# Will the NPVIC reach 270 electoral votes?

Before 2030

Updated: April 27, 2026

Category: Elections

Tags: US Elections

HTML: /markets/elections/us-elections/will-the-npvic-reach-270-electoral-votes/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact to reach 270 electoral votes before 2034, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - NPVIC actively targets states to secure 65 remaining electoral votes by 2030.** - Virginia joined the National Popular Vote Compact in 2020, adding 13 electoral votes.
- Michigan officially joined the Compact in February 2023, adding 15 electoral votes.
- Pro-NPVIC groups strategically target key state legislative chambers for passage.
- Opponents challenge the NPVIC primarily under the U.S. Constitution's Compact Clause.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** At 13c, **market** prices higher than the **11.6%** **model** estimate, suggesting overvaluation given NPVIC legislative challenges.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Before 2028 | 13.0% | 11.6% | Market higher by 1.4pp |
| Before 2030 | 12.0% | 11.6% | Market higher by 0.4pp |
| Before 2032 | 13.0% | 11.6% | Market higher by 1.4pp |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Before 2028 | 13.0% | 11.6% |
| Before 2030 | 12.0% | 11.6% |
| Before 2032 | 13.0% | 11.6% |
| Before 2034 | 17.0% | 15.1% |

- Expiration: January 1, 2034

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market, which asks if the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) will reach 270 electoral votes by 2030, has experienced a significant upward trend since its inception. The perceived probability began at a low of 3.0% on April 14, 2026, and has since more than quadrupled to its current price of 13.0%. The most substantial movement occurred between April 17 and April 22, when the price jumped from 5.0% to 13.0%. The provided context does not offer any specific news or developments to explain this sharp repricing.

The volume patterns suggest growing conviction behind the upward move. The initial price drift from 3.0% to 5.0% occurred on zero volume, indicating it may have been driven by changes in standing offers rather than active trading. However, the subsequent spike to 13.0% was accompanied by a notable volume of 29 contracts, the highest recorded in the sample data. This indicates that the sharp increase in perceived probability was backed by significant market activity, lending more weight to the new price level.

From a technical perspective, the market has established its initial support level at the starting price of 3.0%. The current price of 13.0% acts as a new resistance level and the all-time high. The price action demonstrates a clear shift in market sentiment, from highly skeptical to cautiously optimistic, though the absolute probability of the event occurring is still considered low. The market's collective assessment of the NPVIC's success has become substantially more positive in a very short period.

## Contract Snapshot

The market resolves to "Yes" if states that have enacted the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) possess at least 270 electoral votes before January 1, 2034. If this threshold is not met by January 1, 2034, the market resolves to "No." Electoral votes are counted based on apportionment at the time of enactment, excluding states that have withdrawn, had their membership invalidated by a final court ruling, or have unfulfilled conditional adoptions. The market will close early if the "Yes" condition is met, otherwise it closes on January 1, 2034, at 10:00 am EST.

## Market Discussion

Limited public discussion available for this market.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Before 2030 | 7.2% | 12% | 12% | $545 | $30 |
| Before 2028 | 8% | 14% | 13% | $260 | $92 |
| Before 2032 | 12% | 16% | 13% | $335 | $5 |
| Before 2034 | 17% | 20% | 17% | $282 | $84 |

## What is the Status of National Popular Vote Legislation in Key States?

Michigan HB 4156 Status | Passed House of Representatives [[^]](https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/votes/national-popular-vote-bill-advances-to-michigan-house) |
Minnesota HF 1395 Status | Already passed and joined NPVIC [[^]](https://nationalpopularvote.com/state/mn) |
Nevada AJR6A Status | Failed to pass in current session [[^]](https://saveourstates.com/blog/npv-fails-in-nevada) |

**Michigan's NPVIC bill, HB 4156, passed the House but lacks priority**

Michigan's NPVIC bill, HB 4156, passed the House but lacks priority. In Michigan, House Bill 4156, which proposes joining the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), has advanced through and passed the House of Representatives [[^]](https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/votes/national-popular-vote-bill-advances-to-michigan-house). However, the provided research does not explicitly detail a stated priority level for its passage from Governor Gretchen Whitmer or specific legislative leaders before the end of the 2025 session [[^]](https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/votes/national-popular-vote-bill-advances-to-michigan-house).

