# What will the U.S. withdraw from during the Trump Administration? Before Jan 20, 2029 Updated: April 27, 2026 Category: Politics Tags: International Trump HTML: /markets/politics/international/what-will-the-u-s-withdraw-from-during-the-trump-administration/ ## Short Answer **The model sees potential mispricing: the World Trade Organization at 22.6% model vs 45.0% market, suggesting a significant divergence in probability assessment for a U.S.** withdrawal during the Trump Administration. ## Key Claims (January 2026) **- - Project 2025 targets IMF and World Bank for potential U.S.** withdrawal. - Unilateral U.S. withdrawal from WTO lacks clear executive power. - WTO ruling against U.S. trade policies could trigger withdrawal. - U.S. withdrawal from WTO is projected to severely impact the economy. - **Market** **probability** saw a significant 24-point increase in April 2026. ### Why This Matters (GEO) - AI agents extract claims, not arguments. - Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards. - Enables fact stitching across multiple sources. ## Executive Verdict **Key takeaway.** **Market** at 8c overprices **1.9%** **model** estimate, given withdrawal challenges and severe economic impact. ### Who Wins and Why | Outcome | Market | Model | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | United Nations | 43.0% | 22.3% | Project 2025 documents explicitly target the United Nations for defunding rather than outright withdrawal, providing strong evidence against the market's expectation of U.S. withdrawal. | | World Trade Organization | 45.0% | 22.6% | The Heritage Foundation's Project 2025, which outlines policy for a potential Trump administration, explicitly advocates against U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization, providing strong evidence against the market outcome. | | G7 | 8.0% | 1.9% | The comprehensive Project 2025 policy initiatives, which explicitly address other organizations for withdrawal or defunding, make no mention of the G7 as a target for U.S. withdrawal, significantly contradicting the market's current probability, though some might point to past contentious G7 interactions as a reason for potential disengagement. | ## Model vs Market | Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability | | --- | --- | --- | | United Nations | 43.0% | 22.3% | | World Trade Organization | 45.0% | 22.6% | | G7 | 8.0% | 1.9% | | Interpol | 12.0% | 3.2% | | OECD | 20.0% | 7.0% | | International Atomic Energy Agency | 13.0% | 5.7% | | G20 | 6.0% | 2.2% | | World Bank Group | 28.0% | 16.1% | | Inter-American Development Bank | 19.0% | 9.4% | | International Monetary Fund | 20.0% | 10.1% | - Expiration: January 20, 2029 ## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics Based on the provided chart data, this market is characterized by extremely low volatility and a sideways trend. The price has remained within a very narrow 0.1 percentage point range, fluctuating only between 7.9% and 8.0%. There have been no significant price spikes or drops; the chart indicates a flat line with only a minor tick upward from its starting price. Given that no specific context or news has been provided, it is not possible to attribute this minimal price change to any external event. The trading volume in this market is exceptionally light, with a total of only 58 contracts traded across 45 data points. The sample data shows days with zero volume, which is indicative of a market with very few active participants. This low volume suggests a lack of strong conviction from traders and implies that the current price reflects the sentiment of a small group rather than a broad consensus. The market appears illiquid and is not attracting significant speculative interest. The price action has established a clear, albeit very tight, trading range. The 7.9% level has acted as a floor or support, while the 8.0% level has served as a ceiling or resistance. The market sentiment, as reflected by the chart, is stable and assigns a consistently low probability to the event occurring. The lack of price movement or volume suggests that traders see the likelihood of this outcome as low and unchanging, with no new information currently influencing their positions. ## Significant Price Movements #### 📈 April 24, 2026: 24.0pp spike Price increased from 23.0% to 47.0% **Outcome:** United Nations **What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly. ## Contract Snapshot This market resolves to Yes if the United States completely withdraws from the World Trade Organization before January 20, 2029. If this withdrawal does not occur by that date, the market resolves to No. The market opened on February 18, 2025, and will close early if the event happens, or by January 20, 2029, with projected payouts 30 minutes after closing. ## Market Discussion The market indicates that a U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (45%) and the United Nations (43%) are considered the most probable events among the listed options. While direct arguments for these specific markets