the provided web research, there is no information detailing specific social media activity, news announcements, or market structure factors that occurred on or before June 03, 2026, to explain the 9.0 percentage point drop for the "Before Aug 1, 2026" outcome. The available sources highlight significant developments, such as Iran's announced closure of the Strait of Hormuz on June 11, 2026, and subsequent record-low commercial traffic on June 10-11, 2026 [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/)[[^]](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/iran-announces-closure-of-strait-of-hormuz-to-all-vessels-amid-renewed-us-attacks/3963390), but these events postdate the observed market movement. Therefore, the primary driver for the price drop on June 03, 2026, cannot be determined from the provided materials, and social media activity is irrelevant due to the lack of timely data.

#### 📉 May 30, 2026: 11.0pp drop

Price decreased from 52.0% to 41.0%

**What happened:** The primary driver of the 11.0 percentage point drop was a CNBC news report published on May 30, 2026, titled "Oil exports through Hormuz might not return to levels before Iran war" [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/30/oil-exports-through-hormuz-might-not-return-to-levels-before-iran-war.html). The article announced that analysts suggest traffic may not return to pre-war volumes for many months or years, potentially settling at 60-70% even after a hypothetical peace deal [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/30/oil-exports-through-hormuz-might-not-return-to-levels-before-iran-war.html). This assessment directly decreased the perceived likelihood of traffic returning to normal before August 1, 2026. Social media was irrelevant, as no key posts or viral narratives coincided with the price movement.

### Outcome: Before Sep 1, 2026

#### 📉 June 02, 2026: 8.0pp drop

Price decreased from 46.0% to 38.0%

**What happened:** The 8.0 percentage point drop on June 02, 2026, was primarily driven by the market's reassessment of the severe and sustained disruption at the Strait of Hormuz. Around this period, the Strait was effectively closed to standard commercial traffic, with daily transits in single digits, and war-risk insurance premiums were 8 times pre-crisis levels [[^]](https://straits.live/)[[^]](https://straits.live/report)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/)[[^]](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/strait-of-hormuz-maritime-trade-bears-heavy-brunt-during-100-days-of-iran-war/3959255)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/u-s-military-says-hormuz-open-after-iran-declares-strait-closed/). This continuously worsening situation, without a clear path to a U.S.-Iran diplomatic agreement, made a return to normal traffic before September 1, 2026, appear increasingly unlikely [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/iran-strait-hormuz-oil-tanker-traffic-frontline.html)[[^]](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/from-chokepoint-to-crisis-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-global-oil-markets/). Social media was irrelevant as no related activity was found in the provided sources.

## Contract Snapshot

This market resolves to Yes if the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz, as reported by IMF PortWatch, rises above 60 before September 1, 2026. If this condition is not met by the deadline, the market resolves to No. The market will close early if the Yes condition is met; otherwise, it closes by September 1, 2026, at 9:59 am EDT.

## Market Discussion

As of June 12, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is not operating normally, with commercial traffic at historically low levels and persistent security threats, alongside competing claims regarding its operational status between the US military and Iranian-linked entities [[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/). Prediction markets show low confidence in a near-term return to normal traffic, indicating a 22% chance by June 30, 2026; however, some non-Iranian oil flows have surged in June due to workarounds, and discussions for a US-Iran memorandum of understanding suggest a potential immediate reopening if implemented [[^]](https://www.gate.com/news/detail/gate-prediction-market-hot-events-will-the-strait-of-hormuz-return-to-21560019).

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Before Jun 15, 2026 | 0% | 1% | 1% | $1,505,059.09 | $460,871.57 |
| Before Jul 1, 2026 | 16% | 17% | 16% | $4,123,948.32 | $1,890,709.89 |
| Before Aug 1, 2026 | 38% | 39% | 39% | $1,659,945.55 | $895,096.1 |
| Before Sep 1, 2026 | 45% | 47% | 44% | $656,108.2 | $365,082.62 |
| Before Oct 1, 2026 | 54% | 55% | 54% | $500,474.18 | $314,020.16 |
| Before Nov 1, 2026 | 60% | 65% | 61% | $40,116.23 | $31,973.81 |
| Before Dec 1, 2026 | 64% | 67% | 63% | $29,395.23 | $25,880.89 |
| Before Jan 1, 2027 | 70% | 72% | 70% | $600,065.09 | $349,424.86 |
| Before Apr 1, 2027 | 81% | 82% | 80% | $177,614.59 | $81,853.54 |
| Before Jul 1, 2027 | 81% | 83% | 84% | $355,564.71 | $187,299.95 |

## What specific military or diplomatic actions by the US or Iran could derail the June 2026 MOU and halt the recovery of Hormuz traffic?