Minnesota enacted NPVIC legislation; Nevada's efforts stalled. Minnesota has already enacted legislation (HF 1395) to join the NPVIC, making it the 16th jurisdiction to do so [[^]](https://nationalpopularvote.com/state/mn). As the compact is already law in Minnesota, the question of its current priority level for passage before the end of the 2025 session is no longer applicable. Conversely, attempts to pass NPVIC legislation in Nevada, such as Assembly Joint Resolution 6A (AJR6A) [[^]](https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1766517), have failed [[^]](https://saveourstates.com/blog/npv-fails-in-nevada). The Nevada Legislature will not pass a National Popular Vote plan bill during the current year, 2025 [[^]](https://ballot-access.org/2025/05/12/nevada-legislature-wont-pass-national-popular-vote-plan-bill-this-year/), indicating that the NPVIC lacks sufficient support for advancement or is not a legislative priority in the ongoing session.

## What are the target states for the National Popular Vote Compact?

NPVIC Current Electoral Votes | 205 electoral votes [[^]](https://ballotpedia.org/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact) |
Key Targeted Legislative Chambers | Arizona House, Arizona Senate, New Hampshire House, Wisconsin Assembly, Wisconsin Senate [[^]](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/handicapping-the-2026-state-legislative-map-a-first-look/) |
Forecast for Targeted Chambers | Closely contested or challenging but competitive [[^]](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/handicapping-the-2026-state-legislative-map-a-first-look/) |

**Pro-NPVIC groups target key legislative chambers to secure electoral votes**

Pro-NPVIC groups target key legislative chambers to secure electoral votes. Organizations supporting the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) aim to accumulate 270 electoral votes for the compact to become effective, having currently secured 205 electoral votes from 16 states and the District of Columbia [[^]](https://ballotpedia.org/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact). To advance this objective, these groups often align with efforts to establish Democratic trifectas in states that have not yet joined the compact. For the 2024 and 2026 election cycles, key Republican-controlled state legislative chambers targeted for a flip to Democratic control include the Arizona House, Arizona Senate, New Hampshire House, Wisconsin Assembly, and Wisconsin Senate [[^]](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/handicapping-the-2026-state-legislative-map-a-first-look/). Other chambers, such as the Georgia House and Senate, and North Carolina House and Senate, are identified as more challenging "Deep Red" targets [[^]](https://www.dlcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/DLCC_2026_Opportunity_Memo_And_Chart.pdf).

Targeted chambers are highly competitive with significant financial backing. Current election forecasts indicate that the Arizona House and Arizona Senate are expected to feature "closely contested legislative elections" and are among the "most competitive" state legislative chambers in 2026 [[^]](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/handicapping-the-2026-state-legislative-map-a-first-look/). The New Hampshire House is also considered a "challenging target" for Democrats but remains competitive [[^]](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/handicapping-the-2026-state-legislative-map-a-first-look/). In Wisconsin, both the Assembly and Senate chambers are viewed as competitive, with the Assembly particularly so [[^]](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/handicapping-the-2026-state-legislative-map-a-first-look/). While specific fundraising differentials for individual chambers are not detailed in the available research, both the Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee (DLCC) and the Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC) have announced substantial investments and expanded target maps for the 2026 cycle, signaling significant financial commitment to these state legislative races [[^]](https://www.wispolitics.com/2026/republican-state-leadership-committee-announces-state-legislative-targets-for-2026/).

## What Are the Constitutional Challenges to the National Popular Vote Compact?

Primary Constitutional Argument | Compact Clause (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3) [[^]](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5065245) |
Secondary Constitutional Argument | Article II, Section 1 (State Legislature Power) [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact) |
Legal Scholar Consensus | Divided on validity of NPVIC challenges [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact) |

**Opponents, including groups like the Federalist Society, primarily challenge the NPVIC under the Compact Clause**

Opponents, including groups like the Federalist Society, primarily challenge the NPVIC under the Compact Clause. They contend that the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) fundamentally alters the presidential election process, constituting a "combination among the states" that circumvents the Electoral College without congressional consent [[^]](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5065245). This perspective suggests that the Compact diminishes individual state sovereignty, usurps federal authority over elections, and creates a de facto national government for presidential elections by binding member states to a national popular vote outcome. This shift in electoral power is seen as infringing upon the interests of non-compacting states and the federal structure [[^]](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5065245).

Beyond the Compact Clause, opponents raise additional constitutional arguments against the NPVIC. They argue it violates Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, which grants state legislatures power to appoint electors "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct" [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact). The argument posits that the Compact unconstitutionally delegates this legislative power, as the collective actions of other states would determine how a member state's electors cast their votes, rather than an independent choice by its own legislature [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact). Further concerns include potential violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's "one person, one vote" principle, due process, and equal protection, especially if a state's electoral votes are cast for a candidate not chosen by its own voters [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact).

