# How high will oil (WTI) get by Dec 31, 2026?

In 2026

Updated: April 8, 2026

Category: Financials

Tags: Oil & Gas

HTML: /markets/financials/oil-gas/how-high-will-oil-wti-get-by-dec-31-2026/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect WTI oil prices to reach **$80.01** or above by December 31, 2026, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Global verifiable spare oil capacity is reduced.** - US Permian shale supply elasticity is declining.
- China's crude oil import demand reached record highs.
- Declining Permian rig counts constrain future shale supply.
- Russian Urals crude oil discounts have significantly narrowed.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** **Model**'s **57.9%** vs **market**'s **56.7%** (+1.2pp) suggests sustained high oil prices, implying a 1.8x payout.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| $180.01 or above | 16.0% | 18.6% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
| $150.01 or above | 23.2% | 26.0% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |
| $160.01 or above | 15.5% | 18.6% | Research does not highlight strong supporting evidence. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| $180.01 or above | 16.0% | 18.6% |
| $150.01 or above | 23.2% | 26.0% |
| $160.01 or above | 15.5% | 18.6% |
| $140.01 or above | 32.7% | 35.3% |
| $115.01 or above | 56.7% | 57.9% |
| $120.01 or above | 51.1% | 55.4% |
| $130.01 or above | 30.0% | 35.3% |
| $125.01 or above | 54.0% | 55.4% |
| $135.01 or above | 31.0% | 35.3% |
| $200.01 or above | 12.0% | 14.2% |

- Expiration: December 31, 2026

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market is characterized by a long-term sideways trend, with the current probability of 64.7% trading very close to its starting point of 65.0%. Despite this relative stability over the long run, the price has experienced significant fluctuations, trading within a wide range between 56.1% and 97.8%. The most notable activity occurred in a period of extreme volatility during early April 2026. Within a single week, the price dropped significantly on April 1st, spiked to nearly 90% on April 2nd, and then plunged over 22 percentage points on April 7th, erasing all recent gains.

The specific catalysts for these sharp movements are not identifiable from the available data. However, the trading volume patterns suggest that this period of volatility was accompanied by heightened market participation, indicating that traders were acting with conviction. The chart shows an apparent support level around the 56% probability mark and a strong resistance ceiling in the upper 90s, which has capped previous rallies. The market’s recent return to the 65% level, a long-term pivot point, suggests a consolidation phase following the recent turbulence. Overall market sentiment implies a moderately high probability that WTI oil will reach the contract's target price, but the recent volatility signals significant underlying uncertainty and a consensus that is susceptible to rapid change.

## Significant Price Movements

### Outcome: $130.01 or above

#### 📉 April 08, 2026: 13.6pp drop

Price decreased from 49.7% to 36.1%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

#### 📉 April 07, 2026: 25.0pp drop

Price decreased from 69.0% to 44.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

### Outcome: $125.01 or above

#### 📉 April 06, 2026: 11.1pp drop

Price decreased from 84.0% to 72.9%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

### Outcome: $115.01 or above

#### 📈 April 02, 2026: 18.0pp spike

Price increased from 71.0% to 89.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

#### 📉 April 01, 2026: 14.6pp drop

Price decreased from 85.6% to 71.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

## Contract Snapshot

This Kalshi market resolves to "Yes" if ICE reports that the maximum WTI front-month settle price exceeds $125.00 between the market's issuance and December 31, 2026; otherwise, it resolves to "No." The outcome is verified exclusively from ICE reports.

The market opened on March 4, 2026, at 10:00 AM EST. If the "Yes" outcome occurs, the market closes the following 10 AM ET; otherwise, it closes by December 31, 2026, at 2:30 PM EST, with projected payout 1 hour after closing.

## Market Discussion

The market discussion primarily centers on geopolitical developments between the USA and Iran, particularly concerning the Strait of Hormuz, and their potential impact on WTI oil prices by December 2026. Arguments for higher prices ($150.01+) anticipate a "generational defeat" for the US with Iran gaining significant control and sanctions lifted. Conversely, those betting against the highest targets ($160.01+) suggest that even with Iranian influence, the Strait may remain open, preventing extreme price spikes, or express general hopes for stability. Overall, recent market probabilities indicate declining confidence in WTI reaching higher price thresholds, with the likelihood of exceeding $120.01 or $130.01 both experiencing significant drops.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| $115.01 or above | 54% | 55% | 56.7% | $240,366 | $106,573 |
| $120.01 or above | 51.2% | 53% | 51.1% | $230,643 | $92,306 |
| $125.01 or above | 54% | 55% | 54% | $187,681 | $76,307 |
| $130.01 or above | 29.3% | 29.9% | 30% | $202,724 | $73,395 |
| $135.01 or above | 32% | 35.6% | 31% | $146,590 | $54,009 |
| $140.01 or above | 29.9% | 33.3% | 32.7% | $284,266 | $114,653 |
| $150.01 or above | 23.2% | 26.9% | 23.2% | $340,700 | $156,808 |
| $160.01 or above | 15.1% | 15.7% | 15.5% | $319,330 | $146,695 |
| $180.01 or above | 14.4% | 19% | 16% | $471,986 | $218,609 |
| $200.01 or above | 10.6% | 12% | 12% | $106,575 | $70,316 |