MOU Endorsement Status | Not officially endorsed as of June 12, 2026 [[^]](https://www.businessupturn.com/world/us-iran-mou-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-immediately-extend-ceasefire-60-days-says-axios/)[[^]](https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/chance-for-peace-us-iran-mou-nears-completion-paving-way-for-nuclear-talks-strait-of-hormuz-reopening-video)[[^]](https://san.com/cc/strait-of-hormuz-could-reopen-soon-but-iran-wont-call-the-deal-done/)[[^]](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/hormuz-to-reopen-but-not-change-hands-iran-pushes-back-even-as-draft-us-deal-reveals-major-concessions-article-13948131.html) |
Key Derailment Risk | Persistent disagreements on compliance and US nuclear demands [[^]](https://san.com/cc/strait-of-hormuz-could-reopen-soon-but-iran-wont-call-the-deal-done/)[[^]](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/hormuz-to-reopen-but-not-change-hands-iran-pushes-back-even-as-draft-us-deal-reveals-major-concessions-article-13948131.html) |
Hormuz Traffic Recovery | Partial rebound, but far below pre-war levels [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/iran-strait-hormuz-oil-tanker-traffic-frontline.html)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/11/iran-us-war-hormuz-strait-shadow-fleet-trump/)[[^]](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/hormuz-oil-traffic-rebounds-as-gulf-exporters-find-workarounds-report/articleshow/131671529.cms) |

**Persistent US-Iran disagreements threaten the June 2026 MOU and Hormuz recovery**

Persistent US-Iran disagreements threaten the June 2026 MOU and Hormuz recovery. The June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) faces significant risks of derailment due to ongoing disputes between the US and Iran over the terms of Iranian compliance and US demands regarding specific nuclear limitations [[^]](https://san.com/cc/strait-of-hormuz-could-reopen-soon-but-iran-wont-call-the-deal-done/)[[^]](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/hormuz-to-reopen-but-not-change-hands-iran-pushes-back-even-as-draft-us-deal-reveals-major-concessions-article-13948131.html). Iran's steadfast refusal to relinquish control of the Strait of Hormuz also poses a substantial threat to the MOU and the potential recovery of traffic through this vital waterway [[^]](https://san.com/cc/strait-of-hormuz-could-reopen-soon-but-iran-wont-call-the-deal-done/)[[^]](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/hormuz-to-reopen-but-not-change-hands-iran-pushes-back-even-as-draft-us-deal-reveals-major-concessions-article-13948131.html).

Military actions and Iran's non-endorsement further imperil the agreement. Beyond diplomatic impasses, a cycle of retaliatory military strikes, including US Tomahawk strikes and Iranian responses against Gulf partners, presents another critical risk to the MOU's stability [[^]](https://san.com/cc/strait-of-hormuz-could-reopen-soon-but-iran-wont-call-the-deal-done/)[[^]](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/hormuz-to-reopen-but-not-change-hands-iran-pushes-back-even-as-draft-us-deal-reveals-major-concessions-article-13948131.html). As of June 12, 2026, Iran has not formally endorsed the draft deal, citing new demands from the US, which highlights continuing diplomatic hurdles [[^]](https://www.businessupturn.com/world/us-iran-mou-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-immediately-extend-ceasefire-60-days-says-axios/)[[^]](https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/chance-for-peace-us-iran-mou-nears-completion-paving-way-for-nuclear-talks-strait-of-hormuz-reopening-video)[[^]](https://san.com/cc/strait-of-hormuz-could-reopen-soon-but-iran-wont-call-the-deal-done/)[[^]](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/hormuz-to-reopen-but-not-change-hands-iran-pushes-back-even-as-draft-us-deal-reveals-major-concessions-article-13948131.html).