Constitutional law scholars hold a divided legal consensus on the NPVIC's constitutionality. Among scholars who have published on the topic in the last five years, some support opponents, asserting the NPVIC clearly violates the Compact Clause due to its significant impact on federalism and election mechanics, thus requiring congressional consent [[^]](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5065245). Conversely, a substantial number of scholars argue the NPVIC does not violate the Compact Clause because it does not enhance the power of compacting states relative to the federal government or encroach on federal authority in a way that necessitates congressional consent [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact). These scholars often maintain that the Compact represents a legitimate exercise of state legislative power under Article II, Section 1 [[^]](https://nyujlpp.org/quorum/langsam-compact-clause-national-popular-vote/). The ongoing debate highlights fundamental disagreements over interpreting the Compact Clause and the boundaries of state legislative action within the constitutional framework [[^]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionality_of_the_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact).

## What is the National Popular Vote Compact Status in Key States?

Virginia NPVIC Status | Joined Compact in 2020 [[^]](http://nationalpopularvote.com/state/va) |
Total NPVIC Electoral Votes | 196 (from 16 states + DC) [[^]](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status) |
PA & AZ NPVIC Bills | Introduced in legislatures [[^]](https://www.pahouse.com/InTheNews/NewsRelease/?id=136250) |

**Virginia joined the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact in 2020**

Virginia joined the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact in 2020. On March 3, 2020, Virginia added its 13 electoral votes to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) [[^]](http://nationalpopularvote.com/state/va). This agreement among states pledges to award their electoral votes to the presidential candidate who wins the national popular vote, becoming effective once states totaling 270 electoral votes join [[^]](https://compacts.csg.org/compact/national-popular-vote-interstate-compact/). Currently, the Compact includes 16 states and the District of Columbia, collectively holding 196 electoral votes [[^]](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status).

Pennsylvania and Arizona introduced bills related to national popular vote. In Pennsylvania, the National Popular Vote Act was introduced in 2023 as House Bill 1481 and Senate Bill 980 [[^]](https://www.pahouse.com/InTheNews/NewsRelease/?id=136250). Similarly, Arizona has seen legislative proposals concerning the NPVIC, including HB2806 during the 2023-2024 session and HB4013 in the 2024-2025 session [[^]](https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1826839).

Research lacks specific legislator positions or concerns about impacts. The provided research, however, does not contain information regarding the publicly stated positions of individual moderate Democratic legislators in the Republican-controlled chambers of Pennsylvania or Arizona. Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that any legislators are withholding support for such measures due to concerns over down-ballot race impacts.

## What is the National Popular Vote Compact Status in Michigan and Arizona?

Michigan Voter Support | 66% (May 2024) [[^]](https://civiqs.com/results/national_popular_vote?annotations=true&uncertainty=true&zoomIn=true) |
Arizona Voter Support | 64% (May 2024) [[^]](https://civiqs.com/results/national_popular_vote?annotations=true&uncertainty=true&zoomIn=true) |
National NPVIC Electoral Votes | 205 electoral votes [[^]](https://ballotpedia.org/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact) |

**Michigan officially joined the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) in February 2023, contributing its 15 electoral votes after Governor Gretchen Whitmer signed related legislation into law [[^]](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state/mi)**

Michigan officially joined the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) in February 2023, contributing its 15 electoral votes after Governor Gretchen Whitmer signed related legislation into law [[^]](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state/mi). Although a direct voter initiative aiming to enact the compact for the 2024 ballot was proposed, it ultimately did not qualify due to an insufficient number of signatures [[^]](https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact_Initiative_(2024)). Despite the failure of the ballot initiative, polling data from May 2024 indicates that **66%** of Michigan residents support a national popular vote for president [[^]](https://civiqs.com/results/national_popular_vote?annotations=true&uncertainty=true&zoomIn=true).

In Arizona, efforts to adopt the NPVIC have primarily occurred through legislative channels, with House Bill 4013 and Senate Bill 1300 introduced in 2024 [[^]](https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1963424). However, these bills have not advanced beyond committee referrals, and there is currently no record of an actively qualifying direct ballot initiative for the NPVIC in the state [[^]](https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1963424). Notwithstanding the lack of legislative progress, a May 2024 poll shows significant public support, with **64%** of Arizonans favoring a national popular vote for president [[^]](https://civiqs.com/results/national_popular_vote?annotations=true&uncertainty=true&zoomIn=true).

Nationally, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been enacted by 16 states and the District of Columbia, collectively contributing 205 electoral votes toward the 270 required for the compact to take effect [[^]](https://ballotpedia.org/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact). Broad public opinion research consistently underscores widespread support for a national popular vote for president. A Pew poll, for instance, found that **63%** of American adults support either a constitutional amendment or the NPVIC specifically [[^]](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/63-support-national-popular-vote-president-pew-poll), with state-level polls frequently showing support exceeding **70%** in numerous states [[^]](http://nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers.php).

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Expiration:** January 01, 2028
- **Closes:** January 01, 2034

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

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## Historical Resolutions

No historical resolution data available for this series.

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.