## How Has EIA Redefined Saudi, UAE Oil Capacity?

Saudi Arabia Stated Production Capacity | 12 million barrels per day (bpd) [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/opec-saudi-spare-oil-production-capacity-2025-02-04/) |
Saudi Arabia 2025 Verifiable Spare Capacity (EIA Revised) | 0.7-1.0 million bpd [[^]](https://www.kingdomexploration.com/?article=eia-opec-capacity-redefinition-january-2026-supply-crisis&page=news) |
UAE 2025 Verifiable Spare Capacity (EIA Revised) | negligible, often less than 0.1 million bpd [[^]](https://www.kingdomexploration.com/?article=eia-opec-capacity-redefinition-january-2026-supply-crisis&page=news) |

**Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially showed higher 2025 verifiable spare capacity estimates**

Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially showed higher 2025 verifiable spare capacity estimates. Both nations have officially stated sustained crude oil production capacity targets, with Saudi Arabia aiming for 12 million barrels per day (bpd) and the UAE targeting 4.2 million bpd [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/opec-saudi-spare-oil-production-capacity-2025-02-04/). Prior to a significant re-evaluation by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), analysts, often aligning with the International Energy Agency's (IEA) approach, estimated Saudi Arabia's actual spare capacity in early 2025 to be around 1.5 million bpd. The UAE's spare capacity was estimated at about 0.3-0.5 million bpd [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/opec-saudi-spare-oil-production-capacity-2025-02-04/). The IEA defines spare capacity as supply that can be brought to **market** within 90 days and sustained for an extended period [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/opec-saudi-spare-oil-production-capacity-2025-02-04/).

EIA's stricter capacity definition significantly reduced 2025 spare capacity estimates. The EIA significantly updated its assessment of verifiable spare capacity in January 2026, redefining crude oil production capacity to focus on supply that can be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, a stricter criterion [[^]](https://www.kingdomexploration.com/?article=eia-opec-capacity-redefinition-january-2026-supply-crisis&page=news). This redefinition resulted in a substantial downward revision of 2025 capacity estimates. The EIA's re-evaluation suggested Saudi Arabia's verifiable spare capacity for 2025 was closer to 0.7-1.0 million bpd, while for the UAE, it was estimated to be negligible, often less than 0.1 million bpd [[^]](https://www.kingdomexploration.com/?article=eia-opec-capacity-redefinition-january-2026-supply-crisis&page=news). This adjustment revealed OPEC's total spare capacity to be approximately **60%** lower than previously reported figures [[^]](https://www.kingdomexploration.com/?article=eia-opec-capacity-redefinition-january-2026-supply-crisis&page=news).

## What Were China's Crude Oil Imports and Stockpiling Trends in 2025?

2025 Crude Oil Imports (bpd) | 11.55 million bpd (4.4% increase year-on-year) [[^]](https://www.indexbox.io/blog/chinas-2025-crude-oil-imports-hit-record-highs-driven-by-energy-security-and-low-prices/) |
Total 2025 Imports (tons) | 557 million tons [[^]](https://discoveryalert.com.au/china-oil-imports-2025-strategic-shift/) |
H1 2025 Import Growth to Inventories | Significant portion of 10% import growth directed to inventories [[^]](https://www.vortexa.com/insights/chinas-appetite-for-stockpiling) |

**China's crude import demand reached record highs through 2025**

China's crude import demand reached record highs through 2025. Official customs releases and tanker tracking data show China imported 11.55 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in 2025, marking a **4.4%** increase from the previous year, with total imports amounting to 557 million tons for the year [[^]](https://www.indexbox.io/blog/chinas-2025-crude-oil-imports-hit-record-highs-driven-by-energy-security-and-low-prices/). December inflows also reached record levels [[^]](http://polling.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/). This growth in imports was particularly pronounced in the first half of 2025, with crude oil imports increasing by **10%**, driven by a dual focus on enhancing energy security and capitalizing on lower crude oil prices [[^]](https://www.indexbox.io/blog/chinas-2025-crude-oil-imports-hit-record-highs-driven-by-energy-security-and-low-prices/).

