# Crude oil (Brent) price on Apr 30, 2026 at 5pm EDT?

Apr 30, 2026 at 5pm EDT

Updated: April 28, 2026

Category: Commodities

Tags: Oil & Gas

HTML: /markets/commodities/oil-gas/crude-oil-brent-price-on-apr-30-2026-at-5pm-edt/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect the crude oil (Brent) price to be above **$80.99** on April 30, 2026 at 5pm EDT, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Robust supply growth from Permian and deepwater projects is projected.** - Brent crude forward curve flattened in early 2026, tempering prices.
- China's crude oil imports reached record highs in the second half of 2025.
- Permian new well oil production per rig projected to increase significantly.
- Brent forward curve largely remained in backwardation through early 2026.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** **Model**'s **98.8%** (1.8pp above 97c) offers a 1.0x payout, with tempered price increases expected.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| above $118.99 | 1.0% | 0.8% | Robust supply growth from Permian and deepwater projects is expected to temper crude oil price increases. |
| above $110.99 | 29.0% | 24.8% | Robust supply growth from Permian and deepwater projects is expected to temper crude oil price increases. |
| above $100.99 | 73.0% | 69.1% | Robust supply growth from Permian and deepwater projects is expected to temper crude oil price increases. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| above $118.99 | 1.0% | 0.8% |
| above $110.99 | 29.0% | 24.8% |
| above $100.99 | 73.0% | 69.1% |
| above $92.99 | 99.0% | 98.2% |
| above $104.99 | 54.0% | 49.0% |
| above 94.99 | 85.0% | 88.3% |
| above $102.99 | 69.0% | 64.8% |
| above $106.99 | 48.0% | 43.0% |
| above $96.99 | 90.0% | 88.2% |
| above $98.99 | 82.0% | 79.1% |
| above $116.99 | 19.0% | 15.7% |
| above $108.99 | 42.0% | 37.1% |
| above $84.99 | 99.0% | 98.6% |
| above $88.99 | 93.0% | 98.4% |
| above $114.99 | 7.0% | 15.8% |
| above $86.99 | 99.0% | 98.5% |
| above $90.99 | 99.0% | 98.3% |
| above $80.99 | 97.0% | 98.8% |
| above $112.99 | 18.0% | 15.9% |
| above $82.99 | 98.0% | 98.7% |

- Expiration: April 30, 2026

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market shows a general upward trend, with the probability starting at 80.0% and currently trading at 97.0%. However, the period between April 15 and April 22, 2026, was marked by extreme volatility. The price experienced a sharp 25.0 percentage point drop to 62.0% on April 15, followed by a powerful 28.0pp rebound to 90.0% the next day. This whiplash continued with a 13.0pp drop on the 17th, followed by two more significant spikes. Without specific news or external context provided, the direct causes for these rapid and substantial price swings cannot be determined from the chart data alone. These movements suggest traders were reacting strongly to unstated information or events during this brief period.

The total volume of 2,480 contracts indicates a moderate level of market participation over the contract's life. The price action has established a clear support level at the low of 62.0% and a resistance level near the high of 98.0%. The market has recently been trading consistently above 90.0%, suggesting this level has become a new floor. The current price of 97.0%, near the all-time high, reflects a very strong bullish sentiment. This implies that market participants have a high degree of confidence that the price of Brent crude will resolve above the market's specified threshold on April 30, 2026, despite the recent period of significant uncertainty.