Hormuz traffic has partially rebounded, but full recovery remains uncertain. While traffic in the region has seen a partial rebound, it remains considerably below pre-war levels [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/iran-strait-hormuz-oil-tanker-traffic-frontline.html)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/11/iran-us-war-hormuz-strait-shadow-fleet-trump/)[[^]](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/hormuz-oil-traffic-rebounds-as-gulf-exporters-find-workarounds-report/articleshow/131671529.cms). Stakeholders express skepticism about a return to "normal" operations without a robust, long-term security agreement [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/iran-strait-hormuz-oil-tanker-traffic-frontline.html)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/11/iran-us-war-hormuz-strait-shadow-fleet-trump/)[[^]](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/hormuz-oil-traffic-rebounds-as-gulf-exporters-find-workarounds-report/articleshow/131671529.cms).

## How does real-time AIS shipping data for the second half of 2026 compare to projections from the Dallas Fed and IMO for a return to pre-war traffic levels?

Current Traffic Volume | ~2% of pre-crisis volume (June 12, 2026) [[^]](https://straits.live/)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/) |
Current Daily Transits | ~2 per day (June 12, 2026) [[^]](https://straits.live/)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/) |
Dallas Fed Q1 2026 Projection | 39% expect normal traffic by August 2026 [[^]](https://www.dallasfed.org/research/surveys/des/2026/2601/2601update)[[^]](https://www.dallasfed.org/news/releases/2026/nr260423des-update)[[^]](https://www.cfo.com/news/oil-and-gas-execs-dont-expect-hormuz-traffic-to-normalize-until-august-Dallas-Fed-Baker-Hughes/818619/)[[^]](https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/dallas-fed-iea-baker-hughes-expect-traffic-in-strait-of-hormuz-to-recover-in-h2-2026/article70908246.ece) |

**Strait of Hormuz traffic remains drastically low, far below recovery projections**

Strait of Hormuz traffic remains drastically low, far below recovery projections. As of June 12, 2026, commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz continues near historic lows, estimated at approximately **2%** of pre-crisis volume. This equates to roughly 2 transits per day, compared to a pre-crisis baseline of 94–153 daily transits [[^]](https://straits.live/)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/). These current levels are significantly below earlier projections that had anticipated a mid-year recovery [[^]](https://straits.live/)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/).

Economic forecasts suggest recovery, while maritime authorities maintain caution. The Dallas Fed's Q1 2026 Energy Survey, conducted in April 2026, indicated that a majority of oil and gas executives anticipated a return to normal traffic levels later in the second half of 2026, specifically by August 2026 (**39%**) or November 2026 (**26%**) [[^]](https://www.dallasfed.org/research/surveys/des/2026/2601/2601update)[[^]](https://www.dallasfed.org/news/releases/2026/nr260423des-update)[[^]](https://www.cfo.com/news/oil-and-gas-execs-dont-expect-hormuz-traffic-to-normalize-until-august-Dallas-Fed-Baker-Hughes/818619/)[[^]](https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/dallas-fed-iea-baker-hughes-expect-traffic-in-strait-of-hormuz-to-recover-in-h2-2026/article70908246.ece). In stark contrast, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has upheld a cautious position, warning that no safe passage exists and refraining from issuing projections for a return to pre-war traffic levels due to ongoing security risks and a lack of clarity on transit criteria [[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/)[[^]](https://www.elestrechodigital.com/en/2026/03/27/the-imo-states-that-it-is-unaware-of-irans-criteria-for-authorizing-the-passage-of-ships-through-the-strait-of-hormuz)[[^]](https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/dallas-fed-iea-baker-hughes-expect-traffic-in-strait-of-hormuz-to-recover-in-h2-2026/article70908246.ece). This divergence is further reflected in mid-June 2026 prediction markets and industry observers, who show **market** optimism for a diplomatic deal conflicting with the physical reality of a restricted, high-risk, and effectively blockaded strait [[^]](https://straits.live/)[[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/iran-strait-hormuz-oil-tanker-traffic-frontline.html).