are not detailed, a notable amount of discussion centers on the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO, with some traders strongly believing it will occur and expressing a desire for a market on it, though one counter-argument suggests the U.S. needs NATO's influence against China. ## Market Data | Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | G20 | 2.1% | 5.9% | 6% | $783 | $270 | | G7 | 2% | 8% | 8% | $1,323.71 | $433.71 | | International Atomic Energy Agency | 9% | 13% | 13% | $916 | $771 | | Inter-American Development Bank | 14% | 19% | 19% | $154 | $4 | | International Monetary Fund | 15% | 20% | 20% | $93 | $74 | | Interpol | 7% | 12% | 12% | $1,163 | $475 | | OECD | 17% | 18% | 20% | $1,032 | $956 | | United Nations | 37% | 40% | 43% | $7,175.28 | $2,340.31 | | World Bank Group | 22% | 28% | 28% | $348 | $175 | | World Trade Organization | 38% | 44% | 45% | $3,442.72 | $1,791.72 | ## Which International Organizations Does Project 2025 Target for Withdrawal? IMF & World Bank Stance | Targeted for significant changes, including potential U.S. withdrawal [[^]](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-if-the-us-leaves-the-imf-and-the-world-bank/) | United Nations Stance | Targeted for defunding, not outright withdrawal [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/next-defund-the-united-nations) | WTO Stance | Explicitly advocated against U.S. withdrawal [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-us-should-make-greater-use-the-wto-not-withdraw) | **The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank face critical scrutiny, including potential U.S** The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank face critical scrutiny, including potential U.S. withdrawal. These organizations are most frequently discussed as targets for significant changes within The Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 policy discussions [[^]](https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/index.php/project). While direct publications from Project 2025 do not explicitly provide exact language regarding withdrawal, external analyses indicate a critical stance towards these institutions. Discussions often explore scenarios of a U.S. exit as part of an 'America First' foreign policy framework [[^]](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-if-the-us-leaves-the-imf-and-the-world-bank/). Project 2025 advocates defunding the UN but not withdrawing from the WTO. For the United Nations, The Heritage Foundation explicitly recommends to 'Defund the United Nations' [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/next-defund-the-united-nations). This approach emphasizes financial disengagement and prioritizing global freedom and prosperity through reform, rather than a full withdrawal [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/prioritizing-global-freedom-and-prosperity-the-united-nations-and). Conversely, regarding the World Trade Organization (WTO), The Heritage Foundation's recommendation is that 'The U.S. Should Make Greater Use of the WTO, Not Withdraw' [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-us-should-make-greater-use-the-wto-not-withdraw). This explicitly advises against a U.S. withdrawal from the organization [[^]](https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-us-should-make-greater-use-the-wto-not-withdraw). ## Can US President Unilaterally Withdraw from WTO or UN? WTO Withdrawal Notice | 6 months' notice to Director-General (Article XV, Marrakesh Agreement) [1, p [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12997/IF12997.1.pdf). 1; 3, p [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_the_United_Nations). 1] [[^]](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050609_RL32700_43f253169d4bcadef1bcf0e4936e6738c6d3cb37.html) | UN Withdrawal Clause | Not explicit in Charter, generally accepted under international law [2; 7, p [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12997/IF12997.1.pdf). 2] [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_the_United_Nations) | US Presidential Authority | Clearer for UN (treaty) than WTO (statute) [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_the_United_Nations) | **U.S** U.S. withdrawal from WTO lacks clear unilateral executive action. Any member can withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO) by providing six months' notice, as stipulated in Article XV of the Marrakesh Agreement [1, p. 1; 3, p. 1]. However, the U.S. became a WTO member through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), a congressional statute enacted in 1994 [1, p. 1; 3, p. 1]. This statutory approval complicates unilateral executive action, leading to a significant constitutional debate regarding the President's authority to withdraw without Congress repealing the URAA, thereby not offering a clear path for unilateral executive action [1, p. 3; 3, p. 1]. Furthermore, the URAA includes mechanisms for 'withdrawal resolutions,' emphasizing a congressional role in the process [1, p. 