## Significant Price Movements

### Outcome: above $84.99

#### 📈 April 27, 2026: 18.0pp spike

Price increased from 81.0% to 99.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

### Outcome: above $88.99

#### 📈 April 24, 2026: 10.0pp spike

Price increased from 80.0% to 90.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

#### 📈 April 23, 2026: 10.0pp spike

Price increased from 70.0% to 80.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

### Outcome: above $80.99

#### 📈 April 22, 2026: 12.0pp spike

Price increased from 81.0% to 93.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

### Outcome: above $86.99

#### 📈 April 21, 2026: 14.0pp spike

Price increased from 68.0% to 82.0%

**What happened:** No supporting research available for this anomaly.

## Contract Snapshot

This market resolves to "Yes" if the 1-minute candlestick close price for Brent crude oil on April 30, 2026, at 5 PM EDT is above $104.99 USD/Bbl; otherwise, it resolves to "No." The market closes at this resolution time, with a projected payout by 6 PM EDT on the same day. Settlement is based on data from Trading Economics, and the value is rounded to the nearest two decimal places.

## Market Discussion

Traders generally hold a bullish outlook for Brent crude oil, with several participants anticipating prices to exceed $100, and some predicting levels as high as $112 or $118.99. Key arguments for a "Yes" resolution include geopolitical developments like "reinforcements arriving in the Gulf" and a belief in a sustained upward trend for oil prices; no explicit arguments for "No" are provided. While discussion sentiment leans positive, market probabilities indicate decreasing confidence for Brent prices above $104.99 and $106.99, with recent drops suggesting some caution from the broader market.

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| above $100.99 | 73% | 76% | 73% | $17,420.27 | $9,273.8 |
| above $102.99 | 66% | 68% | 69% | $14,569.86 | $9,804.01 |
| above $104.99 | 52% | 54% | 54% | $16,869.06 | $11,607.05 |
| above $106.99 | 40% | 47% | 48% | $12,351.64 | $8,654.88 |
| above $108.99 | 31% | 37% | 42% | $8,444.46 | $5,456.54 |
| above $110.99 | 26% | 33% | 29% | $17,453.57 | $13,651.05 |
| above $112.99 | 9% | 19% | 18% | $4,552.26 | $2,709.24 |
| above $114.99 | 8% | 25% | 7% | $7,614.24 | $4,999.26 |
| above $116.99 | 9% | 19% | 19% | $9,251.47 | $4,755.18 |
| above $118.99 | 0% | 14% | 1% | $18,735.82 | $13,352.66 |
| above $80.99 | 98% | 99% | 97% | $4,746.26 | $2,192.79 |
| above $82.99 | 97% | 98% | 98% | $3,113.37 | $1,249.11 |
| above $84.99 | 97% | 99% | 99% | $8,228.71 | $4,444.03 |
| above $86.99 | 96% | 99% | 99% | $5,318.6 | $3,351.32 |
| above $88.99 | 91% | 99% | 93% | $7,874.23 | $4,456.75 |
| above $90.99 | 93% | 100% | 99% | $4,763.2 | $2,721.25 |
| above $92.99 | 86% | 97% | 99% | $16,876.35 | $9,021.71 |
| above 94.99 | 86% | 94% | 85% | $15,197.21 | $7,502.77 |
| above $96.99 | 88% | 92% | 90% | $11,547.62 | $6,516.48 |
| above $98.99 | 82% | 84% | 82% | $10,968.08 | $6,289.24 |

## What Are Q4 2025 Projections for OPEC Crude and Capacity?

IEA Q4 2025 'Call on OPEC Crude' | 29.8 mb/d [[^]](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-december-2025) |
OPEC Q4 2025 'Call on OPEC Crude' | 30.5 mb/d [[^]](https://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-monthly-oil-market-report-december-2025/) |
IEA Q4 2025 OPEC Spare Capacity | 3.0 mb/d [[^]](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-december-2025) |

**Projections for Q4 2025 'call on OPEC crude' vary among key agencies**

Projections for Q4 2025 'call on OPEC crude' vary among key agencies. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects the 'call on OPEC crude' for Q4 2025 at 29.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) [[^]](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-**market**-report-december-2025). In contrast, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) forecasts a higher 'call on OPEC crude' of 30.5 mb/d for the same period [[^]](https://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-monthly-oil-**market**-report-december-2025/). The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) does not provide a specific 'call on OPEC crude' for Q4 2025, but projects OPEC crude oil production to average 31.5 mb/d for the full year 2025, noting differences in methodology [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66904).