## How do alternative export routes, like the Saudi East-West Pipeline, compare to the Strait of Hormuz in terms of current oil-flow capacity, cost, and security?

East-West Pipeline Capacity | 7 million barrels per day [[^]](https://fortune.com/2026/03/28/saudi-arabia-east-west-oil-pipeline-strait-hormuz-bypass-7-million-barrels-yanbu-red-sea/)[[^]](https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/articles-interviews/saudi-arabia-east-west-pipeline-the-case-for-long-term-energy-infrastructure-investment/)[[^]](https://thegbm.com/the-two-oil-pipelines-helping-saudi-arabia-and-uae-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/)[[^]](https://fortune.com/2026/04/12/saudi-arabia-east-west-pipeline-full-capacity-iran-war-attack/)[[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/28/hormuz-alternative-routes-2026/) |
Strait of Hormuz Status | Functionally closed to major oil traffic since late February 2026 [[^]](https://fortune.com/2026/03/28/saudi-arabia-east-west-oil-pipeline-strait-hormuz-bypass-7-million-barrels-yanbu-red-sea/) |
East-West Pipeline Cost | Approximately $0.30 per barrel [[^]](https://thegbm.com/the-two-oil-pipelines-helping-saudi-arabia-and-uae-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/)[[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/28/hormuz-alternative-routes-2026/)[[^]](https://www.bakerinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/20260410-Collins-Wars%20and%20Pipelines-Working%20Paper.pdf) |

**The Saudi East-West Pipeline provides a critical bypass to the Strait of Hormuz**

The Saudi East-West Pipeline provides a critical bypass to the Strait of Hormuz.
The Saudi East-West Pipeline, also known as Petroline, possesses a design and operational capacity of 7 million barrels per day, serving as a vital alternative route to the Strait of Hormuz [[^]](https://fortune.com/2026/03/28/saudi-arabia-east-west-oil-pipeline-strait-hormuz-bypass-7-million-barrels-yanbu-red-sea/)[[^]](https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/articles-interviews/saudi-arabia-east-west-pipeline-the-case-for-long-term-energy-infrastructure-investment/)[[^]](https://thegbm.com/the-two-oil-pipelines-helping-saudi-arabia-and-uae-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/)[[^]](https://fortune.com/2026/04/12/saudi-arabia-east-west-pipeline-full-capacity-iran-war-attack/)[[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/28/hormuz-alternative-routes-2026/). This alternative has become essential given that the Strait of Hormuz has been functionally closed to major oil traffic since late February 2026 [[^]](https://fortune.com/2026/03/28/saudi-arabia-east-west-oil-pipeline-strait-hormuz-bypass-7-million-barrels-yanbu-red-sea/).

Pipeline transport offers cost advantages but faces ongoing security risks.
Transporting oil via the East-West Pipeline costs approximately **$0.30** per barrel, making it more economical than other bypass options like SUMED, although it is more expensive than direct tanker transport when the Strait of Hormuz is open [[^]](https://thegbm.com/the-two-oil-pipelines-helping-saudi-arabia-and-uae-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/)[[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/28/hormuz-alternative-routes-2026/)[[^]](https://www.bakerinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/20260410-Collins-Wars%20and%20Pipelines-Working%20Paper.pdf). However, the pipeline experiences continuous security challenges, including vulnerabilities to drone and missile attacks which briefly impacted its capacity in early 2026 [[^]](https://asiatimes.com/2026/05/what-alternatives-do-gulf-states-have-to-the-strait-of-hormuz/)[[^]](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/03/19/hormuz-bypass-pipeline-alternatives-2026/)[[^]](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/03/06/hormuz-unrest-exposes-limits-of-gulf-oil-export-alternatives/). Prediction markets indicate a skeptical view on the Strait of Hormuz returning to normal transit soon, with an aggregate **probability** of 65-**74%** for normalization before the end of 2026 [[^]](https://kalshi.com/markets/kxhormuznorm/when-will-traffic-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-return-to-normal/kxhormuznorm-26mar17)[[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-december-31)[[^]](https://predictiondesk.app/q/when-will-traffic-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-return-to-normal-kxhormuznorm-26mar17).