China significantly accelerated Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) stockpiling in 2025. After a period of slower accumulation between 2021 and 2023, the pace of inventory accumulation likely resumed in 2024 and 2025 [[^]](https://jkempenergy.com/2026/02/15/chinas-oil-stocks-and-readiness-for-war/). A substantial portion of the crude import growth observed in the first half of 2025 was directed into both strategic and commercial inventories [[^]](https://www.vortexa.com/insights/chinas-appetite-for-stockpiling). Towards the end of 2025, China further amplified this strategic shift, accelerating its crude stockpiling efforts amidst a trend of weaker global oil prices [[^]](https://uk.mobile.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-accelerates-crude-stockpiling-amid-weaker-oil-price-trend-2025-12-16/). Consistent high import volumes and active transfers to inventories indicate a robust fill rate as China sought to bolster its energy reserves during this period [[^]](https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/where-china-gets-its-oil-crude-imports-in-2025-reveal-stockpiling-and-changing-fortunes-of-certain-suppliers-including-those-sanctioned/).

## How Will Permian Basin DUCs and Rig Counts Impact 2026 Supply?

DUCs Inventory Outlook | Forecasts vary for 2025; some anticipate a drawdown [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/duc-hunt-what-the-2025-drawdown-means/), while others project operators could exit 2025 with ~25% more DUCs [[^]](https://oilgasleads.com/why-permian-basin-operators-are-exiting-2025-with-25-more-ducs/) |
Permian Active Rig Count | Continued decline heading into 2026 [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/rig-counts-in-permian-basin-texas-continue-to-decline-in-2026/), despite recent fluctuations [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/texas-rig-count-retreats-from-2026-high-u-s-count-up-second-straight-week/) |
US Shale Supply Elasticity | Reduced elasticity, meaning market demand for more oil may not be met by shale production [[^]](https://eastdaley.com/daley-note/the-market-wants-more-oil-shale-may-not-deliver) |

**Permian Basin DUC inventories show mixed forecasts amidst declining rig counts**

Permian Basin DUC inventories show mixed forecasts amidst declining rig counts. Permian Basin drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs) inventory presents varied forecasts for 2025, with some analyses predicting a drawdown [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/duc-hunt-what-the-2025-drawdown-means/) while other projections suggest operators could exit 2025 with approximately **25%** more DUCs [[^]](https://oilgasleads.com/why-permian-basin-operators-are-exiting-2025-with-25-more-ducs/). Concurrently, the active rig count in the Permian Basin is trending downwards and is expected to continue this decline into 2026 [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/rig-counts-in-permian-basin-texas-continue-to-decline-in-2026/). The Texas rig count recently retreated from a 2026 high, reflecting a broader outlook of declining activity for the year [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/rig-counts-in-permian-basin-texas-continue-to-decline-in-2026/).

These trends suggest reduced supply elasticity for US shale oil by 2026. The continued decline in active rig counts [[^]](https://pboilandgasmagazine.com/rig-counts-in-permian-basin-texas-continue-to-decline-in-2026/), combined with the ambiguous DUC inventory that could potentially increase or be strategically held, points to a constraint on rapid production expansion. Industry analyses indicate that shale producers may struggle to fully meet the **market**'s demand for additional oil [[^]](https://eastdaley.com/daley-note/the-**market**-wants-more-oil-shale-may-not-deliver), signaling reduced supply elasticity. Furthermore, the **market** might be underestimating the impact of egress tightening within the Permian Basin, which could further limit supply growth, especially in a scenario of higher oil prices [[^]](https://eastdaley.com/crude-oil-edge/**market**-underestimates-permian-egress-tightening-in-a-100-oil-scenario). Despite certain operators, such as Exxon, leading in projected Permian supply growth for 2026 [[^]](https://eastdaley.com/crude-oil-edge/exxon-leads-the-pack-for-2026-permian-supply-growth), the overall capacity for US shale to quickly ramp up production appears limited, hindering its ability to respond elastically to increased demand by 2026 [[^]](https://eastdaley.com/daley-note/the-**market**-wants-more-oil-shale-may-not-deliver).

## What Are the Key Trends in Russian Crude Oil Pricing and Exports?

Record Urals-Brent Discount | $28 per barrel (at one point) [[^]](https://www.ainvest.com/news/russia-oil-pricing-power-collapses-sanctions-force-record-28-barrel-urals-discount-2603/) |
March 2026 Urals-Brent Discount | $9 per barrel (Brent at $100, Urals at $91) [[^]](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/03/09/iran-war-brent-urals-russia-oil-revenues/) |
India's Russian Crude Imports | 9-month high in March 2026 [[^]](https://www.rediff.com/business/report/russian-crude-oil-imports-soar-to-9-month-high-in-march/20260401.htm) |