Estimates for OPEC's sustainable spare capacity show significant divergence for Q4 2025. The IEA estimates OPEC's sustainable spare production capacity at 3.0 mb/d [[^]](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-**market**-report-december-2025). OPEC, however, projects a higher sustainable spare production capacity of 4.5 mb/d for Q4 2025 [[^]](https://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-monthly-oil-**market**-report-december-2025/). The EIA estimates OPEC crude oil sustainable spare production capacity to be about 2.5 mb/d as of December 2025, with a total OPEC crude oil production capacity of 34.0 mb/d for that month [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66904).

These differing forecasts imply varied **market** tightness and supply flexibility for global oil supply. The IEA's lower 'call on OPEC crude' combined with its 3.0 mb/d spare capacity suggests a relatively tighter **market** outlook [[^]](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-**market**-report-december-2025). Conversely, OPEC's higher 'call' and 4.5 mb/d spare capacity indicate more flexibility within its production capabilities [[^]](https://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-monthly-oil-**market**-report-december-2025/). The EIA's even lower spare capacity estimate of 2.5 mb/d suggests the tightest **market** conditions among the assessments, particularly if actual production approaches its projected 2025 average [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66904).

## How Did China's Crude Oil Imports and SPR Additions Evolve in H2 2025?

2025 Full Year Avg. Crude Oil Imports | 11.27 million bpd [[^]](https://today.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/) |
2025 December Crude Oil Imports | 12.04 million bpd [[^]](https://today.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/) |
H2 2025 SPR Additions | Sustained and elevated due to new storage capacity [[^]](https://www.breakwaveadvisors.com/insights/2026/2/4/new-storage-tanks-to-lift-chinas-crude-stockpiling-demand) |

**China's crude oil imports reached record highs in the second half of 2025 (H2 2025), contributing to a robust year**

China's crude oil imports reached record highs in the second half of 2025 (H2 2025), contributing to a robust year. The full year 2025 saw an average of 11.27 million barrels per day (bpd) in total crude oil imports [[^]](https://today.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/). In December 2025, inflows climbed even higher to 12.04 million bpd [[^]](https://today.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/). These record levels throughout 2025 indicate an increase compared to the 2023-2024 average, although specific average figures for the 2023-2024 period were not detailed [[^]](https://today.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-2025-oil-imports-december-inflows-both-hit-record-highs-2026-01-14/).

China significantly expanded its strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) in H2 2025, sustaining elevated additions. This was primarily driven by new storage tanks becoming operational throughout 2025, supporting a prolonged period of increased crude oil stockpiling demand [[^]](https://www.breakwaveadvisors.com/insights/2026/2/4/new-storage-tanks-to-lift-chinas-crude-stockpiling-demand). The overall trend for 2025 demonstrated China's active build-out of its strategic reserves, leading to its position as holding the largest strategic oil inventories globally [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67504). This continuous expansion of reserves during 2025 represented a significant **market** factor [[^]](https://www.ainvest.com/news/chinese-spr-build-commodity-**market**-implications-strategic-moves-2026-2509/).

## What are the Permian Basin oil production and DUC forecasts for 2025?

Permian Oil Production (2025 Forecast) | 6.7 million b/d [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/TODAYINENERGY/detail.php?id=62884) |
Permian Oil Production (2024 Forecast) | 6.2 million b/d [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/TODAYINENERGY/detail.php?id=62884) |
Permian DUC Inventory (Early 2024) | Over 1,000 DUCs [[^]](https://www.enverus.com/newsroom/duc-hunt-what-the-2025-drawdown-means/) |

**Permian new well oil production per rig is projected to increase significantly in 2025**

Permian new well oil production per rig is projected to increase significantly in 2025. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts an upward trend in new well oil production per rig in the Permian Basin for 2025, driven primarily by ongoing improvements in drilling efficiency and well-level productivity [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/tODAyinenergy/detail.php?id=64124). The EIA anticipates overall Permian crude oil production to rise considerably, reaching an annual average of 6.7 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2025, up from an expected 6.2 million b/d in 2024 [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/TODAYINENERGY/detail.php?id=62884). This growth is projected to occur even with relatively low rig counts, indicating that operators are consistently extracting more oil per well through strategies such as drilling longer laterals and completing more stages [[^]](https://www.eia.gov/tODAyinenergy/detail.php?id=64124).