## Beyond suppressed AIS signals, what satellite imagery and maritime intelligence sources can track 'dark' commercial vessel traffic in the Strait of Hormuz?

Primary Tracking Methods | Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Electro-Optical (EO) imagery [[^]](https://projectosint.com/monitor-strait-hormuz-osint/)[[^]](https://socradar.io/blog/maritime-osint-dark-ships-shadow-fleets/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-19/verify-ais-spoofing-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/106468994)[[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/geospatial-intelligence-expert-y-nithiyanandam-on-why-the-hormuz-strait-is-no-longer-a-neutral-global-common/)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/) |
Supplementary Intelligence | GNSS spoofing detection and port-side observations [[^]](https://projectosint.com/monitor-strait-hormuz-osint/)[[^]](https://socradar.io/blog/maritime-osint-dark-ships-shadow-fleets/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-19/verify-ais-spoofing-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/106468994)[[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/geospatial-intelligence-expert-y-nithiyanandam-on-why-the-hormuz-strait-is-no-longer-a-neutral-global-common/)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/) |
Pattern Monitoring | Tracking non-commercial patterns, e.g., IRGCN small-craft formations [[^]](https://projectosint.com/monitor-strait-hormuz-osint/)[[^]](https://socradar.io/blog/maritime-osint-dark-ships-shadow-fleets/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-19/verify-ais-spoofing-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/106468994)[[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/geospatial-intelligence-expert-y-nithiyanandam-on-why-the-hormuz-strait-is-no-longer-a-neutral-global-common/)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/) |

**Satellite imagery and maritime intelligence track dark vessels in Hormuz**

Satellite imagery and maritime intelligence track dark vessels in Hormuz. When Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals are suppressed in the Strait of Hormuz, the primary methods for tracking "dark" commercial vessel traffic involve the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Electro-Optical (EO) satellite imagery. These imagery-based techniques are complemented by additional maritime intelligence sources, including the detection of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing, observations made at ports, and the monitoring of non-commercial maritime patterns [[^]](https://projectosint.com/monitor-strait-hormuz-osint/)[[^]](https://socradar.io/blog/maritime-osint-dark-ships-shadow-fleets/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-19/verify-ais-spoofing-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/106468994)[[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/geospatial-intelligence-expert-y-nithiyanandam-on-why-the-hormuz-strait-is-no-longer-a-neutral-global-common/)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/).

SAR and EO imagery provide essential vessel detection capabilities. SAR technology is crucial for identifying the physical presence of vessels, offering the advantage of operating effectively regardless of the time of day or prevailing cloud cover. Concurrently, EO imagery provides vital visual confirmation of these detections [[^]](https://projectosint.com/monitor-strait-hormuz-osint/)[[^]](https://socradar.io/blog/maritime-osint-dark-ships-shadow-fleets/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-19/verify-ais-spoofing-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/106468994)[[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/geospatial-intelligence-expert-y-nithiyanandam-on-why-the-hormuz-strait-is-no-longer-a-neutral-global-common/)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/). Analysts integrate these diverse imagery inputs with intelligence gathered from incidents of GNSS spoofing and observations of port activities. Additionally, the identification of distinct non-commercial maritime patterns, such as the formations of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) small-craft, is a key component in successfully identifying dark vessel traffic [[^]](https://projectosint.com/monitor-strait-hormuz-osint/)[[^]](https://socradar.io/blog/maritime-osint-dark-ships-shadow-fleets/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-19/verify-ais-spoofing-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/106468994)[[^]](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/geospatial-intelligence-expert-y-nithiyanandam-on-why-the-hormuz-strait-is-no-longer-a-neutral-global-common/)[[^]](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-falls-as-military-pressure-intensifies/).

## What changes to the IMO's risk classification or maritime insurance premiums would trigger a full-scale return of commercial shipping lines to the Strait?