2; 4]. Unilateral executive action is clearer for U.S. withdrawal from the UN. In contrast, the United Nations Charter does not contain an explicit withdrawal clause, though international law generally accepts a state's right to withdraw from treaties without such a provision [2; 7, p. 2]. Domestically, the U.S. Senate ratified the UN Charter as a treaty. The President's authority to unilaterally terminate treaties is more broadly recognized and has more established historical precedent compared to withdrawing from an organization approved by a specific domestic statute [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_the_United_Nations). Consequently, unilateral executive action for U.S. withdrawal from the UN is considered to have a comparatively clearer path, primarily due to the nature of its domestic approval as a treaty [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_the_United_Nations). ## What are O'Brien, Grenell, Colby's views on UN vs. economic withdrawals? Specific withdrawal arguments | Not detailed for Robert O'Brien, Richard Grenell, or Elbridge Colby in research [[^]](https://www.thewirechina.com/2024/06/30/robert-obrien-on-americas-greatest-foreign-policy-failure-since-the-1930s/) | Past US withdrawals (Trump era) | From dozens of international and UN entities [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-signs-proclamation-withdrawing-international-organizations-white-house-2026-01-07/), total of 66 organizations [[^]](https://www-s4.npr.org/2026/01/07/g-s1-104999/united-states-exits-international-organizations-united-nations) | US withdrawal from UN proposals | General topic covered, specific arguments from named candidates not attributed [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposals_for_the_United_States_to_withdraw_from_the_United_Nations) | **Specific arguments for withdrawal from UN or economic bodies were not found** Specific arguments for withdrawal from UN or economic bodies were not found. The research did not provide specific, developed arguments from Robert O'Brien, Richard Grenell, or Elbridge Colby regarding a preference for withdrawing from the UN system versus international economic bodies like the WTO or IMF. While biographical information for these individuals was available [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_C._O'Brien), it did not elaborate on their detailed policy arguments concerning specific withdrawal strategies. An article related to Robert O'Brien suggested a critical view on past foreign policy but did not detail specific withdrawal strategies from different types of international organizations [[^]](https://www.thewirechina.com/2024/06/30/robert-obrien-on-americas-greatest-foreign-policy-failure-since-the-1930s/). Past administration actions and analyses on withdrawals are general. During the Trump administration, the U.S. withdrew from "dozens of international and UN entities" [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-signs-proclamation-withdrawing-international-organizations-white-house-2026-01-07/) and "66 international organizations" [[^]](https://www-s4.npr.org/2026/01/07/g-s1-104999/united-states-exits-international-organizations-united-nations). Additionally, analyses exploring the potential consequences of U.S. withdrawal from the IMF [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/us-exit-imf-would-be-true-dollar-shock-mike-dolan-2025-04-29/) or the WTO [[^]](https://williamusher.substack.com/p/exiting-the-arena-what-a-us-withdrawal) exist. The Wikipedia page on "Proposals for the United States to withdraw from the United Nations" [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposals_for_the_United_States_to_withdraw_from_the_United_Nations) covered the general topic but did not attribute detailed arguments from O'Brien, Grenell, or Colby. A direct comparison of specific withdrawal arguments is not possible. Therefore, a direct comparison of specific, developed arguments from Robert O'Brien, Richard Grenell, or Elbridge Colby for withdrawing from one type of international system over another cannot be made based on the provided information. ## What are the Economic Consequences of a U.S. WTO Withdrawal? U.S. GDP Loss | Over 5% permanently [[^]](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-05/PA%20996.pdf) | Export Tariff Increase | From 3.4% to 32% [[^]](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-05/PA%20996.pdf) | Import Tariff Increase | From 3.4% to 9% [[^]](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-05/PA%20996.pdf) | **U.S** U.S. withdrawal from the WTO could severely impact the economy. A U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO) is projected to cause severe economic repercussions, including a permanent loss of over **5%** of U.S. GDP [[^]](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-05/PA%20996.pdf). American exports could experience a significant rise in average tariffs, increasing from **3.4%** to an estimated **32%**. Concurrently, U.S. import tariffs might climb from **3.4%** to **9%** [[^]](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-05/PA%20996.pdf). These tariff adjustments are expected to lead to a substantial decrease in exports, job losses, and higher costs for both consumers and businesses. The agriculture and manufacturing sectors are considered especially vulnerable to these changes [[^]](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-05/PA%20996.pdf). State-level data for WTO withdrawal is currently unavailable. While the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has examined the economic effects of other trade agreement withdrawals, specific quantitative state-level data concerning a WTO withdrawal is not found in the provided research [[^]](https://www.uschamber.com/international/which-states-would-be-hit-hardest-withdrawing-nafta). However, the U.S. Chamber highlights the importance of U.S. leadership in reforming the WTO to safeguard American businesses and global trade [[^]](https://www.uschamber.com/international/hope-stirs-at-the-world-trade-organization). Economists widely acknowledge the extensive economic risks associated with a WTO exit, such as global trade disruption and increased consumer prices [[^]](https://weforum.org/stories/2016/08/would-a-us-exit-from-the-wto-unravel-global-trade). In contrast, research concerning a U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) or Interpol does not provide comparable quantitative economic impact data, such as retaliatory tariffs or loss of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status [[^]](https://www.hackingbutlegal.com/p/america-exits-66-international-organizations). ## What Event Could Catalyze U.S. Withdrawal From the WTO? Key Catalyst Event | Binding and high-profile WTO dispute resolution ruling against U.S. trade policies [[^]](http://www.wttlonline.com/stories/wto-panel-report-on-us-energy-tax-credits-and-ustr-response,14765) | Specific Ruling Instance | 2026 WTO panel report on U.S. energy tax credits [[^]](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/623r_272_e.htm) | Withdrawal Precedent | U.S. withdrew from 66 international entities in January 2026 [[^]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/) | **A World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling against U.S** A World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling against U.S. trade policies could trigger withdrawal. A specific and plausible near-term event that could act as a catalyst for U.S. withdrawal from an international organization is a binding and high-profile World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution ruling against U.S. trade policies, such as specific tax credits or tariffs. This scenario is supported by a 2026 WTO panel report concerning U.S. energy tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act [[^]](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/623r_272_e.htm). Such a ruling, particularly if it finds U.S. policies inconsistent with international trade rules, could be perceived by a future U.S. administration as an infringement on national sovereignty or economic interests [[^]](http://www.wttlonline.com/stories/wto-panel-report-on-us-energy-tax-credits-and-ustr-response,14765). Past withdrawals from global bodies enhance future withdrawal likelihood. The plausibility of this event as a catalyst for withdrawal is heightened by a previous administration's actions. In January 2026, the United States formally withdrew from 66 international and United Nations entities, asserting that these organizations were deemed "contrary to the Interests of the United States" [[^]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/). A new high-profile WTO ruling against U.S. policy, especially concerning subsidies or tariffs, could similarly be characterized by a future administration, potentially leading to consideration of withdrawal from the WTO itself. ## What Could Change the Odds **Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable. ## Key Dates & Catalysts - **Expiration:** January 20, 2029 - **Closes:** January 20, 2029 ## Decision-Flipping Events - Catalyst analysis unavailable. ## Related Research Reports - [EU has a new member before 2030?](/markets/politics/international/eu-has-a-new-member-before-2030/) - [Which of these African leaders will leave office next?](/markets/politics/international/which-of-these-african-leaders-will-leave-office-next/) - [Will Trump balance the budget?](/markets/politics/trump/will-trump-balance-the-budget/) - [When will Pam Bondi depart as Attorney General?](/markets/politics/when-will-pam-bondi-depart-as-attorney-general/) ## Historical Resolutions No historical resolution data available for this series. ## Disclaimer This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice. Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results. We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete. ### Data Sources & Model Transparency **Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data. **Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.