Permian DUC inventory is anticipated to gradually draw down into 2025. The Permian Basin commenced 2024 with over 1,000 drilled but uncompleted (DUC) wells, reflecting an increase of more than 200 from the beginning of 2023 [[^]](https://www.enverus.com/newsroom/duc-hunt-what-the-2025-drawdown-means/). According to Enverus Intelligence Research, the Permian DUC count is expected to experience a slight increase through the first quarter of 2024. Following this period, the inventory is projected to flatten and then undergo a gradual drawdown throughout the remainder of 2024 and into 2025 [[^]](https://www.enverus.com/newsroom/duc-hunt-what-the-2025-drawdown-means/). The existing DUC balance represents an estimated **$8** billion in completions capital, which could be deployed, particularly if favorable oil prices incentivize increased completion activity [[^]](https://www.enverus.com/newsroom/duc-hunt-what-the-2025-drawdown-means/).

## What Are Supermajor Deepwater Project Investment Trends and Breakeven Costs?

Guyana Deepwater Breakeven | $30-$40 per barrel (bbl) [[^]](https://www.ainvest.com/news/exxon-permian-guyana-growth-edge-30-40-breakeven-moat-supply-demand-tensions-rise-2603/) |
Upstream FIDs Outlook | Projected to increase in 2024 [[^]](https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/2024-press-releases/as-project-economics-rebound-upstream-fids-to-increase-in-2024-with-focus-on-deepwater-resources/) |
Project Approvals Forecast | Expected to top $100 billion by 2026 [[^]](https://oilnow.gy/featured/slb-sees-2026-project-approvals-topping-100-billion-with-guyana-offshore-a-key-growth-area/) |

**Supermajors maintain a stringent investment hurdle rate for deepwater projects**

Supermajors maintain a stringent investment hurdle rate for deepwater projects. An implied investment hurdle rate for new long-cycle deepwater projects, particularly in regions like Guyana, is indicated by supermajors' highly selective approach. For example, projects operated by a major in Guyana are estimated to have a breakeven point between **$30** and **$40** per barrel [[^]](https://www.ainvest.com/news/exxon-permian-guyana-growth-edge-30-40-breakeven-moat-supply-demand-tensions-rise-2603/). This low breakeven price demonstrates a commitment to sanctioning only projects with robust economics and high returns, reflecting a stringent internal hurdle rate for significant capital deployment in deepwater developments.

Recent Final Investment Decisions signal increasing deepwater project commitments. Recent trends in Final Investment Decisions (FIDs) suggest a significant shift towards increased investment in deepwater resources. Upstream FIDs are projected to rise in 2024 due to a rebound in project economics, with a particular focus on deepwater initiatives in regions such as Guyana, Brazil, and the US Gulf of Mexico [[^]](https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/2024-press-releases/as-project-economics-rebound-upstream-fids-to-increase-in-2024-with-focus-on-deepwater-resources/). For instance, Guyana has seen FIDs for major developments like Hammerhead, valued at US**$6.8** billion [[^]](https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/exxonmobil-reaches-fid-us68bn-hammerhead-project-guyana.html), and the Uaru and Whiptail projects, which represent some of the largest investments in Guyana's history and are on track for start-up in 2026-2027 [[^]](https://oilnow.gy/news/guyanas-uaru-and-whiptail-projects-on-track-for-2026-to-2027-start-up-routledge/). Industry forecasts anticipate that total project approvals could exceed **$100** billion by 2026, with offshore Guyana remaining a key growth area [[^]](https://oilnow.gy/featured/slb-sees-2026-project-approvals-topping-100-billion-with-guyana-offshore-a-key-growth-area/).