IMO Advisory Status | Advises against commercial transit (as of June 2026) [[^]](https://www.zma.go.tz/Notices/MSA%20NO.%2003-26.pdf)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/)[[^]](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/middle-east-strait-of-hormuz.aspx)[[^]](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/safe-passage-of-strait-of-hormuz-does-not-exist-imo-sec-gen)[[^]](https://shippingtelegraph.com/maritime-insurance-news/imo-head-warns-no-safe-strait-of-hormuz-passage/) |
IMO Sec-Gen Confirmation | 10 April 2026 [[^]](https://www.zma.go.tz/Notices/MSA%20NO.%2003-26.pdf) |
War-Risk Premiums Increase | Up to 4,000 times higher than pre-conflict levels [[^]](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/strait-hormuz-reopening-shipping-costs-insurance-premiums)[[^]](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/06/03/hormuz-shipping-trade-iran-war/)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/uk/news/breaking-news/us-launches-new-strikes-on-iran--and-adds-to-insurance-market-strains-576482.aspx)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/marine/a-ceasefire-wont-reopen-the-insurance-market--not-yet-571315.aspx)[[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/28/when-will-strait-of-hormuz-be-safe-for-commercial-shipping-again) |

**The International Maritime Organization continues to advise against commercial transit in Hormuz**

The International Maritime Organization continues to advise against commercial transit in Hormuz. As of June 2026, the IMO maintains that the Strait of Hormuz is operationally unsafe and lacks credible security guarantees [[^]](https://www.zma.go.tz/Notices/MSA%20NO.%2003-26.pdf)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/)[[^]](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/middle-east-strait-of-hormuz.aspx)[[^]](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/safe-passage-of-strait-of-hormuz-does-not-exist-imo-sec-gen)[[^]](https://shippingtelegraph.com/maritime-insurance-news/imo-head-warns-no-safe-strait-of-hormuz-passage/). The IMO Secretary-General confirmed on April 10, 2026, that the Strait is not yet open for normal maritime transit and that no confirmed arrangements for its safe reopening have been established [[^]](https://www.zma.go.tz/Notices/MSA%20NO.%2003-26.pdf). For commercial shipping lines to fully return, the IMO would need to reverse its current advisory. This reversal is contingent upon the establishment of sustained stability, credible security arrangements, evidence of no renewed attacks, comprehensive mine clearance, and predictable, non-hostile naval security arrangements [[^]](https://www.zma.go.tz/Notices/MSA%20NO.%2003-26.pdf)[[^]](https://gcaptain.com/imo-chief-warns-no-safe-passage-exists-in-hormuz-despite-rising-traffic-claims/)[[^]](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/middle-east-strait-of-hormuz.aspx)[[^]](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/safe-passage-of-strait-of-hormuz-does-not-exist-imo-sec-gen)[[^]](https://shippingtelegraph.com/maritime-insurance-news/imo-head-warns-no-safe-strait-of-hormuz-passage/)[[^]](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/strait-hormuz-reopening-shipping-costs-insurance-premiums)[[^]](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/06/03/hormuz-shipping-trade-iran-war/)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/asia/news/breaking-news/the-insurance-industrys-biggest-problem-in-the-gulf-is-a-misconception-575300.aspx)[[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/28/when-will-strait-of-hormuz-be-safe-for-commercial-shipping-again).

War-risk insurance premiums remain exceptionally high for Strait of Hormuz transit. Premiums have surged significantly, reaching up to 4,000 times higher than pre-conflict levels [[^]](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/strait-hormuz-reopening-shipping-costs-insurance-premiums)[[^]](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/06/03/hormuz-shipping-trade-iran-war/)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/uk/news/breaking-news/us-launches-new-strikes-on-iran--and-adds-to-insurance-**market**-strains-576482.aspx)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/marine/a-ceasefire-wont-reopen-the-insurance-**market**--not-yet-571315.aspx)[[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/28/when-will-strait-of-hormuz-be-safe-for-commercial-shipping-again). These elevated premiums are expected to persist even after transit technically resumes, as insurers require long-term evidence of stability to normalize their actuarial models [[^]](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/strait-hormuz-reopening-shipping-costs-insurance-premiums)[[^]](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/06/03/hormuz-shipping-trade-iran-war/)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/uk/news/breaking-news/us-launches-new-strikes-on-iran--and-adds-to-insurance-**market**-strains-576482.aspx)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/marine/a-ceasefire-wont-reopen-the-insurance-**market**--not-yet-571315.aspx)[[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/28/when-will-strait-of-hormuz-be-safe-for-commercial-shipping-again). A ceasefire alone is not yet considered sufficient to reopen the insurance **market** [[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/marine/a-ceasefire-wont-reopen-the-insurance-**market**--not-yet-571315.aspx). Therefore, a full-scale return of commercial shipping would likely coincide with, or occur after, the development of the long-term evidence of stability that insurers require to adjust their models [[^]](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/strait-hormuz-reopening-shipping-costs-insurance-premiums)[[^]](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/06/03/hormuz-shipping-trade-iran-war/)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/uk/news/breaking-news/us-launches-new-strikes-on-iran--and-adds-to-insurance-**market**-strains-576482.aspx)[[^]](https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/marine/a-ceasefire-wont-reopen-the-insurance-**market**--not-yet-571315.aspx)[[^]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/28/when-will-strait-of-hormuz-be-safe-for-commercial-shipping-again).