**Russian Urals crude discounts initially widened, then significantly narrowed**

Russian Urals crude discounts initially widened, then significantly narrowed. Initially, international sanctions led to a record discount of **$28** per barrel for Urals crude relative to Brent [[^]](https://www.ainvest.com/news/russia-oil-pricing-power-collapses-sanctions-force-record-28-barrel-urals-discount-2603/). However, by March 2026, this discount had considerably diminished, with Urals trading at approximately **$91** per barrel when Brent was around **$100** per barrel, resulting in about a **$9** per barrel discount [[^]](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/03/09/iran-war-brent-urals-russia-oil-revenues/). Although this period marked one of Russia's most favorable oil weeks in years, the discount remained the deepest since 2023 [[^]](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/discount-for-russias-urals-crude-oil-is-deepest-since-2023-data-shows/articleshow/128573031.cms). Despite the prevailing discount, Russian crude oil's absolute selling price reached a 13-year high by April 2026, reflecting elevated global oil prices [[^]](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/07/russian-crude-oil-selling-at-13-year-high-a92449).

Sanctions effectively re-routed Russian oil to Asian markets. A major consequence of the sanctions regime has been Russia's substantial redirection of seaborne crude exports from traditional European markets to Asian destinations, primarily India and China. Notably, India's imports of Russian crude oil surged to a 9-month high in March 2026 [[^]](https://www.rediff.com/business/report/russian-crude-oil-imports-soar-to-9-month-high-in-march/20260401.htm). Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), including their February 2026 report, details these re-routing efforts and attests to the ongoing effectiveness of sanctions [[^]](https://energyandcleanair.org/february-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/). While Russia offers discounts to maintain export volumes, demonstrating the sanctions' effect on its traditional pricing power [[^]](https://www.ainvest.com/news/russia-oil-pricing-power-collapses-sanctions-force-record-28-barrel-urals-discount-2603/), the successful shift to new markets like India and China also highlights Russia's adaptability in sustaining its oil exports.

## What Does Managed Money WTI Crude Oil Positioning Indicate?

Primary Data Source | CFTC Commitments of Traders (COT) report [[^]](http://www.cftc.gov/dea/options/deaiceulof.htm) |
Data Purpose | Gauging speculative sentiment and crowding [[^]](https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/commodity-futures-positioning-silver-wti-crude-oil-cot-report-3-march-2026/) |
Current Numerical Data | Not available in provided research results [[^]](https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/commodity-futures-positioning-silver-wti-crude-oil-cot-report-3-march-2026/) |

**CFTC COT reports track 'Managed Money' WTI crude oil positioning**

CFTC COT reports track 'Managed Money' WTI crude oil positioning. The CFTC Commitments of Traders (COT) report is the definitive source for tracking the net positioning of 'Managed Money' in WTI crude oil futures and options markets [[^]](http://www.cftc.gov/dea/options/deaiceulof.htm). This data is crucial for understanding the aggregated speculative sentiment and potential **market** crowding by institutional investors, such as hedge funds. These 'Managed Money' positions reflect their overall bullish (net long) or bearish (net short) outlook on future price movements in WTI crude oil [[^]](https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/commodity-futures-positioning-silver-wti-crude-oil-cot-report-3-march-2026/).

Public sources analyze 'Managed Money' WTI crude oil positions. Numerous publicly available sources routinely publish and analyze this data, with reports from early 2026 specifically addressing commodity futures positioning in WTI crude oil [[^]](https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/commodity-futures-positioning-silver-wti-crude-oil-cot-report-3-march-2026/). However, the "Web Research Results" provided for this analysis did not contain the specific numerical values for the most current net positioning of 'Managed Money' in WTI crude oil futures and options from these reports [[^]](https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/commodity-futures-positioning-silver-wti-crude-oil-cot-report-3-march-2026/).

Specific net positions reveal speculative sentiment near key price levels. If available, these specific net long or net short positions would offer direct insights into speculative sentiment, particularly as WTI crude oil prices approach key psychological levels like **$90** and **$100**. A substantial net long position would typically signal strong bullish conviction and could indicate **market** crowding. Conversely, a significant reduction in net long exposure or a shift to a net short position would suggest waning bullish sentiment or an expectation of price consolidation or reversal [[^]](https://www.stonex.com/en/insights/commodity-futures-positioning-silver-wti-crude-oil-cot-report-3-march-2026/).

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Strike Date:** December 31, 2026
- **Expiration:** January 07, 2027
- **Closes:** December 31, 2026

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

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## Historical Resolutions

**Historical Resolutions:** 10 markets in this series

**Outcomes:** 7 resolved YES, 3 resolved NO

**Recent resolutions:**

- KXWTIMAX-26DEC31-T95: YES (Mar 13, 2026)
- KXWTIMAX-26DEC31-T90: YES (Mar 09, 2026)
- KXWTIMAX-26DEC31-T85: YES (Mar 09, 2026)
- KXWTIMAX-26DEC31-T80: YES (Mar 06, 2026)
- KXWTIMAX-26DEC31-T110: YES (Apr 03, 2026)

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.