Rising deepwater FIDs mitigate structural underinvestment concerns and ensure future supply. This increase in FIDs, coupled with a focus on projects offering low breakeven costs, confirms that supermajors are actively sanctioning developments that meet their stringent economic criteria. While the high hurdle rate ensures capital discipline, the rising number of FIDs indicates a strategic move away from the structural underinvestment observed in prior periods. Projects like Uaru and Whiptail, which are slated for 2026-2027 start-ups, will directly contribute to global crude oil supply around that timeframe [[^]](https://oilnow.gy/news/guyanas-uaru-and-whiptail-projects-on-track-for-2026-to-2027-start-up-routledge/). Therefore, current FID trends reflect an increasing commitment to deepwater developments, aimed at bringing significant new production online in the mid-term future.

## Was Brent Crude Oil in Backwardation in Late 2025-Early 2026?

Brent Crude Curve State | Predominantly in backwardation [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/market-trends-oil-futures-backwardation.html) |
Period of Backwardation | Late 2025 and early 2026 [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/market-trends-oil-futures-backwardation.html) |
CFTC COT Report Analysis | No analysis available from provided research [[^]](http://www.cftc.gov/dea/options/deaiceulof.htm) |

**During late 2025 and early 2026, the Brent crude oil forward curve largely remained in backwardation**

During late 2025 and early 2026, the Brent crude oil forward curve largely remained in backwardation. This **market** structure meant that near-term futures contracts traded at a premium compared to those with later maturities [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/**market**-trends-oil-futures-backwardation.html), typically signaling expectations of tighter immediate supply relative to the long term [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/**market**-trends-oil-futures-backwardation.html). At times, this backwardation was noted to have "sharpened" [[^]](https://commodity-board.com/wti-and-brent-rally-steepens-backwardation-and-fuels-product-tightness/), with the oil **market** explicitly described as being in backwardation as of March 2026 [[^]](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/**market**-trends-oil-futures-backwardation.html). By April 2026, however, the curve displayed signs of flattening following an earlier war-driven price spike, indicating a potential easing of front-end tightness or a reduction in the steepness of this backwardation [[^]](https://commodity-board.com/crude-oil-futures-tumble-as-curve-flattens-after-war-driven-spike/).

CFTC data did not provide explicit **market** expectation analysis. Regarding the positioning of commercial hedgers versus managed money in the CFTC's Commitments of Traders (COT) report, the research included links to raw data for ICEU (Combined) [[^]](http://www.cftc.gov/dea/options/deaiceulof.htm) and Petroleum (Futures Only) for January 13, 2026 [[^]](https://www.cftc.gov/files/dea/cotarchives/2026/futures/petroleum_lf011326.htm). However, these provided sources did not offer an analysis or interpretation of this specific CFTC data, nor did they summarize what the respective positioning of these categories might suggest about broader industry expectations. Therefore, based exclusively on the information presented, a conclusion cannot be drawn concerning the **market** expectations indicated by these specific CFTC Commitments of Traders categories [[^]](http://www.cftc.gov/dea/options/deaiceulof.htm).

## What Could Change the Odds

**Key takeaway.** Catalyst analysis unavailable.

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Expiration:** May 07, 2026
- **Closes:** April 30, 2026

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Catalyst analysis unavailable.

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## Historical Resolutions

No historical resolution data available for this series.

## Disclaimer

This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, legal, or trading advice.
Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

### Data Sources & Model Transparency

**Data Sources:** Octagon Deep Research aggregates information from multiple sources including news, filings, and market data.

**Freshness:** Analysis is generated periodically and may not reflect the latest developments. Verify critical information from primary sources.