## What Could Change the Odds

**Market sentiment suggests a return to normal traffic at the Strait of Hormuz, defined by the IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average of transit calls exceeding a threshold, is more likely later in 2026.** Kalshi’s contract shows probabilities of **40%** before Oct 1, 2026, **48%** before Nov 1, 2026, and **56%** before Dec 1, 2026 [[^]](https://kalshi.com/markets/kxhormuznorm/when-will-traffic-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-return-to-normal/kxhormuznorm-26mar17). A Polymarket-style curve indicates probabilities of **4%** before June 15, **22%** before June 30, **41%** before July 31, and **76%** by Dec 31 for traffic returning to normal, which reflects expectations that US-Iran negotiations and restraint take time [[^]](https://www.gate.com/news/detail/gate-prediction-**market**-hot-events-will-the-strait-of-hormuz-return-to-21560019). Specifically, Polymarket’s end-of-June variant resolves Yes if the IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average is ≥60 for any date between **market** creation and June 30, 2026 [[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june).

**A rapid US-Iran agreement paired with an immediate Iranian stand-down in the Hormuz corridor would be a critical catalyst for an earlier return to normal traffic, though the market views this as unlikely by June 15 [[^]](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/economy/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15).** A tanker CEO was quoted on June 11, 2026, stating that traffic should resume quickly after a credible US-Iran agreement that improves security, although it would not immediately return to prewar levels of 130–140 vessels per day, implying a deal-driven step-up rather than instant normalization [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/iran-strait-hormuz-oil-tanker-traffic-frontline.html). Without such an agreement and immediate action, the **market** expects the NO position to prevail near the June 15 deadline [[^]](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/economy/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15).

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Strike Date:** March 17, 2026
- **Expiration:** July 14, 2026
- **Closes:** July 01, 2027

## Decision-Flipping Events

- **Market** sentiment suggests a return to normal traffic at the Strait of Hormuz, defined by the IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average of transit calls exceeding a threshold, is more likely later in 2026.
- Kalshi’s contract shows probabilities of **40%** before Oct 1, 2026, **48%** before Nov 1, 2026, and **56%** before Dec 1, 2026 [^] .
- A Polymarket-style curve indicates probabilities of **4%** before June 15, **22%** before June 30, **41%** before July 31, and **76%** by Dec 31 for traffic returning to normal, which reflects expectations that US-Iran negotiations and restraint take time [^] .
- Specifically, Polymarket’s end-of-June variant resolves Yes if the IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average is ≥60 for any date between **market** creation and June 30, 2026 [^] .

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## Historical Resolutions

**Historical Resolutions:** 4 markets in this series

**Outcomes:** 0 resolved YES, 4 resolved NO

**Recent resolutions:**

- KXHORMUZNORM-26MAR17-B260601: NO (Jun 02, 2026)
- KXHORMUZNORM-26MAR17-B260515: NO (May 19, 2026)
- KXHORMUZNORM-26MAR17-B260501: NO (May 05, 2026)
- KXHORMUZNORM-26MAR17-B260415: NO (Apr 21, 2026)

## Disclaimer

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Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.

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